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ABSTRACT
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY, An Evaluation of Public
Policy Since 1923 by Malcolm D. Rivkin
Submitted to the Department of City and Regional Planning
on Feb. 7, 1964 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
In early stages of a nation's economic growth, industry,
commercial activity, educational institutions, and other
forms of modern development tend to concentrate at one or
two large urban centers. The growth process becomes
localized in these "national" centers, from which few
modernizing influences penetrate to other parts of the
country. This concentration and the problems to which it
leads are reviewed. Western experience is compared with that
of contemporary developing nations, and distinctions are
drawn. Characteristics of regions experiencing sustained
growth are described. Two principles are established as a
basis for government efforts to create new growth regions
outside national centers; (1) selective concentration of
investment and attention in a few areas of high resource
potential, (2) continuous effort over long periods of time
to guide the selected regions through the growth process.
Ever since the Republic began in 1923, Turkish government
has emphasized extension of development from the traditional
centers of Istanbul and Izmir. The objectives and organiza-
tion of public programs during this period are discussed and
their results evaluated. Creation of Ankara as a viable
national capital and cultural center is cited as the single
most successful effort. Outside of Ankara, development
activity was widely dispersed. Government did not follow a
consistent policy of providing certain regions with sufficient
complementary advantages for sustained growth to occur.
Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara continued to draw the bulk of
modern economic activity and the modernizing elite, despite
heavy public expenditures elsewhere.
Zonguldak Province, a coal-and-steel producing area, is
analyzed as an example of a region which received extensive
public investment since 1923. Zonguldak's failure to achieve
sustained growth is traced to larger national weaknesses in
policy formation and organization.
Lessons on policy and organization for regional development
are distilled from the Turkish experience for possible
application to other nations.
Thesis Supervisor: John R.P. Friedmann
Title: Associate Professor of City and Regional Planning
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INTRODUCTION
I. The Problem Summarized
A. Focus of Research
This is a study of one nationts efforts over a
generation to spread urbanization and economic
development beyond the small area where most of its
modernizing influences had been concentrated. Although
a specific analysis of Turkey, it is also relevant to
the many developing countries that are today adopting
programs to promote decentralized growth. Our chief
concerns are:
1. The nature of Turkish governmental policies
towards decentralized development between 1923
and 1962.
2. The degree to which these policies resulted in
activation of new growth regions (outside the
traditional centers of Istanbul and Izmir)
whose economic and social transformation possessed
a dynamic and self-generating character.
Primary theoretical interest lies with the process
whereby governments can attempt to change backward
areas into growth regions. The case of Turkey is employed
2.
to illustrate some general principles on this question
which are put forth in Chapter One.
B. Urban Concentration and Alternative Responses
In the early stages of a nation's economic growth,
industry, commercial activity, educational institutions
and other forms of modern development tend to concentrate
at one or two large urban centers. The growth process
becomes localized in these "national" centers, from which
few modernizing influences penetrate to other parts of
the country. As a consequence, severe social, economic
and political strains arise both between the national
centers and the hinterland and within the national
centers themselves.
A government confronted with this geographic con-
centration of its dynamic modern sector has an option
of adopting one of two basic approaches to the spatial
allocation of new investment.
1. Continuing the trend towards concentration by
making its major capital expenditures and other
efforts to encourage development within the
national centers.
2. Attempting to stimulate the emergence of new
growth areas in other parts of the nation by
decentralizing development efforts.
The decentralized approach can itself take a form
somewhere between two extremes of broad, overall policy:
3 .
1. Dispersion. Investment resources and incentives
are spread widely over the nation. Some modern
activity is given to a great number of locations
in the expectation that this "seeding" process
will result in activation of new growth regions.
2. Selective Concentration. Only a few areas with
relatively high development potential are
selected for special treatment. Many forms of
related industrial, agricultural, educational,
transport and other public programs are concen-
trated in these areas in an attempt to overhaul
thoroughly their economic and social structure.
Concern with the problems of concentration at
national centers and with appropriate policy responses to
its occurrence are among the most pressing issues that
face developing nations. In the postwar period, several
such as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Venezuela, Israel, and
Nigeria have embarked on attempts to stimulate decentralized
growth. These efforts are relatively recent and any
evaluation must perforce be made on a tentative basis.
II. The Relevance of Turkey
Turkey is a rare example of a developing country with
a long history of government policy directed towards
decentralized urbanization and economic institutions.
Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the
Kemalist revolution of 1919, Constantinople (Istanbul)
4.
had been "the center of all Tnrkish affairs, economic,
political and industrial as well as military. There was
no other city in the country to replace it, no network
of roads and railways which would have enabled the Army
and the government to have rapidly regrouped in another
place." (1) Only the agricultural export center of
Smyrna (Izmir) on the Aegean coast was able to offer some
competition. Constantinople held a virtual monopoly of
the modern industry, commercial activity and education
that existed in Turkey. Smyrna took most of what remained.
Once the Republic was established in 1923, the new
government began to devote major energies and investments
to a build-up of urban centers in the Turkish interior.
Four specific programs were attempted:
1. Creation of a new administrative and cultural
capital at Ankara.
2. Transformation of many provincial towns into
modern cities by making them governmental and
cultural centers for their respective hinter-
lands and by initiating extensive municipal
construction projects.
3. Extension of railroad lines to provicial towns,
connecting them with Ankara and the Western
coast.
4. Establishment of large industries, owned and
operated by the state, in many interior centers.
5 .
After Ataturk's death in 1933. Turkey continued to
pursue decentralization programs. Although the programst
character underwent changes, and the degree to which they
were emphasized by subsequent governments differed, there
is enough evidence to conclude that decentralized growth
has been a significant aspect of public policy from 1923
to the present day.
Turkey's experience is particularly relevant to
problems of developing nations outside the Communist
Bloc, since private enterprise has played an important
role in the modern state. Indeed, much of the public
decentralization effort was undertaken to open a way for
private entrepreneurs to follow.
Thus, Turkey provides a period of almost 40 years
in which it is possible to analyze the goals, priorities,
and organization of a country's conscious effort to
extend development beyond initial points of concentration.
Chapters Two-Four will deal with this analysis.
For a full understanding of the Turkish experience,
we should examine specific regions which were targets of
decentralization measures. Unfortunately, data for most
of these areas are lacking. However, it is possible to
analyze in detail the outcome in one province, clearly
backward in 1923 and subsequently the focus of intensive
development efforts. This is Zonguldak, a coal-and-steel
producing area, the subject of a 1961-62 Ministry of
Reconstruction study in which the writer participated.
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Chapters Five and Six will treate Zonguldak as a case
region where public activities, similar to those applied
elsewhere in the country, were aimed at creating economic
growth.
III. Some Signs of Change
A superficial glance at available statistics is
enough to demonstrate that urban and industrial decen-
tralization have indeed been significant during the
Republic's existence.
Turkey's first census was taken -in 1927, four years
after Ankara was officially declared the capital. Total
population of the country was then 13.6 million (2).
About 16 percent lived in cities over 10,000 in population,
and 8 percent in cities over 50,000.
Istanbul (691,000) and Izmir (154,000) were the only
cities over 100,000 in size.*
Istanbul, its suburbs and the other towns of the
Marmara Region** accounted for 43 percent of the nation's
*Ataturk abolished the Greek names of Constantinople and
Smyrna. According to Ak9ura's estimate (3), at the turn
of the century, Constantinople's population was over
1,000,000 and Smyrna's 300,000. War, the exodus of Greek
and other minorities, plus the transfer of government to
Ankara had reduced the population in these two centers by
1927. Ankara, a town of 25,000 in 1919, was already
75,000 at the time of the census.
**The Marmara Region comprises those provinces which
border on the Sea of Marmara plus the remainder of Thrace.
See Appendix A for a discussion of the breakdown of gross
geographic regions used in the study to illustrate
population change.
populace in cities over 10,000 and 72 percent in those
over 50,000. Two of the country's five cities over
50,000 (Istanbul and Bursa) were in the Marmara Region.
By the census of 1960, total population had slightly
more than doubled and stood at 27.8 million. Population
in cities over 10,000 had tripled and had increased
three-and-one half times in cities over 50,000.
Istanbul (1,500,000) was still the largest city
but had grown roughly at the same rate as the national
population itself. The Marmara region now had only 31
percent of Turkey's population in cities over 10,000 and
only 39 percent in cities over 50,000. Ankara (650,000)
had passed Izmir (400,000) to become the country's
second largest city.
Marked urbanization had occurred in the interior
regions.- These regions now held a substantially higher
proportion of Turkey's urban population, even though
their share of total population was roughly the same in
1960 as it had been in 1927.*
By 1960 a total of 27 cities had passed the 50,000
mark, only five of which were in the Marmara Region.
Seven of the nine communities that had reached 100,000
or more were outside Marmara.
*Demographic information is discussed in detail in
sections of Chapters Two, Three, and Four dealing with
changes to the pattern of urbanization. The reader is
invited to examine maps and tables in these sections.
7.
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Turkey remained a predominantly agricultural nation
throughout this period; nevertheless, it underwent
important industrial expansion as the result of government
and private investment. Istanbul was still the largest
industrial centerbut in 1956 contained only 30 percent
of the plants with over 10 workers, as contrasted with
its near monopoly of manufacturing at the Republic's
start. (4) Izmir was the second largest seat of industry,
but Ankara and interior cities such as Adana, Kayseri,
Sivas, Karabuk, Malatya and Erzurum now had major national
factories.
IV. A Basis for Evaluation
These and other available statistics can illustrate
that significant decentralization has occurred in Turkey
since 1923. Yet such figures provide only the bare bones
of analysis. They are unable to tell us how "effective"
Turkey's-decentralization efforts have been. Nor are
they sufficient indicators of the degree to which measures
implemented in Turkey might possess transfer value for
other nations interested in decentralization policies.
Are the new urban and industrial areas in reality
fountainheads of dynamic economic and social development?
To answer this question we must first have some criteria
for judgment. Chapter One reviews the problems of urban
concentration in detail and proposes a basis for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of decentralization policies.
9.
CHAPTER ONE
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
"Urbanization is a critical process in
the development of the modern nation
state. Historically, all complex and
advanced civilizations have sprung from
the city, and in the contemporary world,
urban life is the dynamic basis for most
of the activities and processes we
associate with modernity and economic
progress. Therefore, any systematic
effort to transform traditional societies
into modern nations must envisage the
development of cities and modern urban
societies."
- Lucien Pye (1)
This study is based on the assumption of an intimate
relationship between urbanization and economic growth.
Our first order of business will be a review of factors
leading to concentration of modernizing institutions at
one or two large urban centers during the early stages
of a nation's economic development.
I. Concentration at National Centers
A. The Pre-Industrial Period
Kingsley Davis, in a pioneering analysis of
urbanization rates for many countries, both developed
and developing, reached two fundamental conclusions
10.
regarding urbanization during a nation's pre-industrial
period. (2)
1. During this period the proportion of urban to
rural population is quite small.
2. The rate of change in urban population (increase
or decrease) is relatively slow.
Before industrialization, the bulk of a nation's
populace is agricultural. Primitive peasants are tied
to the land, their horizons bound by the boundaries of
their fields, their aspirations couched to the vagaries
of rainfall, drought, and tax collection. They have
little need or thought of cities. Oscar Handlin paints
a picture in The Uprooted (3) of the fatalistic peasant
whose life is governed by the rhythm of the seasons that
could fit the Turk, or Persian, or Indian as well as the
pre-industrial European whom Handlin describes.
Towns do arise in this period, however; for market,
religious, administrative, or military reasons. Their
functions are primarily those of control or commerce.
Their populations tend to be small and confined to
soldiers, clergy, artisans, merchants, landowners,
tax-collectors and other government officials. (4)
In Turkey, over centuries a thoroughfare for east-west
caravans, many of these towns served as stopping-places
a day's journey apart along the principal caravan routes.
11.
The pre-industrial market towns exerted a "non-
competitive" influence over villages in their hinterlands.
Any business that the villagers had to do was done in the
town or with its residents. The town was the sole or
principal contact point between the peasant culture and
any other form of civilization.
As a result, a nation was frequently one whose
citizens felt small allegiance to a central government
or national purpose. It was rather more a collection of
these individual market towns and their rural hinterlands,
each self-contained as to economic and social activity.
Friedmann (5) terms this spatial pattern one of isolated
regional economies and notes that it was prevalent in
Venezuela before the 20th century exploitation of oil.
"Venezuela can be said to have consisted at
the beginning of the oil period of a number
of more or less closed regional economies
which had but little commerce among them-
selves and which could be governed from the
center only with difficulty."
Vernon (6) describes a similar pattern for 19th
century Mexico,* and Robinsont s picture of Turkey before
*Vernon comments: "In the case of Mexico, the tendency
to regionalism was aggravated by the country's disconcerting
geography.. The geography of the country not only handi-
capped the overland movement of goods, but also encouraged
the retention of major linguistic and cultural differences.
The physical scene was such as to challenge the authority
of any central government. Local rebellion was easy;
and wherever local rebels gained autonomy, they usually
imposed the only kind of law they knew--systems of
monopoly and personal privilege.... At times, too, the
local authorities levied taxes on goods that tried to
leave their areas.... Mexico was divided into an infinite
number of tiny markets."
12.
the Republic (See Chapter Two) depicts a practically
identical situation.
One or two large cities may exist during the pre-
industrial period. A country or Empire may have foreign
trade, and entrepots are necessary. A royal government
must be headquartered. A colonial power needs a central
base of control. In many cases, the locus of functions
for international trade, national government and artisanry
coincided to result in large, fairly stable urban centers
before the industrial revolution. (7) London, Paris,
Rio, Peking, Bombay, Buenos Aires, Djakarta were but a
few. Like Constantinople before the Republic, each of
these was "The Town" of its nation.
B. Industrialization and the Center
When Industrialization begins, enterprises not bound
to raw materials sites, tend to concentrate at a few
points. These are usually the few large, diversified
centers established during the pre-industrial period.
A 1954 United Nations economic survey of continental
Europe and the Mediterranean points out the high degree
of coincidence between older administrative and trading
centers and heavy concentrations of industrial employment
in modern times. (8)
Several reasons account for this early tendency to
agglomerate.
1. Entrepreneurship comes often from the commercial
and trading classes already established in the
centers and who have been most exposed to
contact with other, more advanced societies.
2. If the new industries rely on importation of
raw material or machinery, location at the port
or other major transportation junction is most
accessible to sources of supply.
3. The few financial and commercial institutions
that exist in pre-industrial times are usually
in the largest centers.
4. Access of entrepreneurs to high government
officials (for a variety of reasons, from
obtaining permission to build plants to offering
bribes for import permits) is often essential.
5. The existing large cities offer a more concen-
trated and immediately accessible market than
elsewhere. (Peasants with low income are
unlikely to provide an early market for manu-
factured goods.)
6. The labor supply, while not necessarily trained
for industrial pursuits, nevertheless contains
artisans and others with skills who can form a
nucleus for an industrial labor force.
A significant factor of risk exists to influence
entrepreneurial choice. Entrepreneurship involves
13.
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assumption of risk for the long-run chance of profit.
Particularly in the early stages of industrial growth,
with undeveloped markets, untrained labor, and little in
the way of infra-structure, with communication to outlying
regions rudimentary or non-existent, risk is minimized
when maximum accessibility to the best opportunities for
markets, labor, transport, and utilities is maintained.
1. External Economies
Once the pattern of industrial concentration takes
effect, it tends to become self-reinforcing. If industrial
investment shows signs of profitability, more industry
proceeds to agglomerate with the first. Gunnar Myrdal (9)
offers the following explanation of the process:
"In the centers of expansion, increased
demand will spur investment which in its turn
will increase incomes and demand and cause
a second round of investment, and so on."
External economies are created which act as further
incentives to concentration:
Hirschman notes (10) that industrial demands for
services and utilities in the large centers result in
major governmental infra-structure investments, which
make these centers even more attractive for new industries.
After the initial spurt of development, a labor
force becomes trained and available to train other
workers. New credit institutions may be established,
reinforcing the center's position as the main or sole
source for financing of enterprises.
lffiw _ - - --- ---- __ , ___
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The very reasons that brought development of manu-
facturing to the city or region it dominates are now
magnified; and growth of new operations at this focus of
national development leads to a populace with an increasing
diversity of skills and interests.
Education is necessary to staff the top echelons of
the enterprises, as well as of government and commerce,
themselves faced with increasing complexities of function.
Therefore, it is at the center that creation of universities,
training schools and other specialized institutions tends
to take place.
Here too is the market for theatres, museums, and
other sophisticated forms of entertainment; and the
major hospitals and law offices; the service enterprises
which can build a clientele where substantial basic
employment and income levels exist.
Development at the center reaches out to produce
changes in the nearby rural hinterland as well. The
growing urban market exerts pressure on subsistence
agriculture for conversion to cash-crop farming which
can supply its needs for milk, perishable vegetables and
fruits where climate and soil conditions allow. Capital
from the center also becomes available for hinterland
agricultural investment. According to Myrdal and the
UN European survey, the greatest impetus to modernize
agricultural practice occurs in the vicinity of the
large urban center. (11) This conclusion parallels
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findings of Nicholl and Tang (12) in the Southern USA
that most diversified and profitable agricultre is conducted
near the industrial cities.
In some nations these great centers of development
have been single cities and their hinterlands, such as
Buenos Aires for Argentina, Athens for Greece, Lisbon
for Portugal. In others two or more city regions may
vie for dominance--Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Brazil,
Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt. But in most cases of early
industrial growth, whether the magnets be one or a few,
countries seem to be similar in that the major impetus
for and institutions of development are "localized" in
a relatively small area.
Presence of opportunity at these cities make them
chief targets for rural migration. Bauer's observations
indicate that large, established centers experience the
greatest amount of population increase during the early
industrialization period. (13)
Yet population growth is not the most striking
manifestation of the centers' attraction. Of much more
fundamental significance is the continued concentration
of a nation's modernizing institutions and influences to
the virtual exclusion of most other areas.
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2. Evidence of Concentration
Evidence has been gathered from a number of national
centers to indicate their unusually high proportion of the
nation's industry telative to population.* Yet the imbalance
has been measured in other'activities as.well.. The-UN's
European Economic Survey (17) comments on the heavy
concentration of credit facilities and technical training
schools in center regions with a commensurate paucity
outside. Friedmann (18) cites the case of Rio de Janeiro
and Sao Paulo with 20 percent of Brazil's population and
57 percent of its professional workers. The situation
of pre-Republican Turkey, where Constantinople held
every one of Turkey's secular institutions of higher
education except some minor military academies, is by
no means unique, even to the present day.
*Baghdad, for example, in 1954 accounted for eight percent
of Iraq's population. At the same time it held 20 percent
of Iraq's industrial enterprises and 36 percent of its
industrial workers. Even more strikingly, Baghdad possessed
51.5 percent of the industries with 100 or more employees
each and 61 percent of the number of workers in these
firms. It had 58 percent of the country's annual
industrial payroll, and 66 percent of total value of
machinery excluding that of the oil fields. (14)
Calcutta and Bombay between themselves held 14 percent
of India's urban population in 1951, yet contained
together almost one-half India's industrial establishments. (15)
Cairo and Alexandria, for another example, contained 16
percent of Egypt's population in 1947 and 54 percent of
its industrial employment. (14) In neighboring Israel,
Tel Aviv had 21 percent of national population and 40
percent of industrial employment. (16)
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The large center is the incubdb$ of modernization.
Friedmann terms it the "central stage where the drama of
socio-economic transformation is carried out." (19)
Hoselitz, summing up what he considers the agreement among
students of urbanization, suggests that
".. to the extent to which the process of
modernization is mediated through urban
centers, the larger cities play a more
crucial role....in general, the larger the
city, the more important is its general
mediating function in the process of social
change and acculturation. To some extent,
therefore, the rapidity with which a
country modernizes, or at least with which
psychological attitudes favorable to
modernization are created, is dependent
on the growth of its cities and especially
the large cities." (20)
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II. The Center-Periphery Conflict
A. Economic, Social, and Political Strains
As the process of concentration occurs, severe
economic, sociaL and political strains arise between the
national center and the rest of the country. Similar
problems faced wealthy Western nations in their initial
growth periods, but the difficulties of newly developing
countries in this respect appear to be more severe with
less possibility of easy resolution.
Industrialization and the consequent accelerated
movement of people from countryside to the national
center magnify economic and social differences between the
center and the nation outside. The faster the progress
at and movement towards the center, the faster are
differences magnified.
The national center develops increasing economic
strength and cultural diversity, while hinterland
regions, still engaged in their traditional form of
life and economy, appear to stagnate.
Perloff, Friedmann and others (21) have graphically
termed this a center-periphery relationship in which the
entire nation becomes peripheral to the main urban centers,
contributing men and material to their continuing progress
and receiving little in return. Iyrdal suggests that a
"centripetal" process of investment, consumption, and
re-investment begins to build up momentum for sustained
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internal development of the center, leaving the nation
outside in a backwater.
".. the ever-increasing internal and external
economies interpreted in the widest sense of the
word to include... .a working population
trained in the various crafts, easy communi-
cations, the feeling of growth and elbow
room, and the spirit of new enterprise--
fortified and sustained their continuous
growth at the expense of other localities
and regions where instead relative stagnation
or regression became the pattern." (22)
Economic dualism occurs as a result of the increasing
marginal rates of return on investment at the center
and the perfection of its market in the face of stag-
nation at the periphery. The more attractive investment
at the center becomes, the fewer attractions exist for
investment in the periphery. Morris and Myrdal (23)
cite great difficulties involved in attempts to indus-
trialize Southern Europe because of its inability to
compete successfully with the highly-urbanized production
areas to the North. The UN European Economic Survey
found that credit facilities for possible entrepreneurs
in the poorer regions were practically non-existent (24)
and concluded that education and even agriculture--the
traditional economic activity--were making far slower
progress outside of the central regions.
Per capita income is a significant indicator of
economic dualism. Incame and consumption levels of
main urban centers tend to be far higher than elsewhere
in the developing countries. No matter how marginal the
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work which a city-bound migrant discovers, chances are
that he will obtain higher material standards than the
subsistence peasant. It is this factor of higher material
standards that the Indian economist Chaudhuri cites in
caution against too-zealous governmental efforts to
restrict rural-urban migration. (25)
A most revealing picture of income imbalance is
presented in Map I-1. Here the regional distribution of
per capita income in the less-developed European and
Mediterranean countries is contrasted with that of the
wealthy northern nations. A presentation of results from
the UN European Economic Survey, the map indicates far
greater disparity of wealth between the large urban centers
and the hinterland in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece,
Yugoslavia and Turkey than in the northern countries.
These richer nations have pockets of economic backwardness
as well, but experience a significant spread of wealth
from the center.
Economic imbalance is not entirely a question of
imperfectly distributed natural resources or scarcity of
capital. Many of the developing nations have rich,
untapped resources of raw materials, water, and fertile
soil in areas outside their national centers. Exploi-
tation of these resources could bolster the economy by
substituting for imports, providing new goods for export,
or otherwise adding commodities for national consumption
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MAP I-1
REGIONAL INCOME DISPARITIES WITHIN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
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and providing jobs. Attempts to create new consumer
markets might also be warranted. Such activity could well
be profitable for the same entrepreneurs who invest in
consumption industries and real estate at the centers.
If the "frontier spirit" prevailed in developing nations,
opportunities in the periphery might be mobilized more
effectively.
Hirschman, however, suggests that entrepreneurs
tend to "overvalue" the payoff at central locations eyen
though they may possess objective information on profitable
possibilities in the periphery. (26) Mistrust in the
stability of government and a reluctance to leave the
amenities of the large westernizing cities may bear on
this unwillingness to look elsewhere. As the center
continues to offer greater creature-comforts and a wider
variety of services, the reluctance to risk outside
intensifies.
The economic gap between center and periphery has
a social counterpart, perhaps even more serious for a
nation's long-run viability.
Attractiveness of the center works to drain the
rest of the nation of its best and younger citizenry,
those who could be the backbone of modernization in their
own habitats. Big city spells opportunity for more easily
mobile individuals of provincial towns and villages.
They join the migration stream far out of proportion to
their numbers. Bogue and Zachariah's study of migration
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to the four largest Indian metropolises of Bombay,
Madras, Delhi and Calcutta (27) indicates, for example,
that between 50-70 percent of the male immigrants are
between the ages of 15 and 29.
Presence of the younger and presumably more adven-
turous people in the metropolis reinforces its position
as the vigorous center of new ideas, the training
ground for new skills and associations.
Deprived of their own more vigorous elements,
peripheral regions suffer. Those who might have tried
to introduce new techniques have left. Rigid family
patterns and social customs which act to prevent change
are reinforced as the rebellious have opted for new
opportunities in a different environment.*
But social problems of concentration are not
confined to peripheral regions. They are perhaps of most
immediate severity within the metropolis itself. The
migrant, even when moving with others from his village
*John B. Lewis makes the following comments on the social
consequences of what he terms India's increased "metro-
politan centering:"
".. Most distfjbing of all, metropolitan-centering
maximizes India's drift towards the condition of
a polarized 'dual' society... .Its effect is to
gather the progressive elements in the society
into metropolitan concentrations that, in terms
of income and ideas pull farther and farther
away from the traditional rural mass." (28)
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as a group, has left security of home, family, and native
habitat behind. Patterns of work and living in the metro-
polis are so different, even from provincial towns, that
a difficult adjustment period must be faced. Often the
peasant lacks education or skill for urban jobs that
are vacant, and in general he is unable to read or write.
Without the reinforcement of an environment he understands,
without the skill to cope with challenges from the new
environment, despair and dissillusionment await him.*
Those who do find work may indeed be better off than
in poverty-stricken rural surroundings. But unemployment
at the centers is severe.** If lucky, the unskilled
migrant may become underemployed instead of jobless.
The countless numbers of car washers, shoe-shine men,
hawkers, and office-runners in the capitals of the
underdeveloped world attest to a degree of unproductive
*George Weaver (29) lists five major handicaps to the
social integration of migrants to the metropolis:
"a. misinformation about job opportunities and
cost of living
b. abrupt severance of ties with the home
community
c. ignorance of institutions of the (new) urban
community
d. imdediments to communication with city people
e. educational deficiencies which in urban
occupations and life represent insurmountable
handicaps."
**Bauer (30) examined the same four Indian metropolises
as Bogue and Zacharias and discovered that in 1956 the
percentage of unemployment in these cities was double
that of India's urban population elsewhere. Friedmann (31)
reports an unemployment rate of 20 percent in Caracas.
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employment perhaps without parallel in the early growth
of the West (See page 33 ). It appears that the peasantry,
as well as the urban entrepreneurs, may "overvalue"
opportunities at the center.
Underemployment is not confined to the illiterate
and encompasses many of the western-educated elite.
Although peripheral regions desperately need their
talents, the metropolis is often oversupplied with
university graduates who, like the capital supply itself,
are unwilling to flow out of their incubus to undertake
risk or challenge.
In the face of employment problems at the metropolis
and the slums and shanty-towns that seem to nurture the
migrants and their social problems, one might well agree
with Catherine Bauer that "the big centers are... .almost
as poor as they are rich." (32)
Economic and social strains both within the metro-
polis and between the center and its periphery lead to
potentially dangerous political tensions.
The periphery is well aware of the center's bounty
and its own stagnation and decline, yet feels it can do
little (within the constraints of legitimate political
conduct) to redress the imbalance. As the gap widens,
peripheral areas afford breeding grounds for political
agitation. The peasant leagues of Northeast Brazil who
for several years have clamored for government investment
in this vast depressed region; the discontented Bolivian
tin-miners; the support for Viet Cong outside of Saigon
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are all, to a degree, manifestations of tensions between
a bountiful center and a barren periphery. In building
up Anatolian support for his revolution, Ataturk dwelt
heavily on feelings of resentment towards exploitation
by the Ottomans and the foreigners in Istanbul. Whether
the pressures take the form of open conflict or lobbying
for more public investment in peripheral areas, they
cannot long be ignored by a central government "because
of compelling considerations of equity and national
cohesion." (33)
Yet a large, discontented, underemployed metropolitan
proletariat may be an even more risky political liability.
Dissension in the countryside is scattered, as difficult
to organize as the various regions and sub-regions are
fragmented. A concentrated urban mass, however,
physically close to the centers of national power, can
become a tinderbox to give the leadership of developing
nations cause for concern. Whether the dangers are real
or imagined, the concern nevertheless exists.*
*This is being written shortly after two events in national
centers of developing nations which indicate how explosive
such a metropolitan mass can become: the Buddhist demon-
strations in Saigon and the destruction of the British
Embassy in Djakarta by a mob of 10,000.
Tangri Shanti, an Indian political scientist, voices
his fear that "if the educated unemployed provide
leadership, these transients....the lumpen proletariat,
provide the raw material for mobs. Political parties,
trade unions, business and religious groups, displaced
landlords, and princes willing to provide ideological,
financial and organizational resources for making
effective use of these two groups are not scarce in the
cities." (34)
Footnote contd.
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Footnote contd.
Wingo, who takes the more dispassionate view of a
foreign observer, nevertheless concurs that "unless
comprehended in the development policies, this vast,
culturally pulverized proletariat can harbor the seeds
of political instability which may preclude an orderly
long-range development of the nation's economic potential
and amplify the social disruptions which the development
process should seek to mend." (35)
So long as opportunities for productive employment in the
regions from which migrants come remain slight and so long
as other areas lack the "image" of a better life that the
national center conveys, political consequences of center-
periphery conflict will continue to endanger national
stability.
B. The Physical Consequences of Concentration
Heavy concentration of urban population and economic
activity at these national centers results in manifold
and costly physical development problems. These are, as
urbanization itself, an inevitable consequence of economic
growth. Any solutions which bring adequte relief at
a stage of heavy concentration are extremely costly,
particularly in view of the limited resources a nation
has available for public works. Attempts at such
solutions may indeed draw even more funds into the
growth process at the center, leaving commensurately less
for public investment in peripheral regions. Thus the
center-periphery conflect can be intensified in still
another way.
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Most basic is the housing problem. Haar (36), for
example, cites adequate housing as the single most
significant and most ignored issue confronting the large
cities of Latin America. In Calcutta, hundreds of
people count a concrete strip in the main railroad station
as home. Bombay, Rio, Djakarta, Cairo, etc. are all
ringed for miles with shanty-towns, "favelas," "bidonvilles"
that multiply and--at the very least--block an orderly
pattern of urban expansion and present severe sanitation
difficulties. (37) Evan San Juan, a much smaller national
center than many, where the full weight of U.S. housing
programs has been brought to bear, still has a large
tin-and-tar-paper slum on a marsh bordering the central
business district.
Along with housing is the problem of utilities,
both for the people and industries. Fountains and
septic tanks which could serve in less congested areas
must be foregone for water and sewage systems. Residen-
tial and commercial electricity demands are so intense
that expensive, high capacity installations present the
only possible supply solution. Traffic congestion and
the increasing journey-to-work distances require
extensive investments in sophisticated transport networks.
Lewis suggests that today the incremental costs of
providing industrial services and utilities for the
Indian Metropolises far exceed those in smaller
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communities. (38) While India has perhaps drawn the most
intensive study of urban development costs,* there is no
reason to suppose that her basic situation differs from
other nations in a similar position. As pressures for
expansion of the centers accelerate, so do the physical
problems and the price of their alleviation.
*Catherine Bauer made one of the few studies of comparative
urban development costs for cities of varying size and
density and concluded that the cost of housing and
services in the dense Indian metropolises is much greater
than in smaller, less congested cities. (39)
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III. Spread from the Center
A. Western Experience
If lessons from developed countries were alone the
yardstick for measuring prospects, the new nations would
have little cause to worry. They might expect an
eventual spread of development from the center and a
gradual equalization of income and opportunity as other
regions increase their attraction power for investment
and the modernizing "elite."*
A similar early process of concentration occurred
in Northern Europe and the United States. Once a strong
economic base operated within the large centers, however,
demands grew for new markets, new sources of raw material
and labor that could not be filled by the metropolis.
Government's welfare and infra-structure activites also
increased and broadened. Both urbanization and productive
activity spread away from their initial incubi.
Myrdal's centripetal force of attraction to the
center eventually became centrifugal and pulled more and
more of the outlying regions into the stream of development.
*In an attempt to establish general principles we may
lose sight of the individual instances where great spurts
of growth have occurred. One example is the transformation
of Medellin and Cali into diversified industrial centers
in Columbia. Another is Brazil's Belo Horizonte production
area northwest of Rio de Janeiro. The characteristics
of such development regions, whose occurence has thus
far been rare, will be considered in the discussion of
targets for decentralization policy on p. 43.
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He suggests.that pressures for attention from the peri-
phery combined with the lure of entrepreneurial profit
and a growing sense of governmental responsibility to
reduce the inequities that had occurred:
" .in the developed countries regional
inequalities have been mitigated, and in a
few of the richest and most advanced ones
almost wiped out of existence by the
spread of expansionary momentum and by
policy interferences on the part of the
national state." (40)
The income-distribution pattern of the Northern
European countries depicted on Map I-1 indicates how
wide a diffusion has occurred.
Perloff (41) describes a similar spread in the
United States after the early establishment and concen-
tration of production in major Eastern seaboard cities.
Although the United States still has areas of depression
and excessive unemployment, Bogue's studies (42) conclude
that this country now is covered by a set of interlocking
metropolitan areas, each with central cities exerting
wide influence on the production and consumption patterns
of their hinterlands.
John Friedmann (43) is evolving a development model
of spatial structure in which he times the emergence of
the large "monopolistic" center during the early
industrialization period. Once its growth is well under-
way, Friedmann sees outlying regional centers materialize,
each performing modern functions of production and
administration and linked with a number of smaller
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dependent towns and cities. These regional centers,
which might specialize in certain phases of production
suited to their resource environment, contribute to the
diversification and expansion of the national economy--
and provide alternate targets for investment and population
migration to that of the national center.
At a highly advanced stage of development, secondary
and service activity outdistance industry as the main
source of employment. Agriculture becomes so mechanized
as to require little labor. Then, according to Friedmann,
the boundaries of national and regional centers will
begin to flow together, eliminating remaining pockets of
backwardness. What he calls an "integrated space economy"
will have come into being on the national scale. At this
stage. the spatial pattern of a nation is an interlocking
and hierarchical network of metropolitan regions, similar
to what Bogue depicts for the United States.
If developing nations echo Western experience and
move towards a pattern in accordance with Friedmann's
model, we might be more confident that major industry
and other modernizing influences will eventually spread
with force into the periphery. However, strong evidence
indicates that the process of diffusion may be immensely
harder than it was in Northern Europe or the United States.
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B. Discouraging Prospects
Many developing nations are faced with a weaker
economic structure in their large national centers than
was the West at a comparable stage of urbanization. In
these countries, industrial employment occupies a far
smaller proportion of the labor force than it did in
Europe at a time of similar urban-to-rural population
balance. This means that the expansionary forces, which
elsewhere reached out to encompass peripheral regions
in the growth process, may not now be appearing.
Hoselitz shows that in Germany of 1882, 47.3 percent
of the labor force in cities over 100,000 derived their
livelihood from manufacturing and mining, whereas the
comparable figure for India in the past decade has been
29 percent. Hoselitz takes a further sample of eight
Western European countries,* whose proportion of urban
population during the 19th century was similar to that of
India during the 1950's (i.e. 10-12 percent in cities
of more than 20,000) and computes their average percentage
of labor force in manufacturing at 27.3 percent. In
1951, only 10.7 percent of India's labor force was in
manufacturing. (44)
*Austria, Ireland, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Portugal, Hungary.
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To carry Hoselitz's findings further, we assembled
the material in Table 1-1 below. It contains estimates of
industrial labor force in several other developing nations
where concentration in a few large cities has reached
enormous proportions. These nations, too, fall far
below the 19th century European levele.
One might surmise that contemporary automation has
reduced requirements of industrial employment so that
newly established firms can operate productively with a
smaller component of workers; thus releasing more people
for profitable service trades. Yet in developing
nations, much of the industry is characteristically
labor-intensive and fragmented into small and inefficient
operations. (45) Despite the larger, more efficient
firms at national urban centers, most of the metropolitan
workers are in marginal industrial operations or are
underemployed in services ranging from office-running
to shining of shoes.
A far higher rate of population increase and
commensurate pressures on rural land, appears to have
triggered the rural-urban population movements in
developing nations at an earlier state of economic
Table I-1
Proportion of Labor Force in Industry for Selected Countries
1 2
Pet. of "Economically Active"
- Pop. in Manufacturing
Pat. of Pop. in
Cities over
20,000_
Largest City's
Prop. of Pop. in
Cities over 20,000
Ceylon '53
Egypt 147
Mexico '50
Morocco '52
Pakistan '51
Tunisia '56
Venezuela '50
10.0%
10.0
11.8
6.9
6.5
10.0
10.0
11.1%
36.9
15.1
27.0
8.0
18.2
31.0
47.0%
32.5
37.5
32.0
16.8
59.5
31.5
Source: Col.1 percentages computed from totals of
"Economically Active Population" in Yearbook of
Labor Statistics, " ILO, Geneva, 1962, pp.14-1.
Col. 2-3 percentages derived from United Nations
Demographic Yearbook, 1960, U.N., N.Y., pp. 28$5-368.
w3
Country
3
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growth than in the west;* e.g. before the national
centers are strong enough to absorb the swelling flow
of humanity into their productive processes.
Past experience has shown the need for a strong
industrial and commercial base at the center before a
spread effect can build up substantial momentum. If
the economy of the center is indeed too weak to support
adequately even the populace near at hand, then developing
*Rostow (46) describes the comparative population picture
as follows:
"Historically, population rates of increase
during the take-off decades were generally
under 1.5% per annum. France was as low as
0.5%, Germany, Japan, and Sweden about 1%,
Britain as high as 1.4% only in the two decades
preceding 1820. Nineteenth Century United
States (over 2.5%) and pre-1914 Russia (over
1.5%) are the great exceptions; but in both
cases these rates occurred in societies
rapidly expanding the area under cultivation.
Aggregated annual rates for the major under-
developed regions of the contemporary world
are about as follows; Latin American 2.5%,
South Asia, 1.5%, the Middle East, 2.3%, the
Far East 1.8%, Africa, 1.7%."
This population pressure, a product of rising or stable
birth rates and falling death rates is hardest in agri-
cultural districts. Hoselitz (47) points out that the
West European countries during the 19th Century had
available from 3 to 5 times as much cultivatible land
per farm family as in India today and that the early period
of western industrialization and urbanization coincided
with major rationalization of agriculture and productivity
increases. A population to resource imbalance occurred in
Europe, but came largely from improved technology requiring
a smaller agricultural labor force. Yet agricultural
technology in many developing countries with dense rural
populations has not substantially improved productivity
before emigration begins or even in the early stages of
the process. The already intense migration presages an
even greater one when/and/if attempts at rationalized
agriculture succeed.
countries may be unable to rely on emergence of spontaneous
drives towards new markets, resources, and labor which in
the West set the spread effect in motion.
By no means all of the migrants go to the national
centers. Many do gravitate towards provincial capitals
and other smaller cities. But the flow of people to other
"catch basins" does not in itself relieve a nation of
problems stemming from concentration at the metropolis...
since human migration is only one phase of the difficulties.
So long as the few large centers continue to attract
a disporportionate share of industry, commercial activity,
professional people, and modernizing institutions,the gap
between metropolis and nation will widen. For there will
be proportionately fewer industrial jobs for the migrants
to smaller cities. There will be proportionately fewer
education opportunities or chances to learn new skills.
There will be proportionately fewer doctors, administrators,
lawyers, teachers, etc. able to handle the service and
organizational apparatus of the smaller cities or the rural
regions.
In a way, these nations are faced with a particularly
intractable dilemma. The center needs strengthening if
its entrepreneurs and institutions are one day to expand
in the periphery. Yet every investment to strengthen the
center with infra-structure, housing, institutions, etc.,
widens the gap between it and the nation outside.
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One conclusion, perhaps inevitable, is that far
greater reliance must be placed on the activities of
national governments than in the West... if a spread of
growth from national centers is to occur, if idle resources
and manpower in outlying regions are to be brought into
the productive cycle, and if the negative aspects of the
center-periphery relationship are to be softened. Only
the governments of these nations possess power and funds
at least sufficient for an effort to grapple with the
issues.
With this by way of preface, we now turn to the
policy alternatives open to governments confronted with
the center-periphery pattern of development.
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IV. Spatial Allocation of Investment--Basic Alternatives
A government faced with center-periphery problems
can emphasize one of two essentially opposite alternative
policies of investment allocation.*
1. Continuing the trend towards concentration by
making its major capital expenditures and other
efforts to encourage development within the
national centers.
2. Attempting to stimulate emergence of new growth
areas in other parts of the nation by decen-
tralizing development efforts.
In actual practice, of course, a program may be
designed to fall somewhere between the two extremes.
A number of reasons might motivate a government to
emphasize continued investment at the center. Given a
weak economic base at the center despite its dispropor-
tionate share of the nation's modern productive activity,
a government might be justifiably concerned with making
every effort to strengthen the central regions. It might
well reason that existing nuclei should function at peak
*The rower and responsibility for phases of development
differ widely among governments. We will assume, however,
that "government" in this context has the responsibility
to construct and operate major aspects of infra-structure;
i.e. transport systems, electricity, schools, hospitals,
etc. Further, we assume that government influences or
controls location of basic industry (whether or not
government owned) and has power to adopt incentives such
as tax abatements, free land, industrial districts,
special credits, etc. which might direct the location
of private industrial and commercial activity.
40.
capability before new areas requiring heavy outlays for
basic services are brought into the growth stream.
Public authorities might conclude that attempts to
stimulate the periphery would fare more successfully
once the center's economy operates at peak capability and
provides productive employment for the bulk of its labor
force.
Social and political problems posed by the great
metropolitan proletariats might also lead to high priorities
for central public investment. Thus we find Haar (48)
advocating major efforts to create housing in Latin
American metropolises. A government, concerned with the
welfare of peasants shunted into slums and fearful of
possible revolutionary explosions may well put first
attention to investments which alleviate distress of the
metropolitan masses.
Other, less "economic" factors may also be involved.
A dictatorship, desirous of consolidating power by aweing
its populace, could set out to make a world show-place of
its national center. Thus did the Jimenez regime in
Venezuela and Batista in Cuba lavish millions on modern
monumentality for their capitals.
Dictatorial aspirations aside, a government might be
ill advised to abandon completely attention to the metro-
polis. Too much of the nation's economy is concentrated
here, and the physical and social problems are too acute
to be ignored. At least minimal investment to bolster
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this economy and alleviate some of the physical problems
will be required; and even minimal investment adds to the
existing complex of advantages.
Yet a policy which involved concentration of public
action at the center to the virtual exclusion of other
regions might in practice prove unworkable. For it would
result in heightening the strains which already mark the
center-periphery conflict. The gap would widen. Migrant
flows directed to the center would intensif% perhaps
nullifying increases in housing and productive employment,
and the resistance to investment elsewhere would easily
continue. Raw material and human resources of peripheral
regions which might make important contributions to
national development would still lie idle. An even
greater opportunity would arise for political unrest
in the periphery. Public attention to the center must
continue, but is exclusive at its own peril.
Let us instead assume government decides to narrow
the center-periphery gap. Some form of public policy
which promotes decentralized development is required.
Some "pusht" by public authorities is necessary to set in
motion for other regions that process of dynamic growth
which has thus far been confined to the national center.
Here again, the choice of strategy falls between two
possible extremes.
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1. Dispersion. Investment resources and incentives
are spread widely over the nation. Some modern
activity is given to a great number of locations
in the expectation that this "seeding" process
will activate new growth regions.
2. Selective Concentration. Only a few areas with
relatively high development potential are selected
for special treatment. Many forms of related
industrial, agricultural, educational, transport
and other programs are concentrated in these
areas in an attempt to overhaul thoroughly their
economic and social structure.
Given these alternatives of dispersion and selection,
can some general principles be put forth to guide a nation's
choice? True, each country offers a different amalgam of
social, political, and economic circumstances, and attempts
at broad generalizations are risky. Nevertheless, certain
common elements in the process of regional development may
offer clues to that basic form of public decentralization
policy most likely to result in activation of new growth
regions outside the national center. It is to this subject
that we now address our attention.
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V. Characteristics of Growth Regions
The concept of "growth region" is extremely vague and
elusive. Perhaps the most effective approach, therefore,
would be to isolate a set of characteristics by which any
area in the process of dynamic economic and social develop-
ment can be identified. Such a list could perhaps stand
as the catalogue of targets for public decentralization
policy. With the targets firmly in mind, we might be
better able to propose an appropriate course for the policy.
Of course the national center is itself a growth
region. Other areas might be unable to achieve its number
and scope of activities, but they must nevertheless come
to possess some of the center's basic attributes if their
own growth is to be dynamic and self-generdting.
A small body of post-war literature has dealt with
the fundamental similarities between regions in the process
of development. Perroux was among the first of the writers
to turn his attention to the spatial context of development.
He coined the expression "pole de croissance" or "growth
pole" to describe areas within a nation where the process
of economic growth has become self-sustaining. (49) A
nation's development accelerates, he stated, as the
strength and number of these growth poles increase.
Hirschman, Friedmann, and Rodwin have accepted Perroux's
main approach and added important insights of their own. (50)
Their thinking is reflected in the following paragraphs.
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1. Rapid urbanization that results in:
a. Retention of population within the region
who might emigrate in the absence of local
economic opportunities.
b. Attraction to the region of migrants from
other areas.
We have assumed urbanization to be an essential and
inevitable consequence of economic development. Discussion
of the national center and its rise bore out this assumption.
Other regions in the process of growth will, therefore,
experience rapid urbanization as modern productive activities
become established.
When work in industry and services replaces a
dependence on agriculture, many residents of a region
who might otherwise emigrate for new opportunities remain
either in their native villages or in the urbanizaing
areas. (51)
Presence of economic opportunity outside the national
center relieves the latter from some of its population
pressure. Other targets for migration become tangible.
Peasants from the periphery learn of the employment
prospects, and many move to the new opportunity areas.
Managers, professionals, and investors from the center may
even transfer their activities.
This does not mean, however, that all rapidly-growing
cities are centers of growth regions. Landless peasants
may be impelled to provincial towns out of desperation
rather than any objective appraisal of work prospects.
While urbanization is basic, the following factors are
perhaps more indicative of an area's development strength
and potential.
2. Major industrial development, related to the
region's resources, which is able to function
profitably without prolonged subsidy.
Industries concentrated at the national center
primarily because of its entrepreneurs, markets, and skilled
work force rather than its natural resources.
Prosperity achieved by the first industries pointed the
way for further entrepreneurship and agglomeration.
In outlying regions, however, the main economic
justification for development must be exploitation of
natural resources whose transformation is of some
significant value to the nation. Resource exploitation
is perhaps the sole initial advantage these areas possess
over continued concentration of investment at the center.
Friedmann calls them "strategic sub-centers from which
important peripheral resources are brought into the
productive cycle of the national economy." (52)
Subsidy might be required to begin the cycle of
resource exploitation. Factories, mines, and agricultural
processing plants may need support during an initial
shakedown period, or until the markets for their products
are sufficient. Within a reasonable period of time,
however, these operations must begin to show a profit--
as did the first plants at the main centers. Unless profit
appears, there is little advantage for additional invest-
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ment. In a region whose growth process is dynamic, basic
industry will serve to attract additional plants and
commercial services, thereby expanding the region's
economy and employment structure. Without profitable
resource exploitation, however, few activities will be
tempted to locate outside the main centers.
3. Existence of external economies which lead
to the formation of industrial complexes.
Perroux considers existence of industrial complexes
the single most significant indicator of a growth region. (53)
It is a sign that the basic resource exploitation has led
to further and more diversified rounds of investment.
A "multiplier" effect has taken place. The area is indeed
expanding in opportunity and employment.
Agglomeration could not occur, however, in the
absence of certain fundamental external economies; e.g.
sufficient capacity in systems of transport, power, water,
other infra-structure and services to enable shared
utilization by plants other than the original basic
industries. Existence of industrial complexes is a sign
that external economies have been created.*
*Dyckman makes the following case for creation of external
economies as the basis for industrial development:
i...the heavy industries require large amounts of
power, water, and transport and the light industries
with much more modest requirements will share in
the same electricity and water supply systems and
transportation networks, Indeed one of the strongest
arguments against the isolation of heavy industry in
a developing economy is the argument that the over-
head requirements of that industry are likely to be
Footnote contd.
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Footnote contd.
so great as to require the installation of systems
on which many small plants can profitably feed.
If a modern plant were forced to provide its
entire social overhead in isolation from such
industrial complexes, the capitalized additional
costs would be upwards of 40-50 percent of
regular production costs." (54)
In a region where resource exploitation has been the
initial basis for development, roughly five different
types of enterprise are likely candidates for industrial
complexes that might evolve. They are:
a. additional firms or plants to exploit the
basic resources.
b. firms to provide inputs for the basic industries.
c. firms to further process the outputs or by-
products of basic industries.
d. firms to exploit other regional resources which
can now be brought into the productive cycle
by virtue of national demand, the infra-structure
installed to service the major plants, presence
of trained labor, etc.
e. firms to provide consumer products for regional
or other markets.
All of these are in some way related to the first
major plants; as competing or complementary operations, as
sharers of their infra-structure, or as purveyors to the
markets the major plants and their employees help to
provide.
4. Rising per capita incomes to support an
increasing amount of service activity and
employment.
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A rise in per capita income is a basic goal for any
nation's development program. This rise within a growth
region may not come immediately. Low wage rates (relative
to the center) may be part of an area's initial advantage
for industry. As the plants begin to show profit, however,
and as agglomeration takes place, wages will rise with the
prosperity of the new industries.* Higher incomes will
lead to the growth of profitable service enterprises,
indicating that both the wants and ability to pay of the
local citizenry have increased. Service operations will
form a new source of employment, aiding in diversification
of the region's economy. Friedmann considers a rising
complement of services a sign that a region is moving into
higher stages of development.
Higher incomes will also mean that the region is
becoming a consuming area in addition to its functions
as producer. It will begin to provide a market for
manufactured goods produced in the national center and
other areas and thus play a further role in expension of
the economy.
5. A level of educational services substantially
higher than the national average and a stock
of other social overhead facilities (transport,
power, housing, urban utilities, etc.)
sufficient to enable continuing economic growth.
*Low wage rates were part of the package of attractions
which Puerto Rico offered for investors during the 1950's.
Now, according to government officials, labor costs are
roughly the same as those in the continental United States.
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We have noted that the national center tends to
monopolize the institutions for higher education. As an
essential aspect of their attraction power, other growth
regions will also come to offer extensive educational
opportunities geared to supplying trained manpower for
their industries and commercial firms. The chance to
obtain specialized training and even university degrees
within the region will help retain many potential
"modernizers" who would gravitate to the national center
were local training not available. Technical and
vocational schools, secondary schools, in addition to
a strong elementary education, will be the basis for
raising the region's ability to undergo further economic
expansion and cultural development.
External economies in other forms of infra-structure
must also be sufficient to enable a continuing expansion
of activites. Where blockages and shortages arise, they
must be quickly identified and relieved or further growth
will be impeded. Urban amenities (e.g. housing, enter-
tainment) may have to equal or surpass those of the
national centers both to attract and retain some of the
key managerial and professional personnel.
6. Rationalization of agriculture and conversion
from subsistence to cash-crop farming.
Modernization in growth regions is not confined to
the cities or to urban activity, although industrial
development furnishes the impetus for rural change.
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By providing alternative employment for agricultural
workers and by forming a market for vegetables, fruits,
and other cash crops, the cities unleash pressures to
transform agricultural practices in their hinterlands.
Studies noting this effect have been cited above (p Is ).*
7. An "atmosphere" within the region conducive
to further spurts of growth and change.
The entrepreneutrial spirit appears to flourish in
areas of dynamIc growth. Hirschman talks of an "industrial
atmosphere.. .with its special receptivity to innovation and
enterprise." (57) There is a great willingness on the
part of private individuals and government to innovate,
not only in industry, but education, services and other
activities. Aspiration levels are high as is the
readiness to exert oneself in the achievement of
aspirations. This "atmosphere for development" cannot be
quantified. However, the degree to which the six other
characteristics of growth are present will indicate whether
or not a spirit of enterprise exists and is being tapped.
*Clawson (55) considers modernization of agriculture one
of the most significant consequences of urbanization.
Rodwin looks for social and cultural changes in the rural
hinterland as well.(56)
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VI. The Case for Selective Concentration
The seven characteristics noted above may be considered
indispensible attributes of regions in process of dynamic
growth. Public policy directed towards stimulation of new
growth areas outside the national center should of
necessity consider existence of these characteristics as
an ultimate goal.
For most peripheral regions, however, achievement of
such a development level would require a major transformation
of economic and social structure. A government must
therefore ponder whether dispersion of public investment
over a wide area or selection of a few key areas for
concentrated attention is most likely to induce the
necessary transformation.
Several considerations might lead towards a policy
of dispersion. Equity is perhaps the most significant,
In an effort to redress the imbalance between a bountiful
center and a barren periphery, a government might wish to
give many parts of the country some form of industry,
infra-structure, educational facilities, and so on, as
an indication of its concern. Political pressures from
several directions within the periphery may also play a role.
A government lacking knowledge of its hinterland
resources might scatter its investments in a probing
operation and be willing to undergo risk that some will
"take" and others not.
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The romantic hope that a society can somehow undergo
development yet remain rural may lead to a widespread
village distribution of factories or creation of a number
of small and scattered new towns in rural areas.
In the description of Turkey under Ataturk (Chapter
Three) we will note that a certain amount of dispersed
public investment came more from the government's desire
to spread nationalistic feeling and consolidate power
in the hinterland than from its goal of economic
development.
However valid these objectives and concepts might
be in a nation's scheme of values, dispersion of public
investment has little fiscal justification. Gross
inefficiencies may be involved in the spread of many
isolated projects throughout the nation. Scattered
factories require the expensive duplication of infra-
structure. Often, government's energies are spread so
thinly that essential elements of infra-structure for
some plants are never constructed and the plants lie
idle. (58) Complementarity between investments is lost.
Given the paucity of funds available for investment,
rare is the nation that can afford such a loss of efficiency.
Yet the single most important factor mitigating
against a policy of dispersed investment has, to this
writer's knowledge, not yet been cited in the literature.
That is the role of the national center itself in
developing countries where "frontier spirit" is lacking.
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For the national center will continue to exert its
attractive powers for modernizing institutions and
individuals throughout the period in which decentralization
measures are applied. Until such a time as the comparative
disadvantages of other regions have been wiped out, a
dI;sproportionate amount of investment, professional people
and migrants will continue to concentrate at the center.
Any other area where the modernization process is attempted
will have to fight against this competing pull. It will
need a strong set of complementary assets to compete
successfully.
Let us now examine some evidence leading to this
conclusion and its implications for decentralization
policy. Two examples where the center has consolidated
its drawing power while major public decentralization
efforts were in progress are cited below.
In the 10 years between 1950 and 1960, India under-
took a wide variety of decentralization programs--from its
emphasis on village industry to the construction of new
steel towns, refugee cities, and Chandigarh, and a TVA
inspired project for the Damodar river valley. A policy
of spreading growth was explicit in the five-year plans
employed during the peiod.
Bombay and West Bengal (Calcutta) had held 44 percent
of India's industrial establishments in 1951. Despite the
decentralization programs and the Indian government's
intended use of licensing power to discourage further
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agglomeration, 46.2 percent of all the new plants licensed
between 1951-57 located in Bombay and West Bengal states.
Thirty-five percent of the total came to the two metropolitan
areas which had held 14 percent of India's urban population
in 1951. Bredo comments on this situation:
"..no major shift has occurred in the
dispersion of industry from the concen-
tration in these two large industrial
complexes.... economic growth seems to
work in the direction of centers where
there is already a clustering of industry
or commercial activity." (59)
Nothing could be more of a contrast to India than
tiny Puerto Rico. In 1950, the San Juan region held
63 percent of Puerto Rico's population and 48 percent
of its industrial employment. During the "bootstrap"
operations of the next decade, special incentives were
offered to industrial firms for location in parts of the
Island other than San Juan. Rentals for government owned
plants were less outside of San Juan. Easier credit
terms and special worker-training programs were arranged.
A free trade Zone was established in Mayaguez. Transport
and utility lines were improved. Yet by 1960, San Juan
held 65 percent of all industrial employment on the Island,
and three-quarters of all the new industrial jobs created
during the decade aent to the San Juan region. (60)
Inauguration of decentralization programs in most
developing nations is of such recent vintage that further
comparative data are difficult to obtain. Friedmann does
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note, however, that the concentration of Venezuela's urban
population in the Caracas region dropped only 4 percentage
points between 1936 and 1960 (51% down to 47%) even while
oil was being exploited in Maracaibo and industrialization
of other areas such as Valencia and Guayana had begun to
contribute to the nation's economy. (61) Israeli planners
have told this writer of their concern with continued
industrial concentration at Tel Aviv, despite successful
efforts to develop industrial complexes elsewhere.
Brazilian authorities are concerned that few Rio de Janeiro
and Sao Paulo businessmen and even national government
officials have been tempted to establish permanent bases of
operations in the new interior capital of Brasilia. (62)
Strong pulls from the center continue regardless of
public activity to spread growth. When government takes
as objectives a broader distribution of urbanization and
modern economic activity and the exploitation of hinterland
resources, this is cause for real concern.
Turkey was perhaps the one nation where government
made intense efforts to divert all possible investments
away from the traditional center (Istanbul, during the
Ataturk period). Yet material in Chapter Three reveals
that Istanbul continued to draw the bulk of private invest-
ment even while it was losing its political functions.
Istanbul's growth during the Ataturk period was far slower
than might have been expected without the decentralization
programs, but nevertheless exceeded most other regions.
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If those funds and incentives which government can
devote to spreading development are themselves extended
over a wide area, any outlying peripheral region will be
hard-pressed to amass enough necessary advantages to
generate dynamic growth. The center would continue as
the chief target for risk-conscious investors, cosmopolitan
professionals, and the most ambitious from the migrant
stream. Its physical and social problems would intensify.
The economic gap to the rest of the nation would widen.
Thus a policy of selective concentration becomes
essential if a nation expects to move any of its more
backward regions out of peripheral status.* Some
commitment should be envisaged, first to identify those
few areas which seem to possess greatest resource potential
and, second, to adopt programs of concentrated public
action (in industry, transport, power, housing, agriculture,
education, etc.) within these regions.**
*Rodwints concept of "concentrated decentralization" is
similar but deals primarily with a build-up of metropolitan
areas in the hinterland. We are, however, concerned with
concentrated application of public effort to both urban
and rural areas within a given region. (63)
**Such a view has led Tinbergen (64) to suggest that
countries draw up inventories of regional assets and
allocate investment on the basis of highest priority to
regions of highest potential. Bredo and Harris (65) have
criticized Indiats dispersed investment system and offered
as an alternative concentrated attention to areas with
medium sized cities where some entrepreneurial activity is
already in existence. Friedmann (66) concludes that some
of the outlying regions in Venezuela have much greater
opportunity to become significant growth poles than others.
He proposes that the Venezuelan government direct its
major decentralization efforts to push these regions into
advanced stages of development.
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We cannot propose here a schema whereby any nation
can identify its highest potential development regions.
Such a schema would require major modifications in each
specific case. Rather, our intent is to demonstrate that
the principle of careful selection of a few areas for
concentrated attention must form the basis of a decentrali-
zation policy bent on stimulating growth regions outside
the national center.
Early development gravitated to the center because of
its initial "bundle of advantages." Backward areas will
develop strength only when government takes a leaf from
the center's book, makes the most from its limited
investments, and encourages new loci of concentration
within the periphery.
Such a policy of necessity means that much of the
periphery would be neglected--at least in the first stages
of the decentralization process. Rarely would funds or
personnel be available for projects in more than a limited
number of districts. Political repercussions, therefore,
from a decision to select few development areas can perhaps
become severe. Why, asks one segment of the periphery,
do others receive largesse while we continue to stagnate?
A threat to stability can occur here as well, and govern-
ment must weigh the danger of this threat in making its
choices. Yet choices are essential, if development is to
spread. Once the few high-priority sub-centers are
enjoying dynamic growth, then public effort to reduce the
periphery further can proceed,
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VII. The Corollary of Selective Concentration--A
Continuing Development Organization
Still another matter requires discussion before we
turn from theoretical background to a detailed analysis
of Turkey. That is the organizational approach to a
decentralization program. For the problem is not merely
one of investment allocation. Once a government decides
to concentrate attention on a potential growth region,
there is a corollary need to establish some form of
continuing organization with long-term responsibility for
furthering development in each selected area. This need
stems from two considerations:
1. The growth process is evolutionary. No matter
how concentrated and complementary are the
initial investments, until a region's basic
resources are actually being exploited, critical
allied and secondary activities may not appear.
A time lag is inevitable. One function of a
continuing control mechanism is to reduce the
time lag as much as possible.
2. The national center maintains its attractiveness
for investors and professionals during the period
when the growth region's complement of advantages
is being constructed. Government may therefore
be forced to exert continuous counter-pressure
by providing special incentives within the target
regions, timed to the emergence of new opportunities.
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Unless a potential growth region receives some form
of constant and special public attention, it may well sink
back to peripheral status even after being vested with its
first complement of modern economic activity and infra-
structure.
The process which peripheral regions must experience
in their drive for development can be illustrated by
recalling the process which characterized early experience
of the center itself. Dynamic growth at the center
materialized only after the first tentative entrepreneurial
efforts took root and indicated room for others to follow.
A nucleus of commerce and artisanry accommodated the early
probes at modern production, but a trained labor force and
the bundle of services grew only as new productive investment
made new demands on the other sectors. We remember Myrdal's
comment in which he saw the center build momentum through
a series of cycles or "rounds" stemming from earlier
successes.*
*Myrdalls concept of rounds bears striking similarity to
Hirschmants view that development on a national scale
occurs through a series of "imbalances." Broadly speaking,
Hirschman believes that certain sectors of productive
activity push ahead of the rest of the economy, and the
shortages of related productive and service activities
cause public and private sources to recognize that new
investments can profitably fill the gaps. Imbalance is
necessary, he submits, for without it the build-up of
secondary investments would not occur. (66) Note the
further similarity between Hirschman's unbalanced growth
concept and Rostow's thesis that in any country some
"leading sectors" move ahead of others and trigger the
development process. (67)
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"In the centers of expansion, increased
demand will spur investment which in its
turn will increase incomes and demand and
cause a second round of investment, and
so on.," (68)
Now if this sequence operates within the center, one
might reasonably suppose it must operate in the outlying
growth regions as well. Thus a "first round" of basic
resource exploitation and infra-structure installation may
be essential before allied industry and services can be
established.
The second and subsequent rounds may be unable to follow
immediately in the first: i.e. the basic industries must
show possibilities of profitable operations; a trained labor
force must be large enough to take on new assignments;
potential entrepreneurs will want to ponder the type of
investments they might undertake. A critical period ensues
in which the region may move forward to further rounds of
development or stay in place. If the basic investments have
potential to generate linked activites,* then the
*Hirschman makes the following comments about linkages.
"Analysis of a prospective investment project should
above all try to evaluate its effect on further
development decisions instead of conventionally
concentrating on its own prospective output and
productivity. Specifically, every decision should
be analyzed to discover its possible 'linkages' with
other decisions that might follow it. For example,
a prospective decision to encourage the importation
of some consumer goods, such as radios, should con-
sider not simply the economy's need for these goods
but the probability that their importation will in
time (underline mine) lead to a decision by domestic
investors to assemble them locally, as well as the
'linkage' effects of such assembly operations of
further domestic production decision." (69)
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sustained interest of government is particularly needed
to push the region through this critical period.
With the center in full flower of its attractiveness
for investors and professionals, there is even more reason
to fear that second and subsequent rounds of development in
outlying regions will not occur. The center may well
continue to offer a balance of advantages and amenities so
great that growth opportunities elsewhere go begging--no
matter how profitable they could prove to be. Entrepreneurs
and other modernizers may continue to "overvalue" prospects
at the core. A steel-producing area, for example, may
begin to offer tangible prospects for secondary fabricators
that are lost because investment in central city real-estate
seems more profitable and secure. An added strain is placed
on the potential growth regions which, without expanding
complements of modern activity, can, over time, revert to
peripheral status in relation to the continually expanding
center.
Thus, government must be concerned both with the
natural processes of growth which offer time lags to be
overcome, and with the continued pull of the center which
works to prevent expansion in the periphery. To compensate,
government is almost forced to provide sustained attention
to each growth region's development. As Albert Mayer puts
it:
"Intense concentration and continuity are
required in building up new situations from
the bottom... .and programs have to be
tailored to this iron necessity." (70)
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Effort of such a sustained character must provide each
region with a continual set of "special advantages." The
specific devices employed can take many forms; such as:
a. incentives to entrepreneurs and professionals
for location in the region (subsidies, tax
exemptions, housing, free land, special
technical assistance and training programs
for plants, etc.);*
b. further infusion of overhead investment and
amenities;
c. direct construction and operation of new
enterprises by government itself.
Each device chosen would be geared to provide the best
possible opportunities for a region to move from one stage
of growth to another--at least until such a time as the
region possessed sufficient strength to generate spon-
taneous development on its own.
A government must therefore have a flexible enough
administrative structure to establish some mechanism
concerned with realizing the potential of each selected
growth region. The actual form could vary a great deal,
again depending on the particular country and its system
of political and economic organization. Alternatives
might range from TVA-type authorities to operate the basic
industries and control infra-structure allocation in each
region; to central government bureaus charged with
expediting regional growth; to existing local administrative
agencies infused with new sets of development responsibilities.
*The Israeli experience is particularly interesting in this
respect. Officials have described to this writer a system
of tax and import duty exemptions now being applied to
attract shopkeepers and other service personnel to the
desert industrial centers.
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Our purpose in this chapter is to outline the concepts
which might guide a nation bound on decentralized growth,
not to prescribe a specific organizational structure
which would hold in every case. The concept must be one
of continuing effort and sustained attention to the regions
selected for special treatment. Without such a concept
and a means of implementation suited to the nation
involved, attempts at spreading economic and social
change may have little chance to take root.
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VIII. Concluding Note
If the reader has borne with us thus far, our two
main points--that decentralization efforts should be made
on a selective basis in peripheral regions of the highest
growth potential and that the commitment to decentralize
involves a corollary commitment to guide the selected
regions continually through the growth process--may
strike him as both logical and elementary. These concepts
might hardly seem profound or deserving of the extensive
background provided. If not for the reasons stated
earlier, a sheer shortage of skilled managers and
administrators in developing nations would dictate
selection of limited areas and attempts to provide
continuity.
Yet elementary logic is not always the course
followed in developing (or developed) nations. Decen-
tralization may often be essayed through a governmental
system which does not allow for the most efficient program.
Political and other considerations may be stronger moti-
vations for projects than the spread of development.
The pattern of growth under which a country inaugurates
its programs may not be one of "pure" center-periphery
characteristics. A multitude of reasons can cause a
nation to diverge from the principles presented above.
The principles are important, however, for they
provide a framework within which the experience of a
specific nation can be examined and evaluated.
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Turkey's forty years of decentralization policy is
the main subject of this study. In analyzing the policy--
its genesis, changes, and effects--we will be particularly
concerned with the degree to which concentrated attention
and continuing development mechanisms were applied to the
areas selected for investment. Lessons that the Turkish
experience rmight hold for other developing nations more
lately embarked on decentralization programs are also of
significance and can conceivably suggest changes or
modifications to the two basic principles that form our
study framework.
It is well to point out that the statistical data
available for an examination of Turkey are extremely
sketchy and come from a wide variety of sources whose
reliability can not 1'e checked. The reader must, therefore,
consider statistical material presented here as indicative
of relationships and orden of magnitude, not necessarily an
accurate presentation of facts. Problems are particularly
acute for the period before World War II, when little
except basic population data was systematically collected,
and secondary sources will be relied upon heavily in
reconstructing a picture of these early years.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BEGINNINGS
"The streets of Istanbul are paved with gold."
-- Old Turkish Proverb
I. Spatial Distribution of Development at the Start
of the Republic.
A. The Land
Modern Turkey has an area of 296,500 sq. miles or
780,000 sq. kilometers. (1)* It adjoins six other
countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and
Syria), and is also bounded by three seas (Mediterranean,
Aegean, and Black). Within its borders is the network
of waterways (the Bosphorous, the Sea of Marmara, and
the Dardenelles) which traditionally provided access
between Russia's souithern ports and Europe. Less than
4 percent of Turkish territory lies to the West of this
water thoroughfare in continental Europe. The major part
is in Anatolia and extends some 900 miles into Asia.
Boundaries of modern Turkey were mainly established
under the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by the
victorious allies of World War I and Mustafa Kemal's
*Since Turkish measurement data are available only in the
metric system, aside from the mileage figures in this
section, we will use the metric system throughout the text.
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new Republican government.** Only a small portion of
the former Ottoman Empire was'deeded to the new state.
During the early 19th century, the Ottomans held a
domain of 1,880,000 sq. miles, encompassing most of the
Balkans as well as large portions of Northern Africa and
the Arab Middle East. National revolutions reduced
this empire but, by the outbreak of World War I, Ottoman
territory was still on the order of 700,000 sq. miles.
Turkey joined the German side and was defeated by
the allies. The French, English, Italians, and Greeks
then laid plans to divide the Empire further among
themselves and leave only a small portion of Central
Anatolia under Turkish Control.
In 1919, the Sultan sent Mustafa Kemal on a mission
to disarm the remaining Turkish forces in the eastern
highlands as part of the surrender agreement. Kemal,
the general who had 'beaten the British at the siege of
Galipoli, began a revolution instead. He organized the
armies and the Anatolian citizenry to battle the Greeks,
then moving inland from their enclave on the Aegean Coast
in an effort to seize more of Anatolia. Kemal's forces
pushed the Greeks to the sea. The Sultan was deposed in
1923, a republic declared with Kemal as President, and
Anakara proclaimed as the new capital. Kemal's government
refused to accept the earlier partition and negotiated
the Lausanne settlement which gave the nation all of
Anatolia and a part of European Thrace. (2)
**The only territory gained after 1923 was the southernmost
province of Hatay, ceded by France in 1938.
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The land itself was immensely varied in climate and
topography. It ranged from lush, semi-tropical coastal
littorals to high steppes and great mountain chains where
even today people live a semi-nomadic existence. Thrace
was gentle, rolling country. Anatolia was quite in contrast:
On three sides--North, West, and South--were coastal plains,
narrowest at the Black Sea. Behind them rose tall peaks,
in whose center lay a vast and barren plateau.
"The main feature of the Anatolian penisula
is the high mountains surrounding it on all
sides, which separate most of Anatolia from
the sea and from the Asiatic mainland. The
Anatolian peninsula has often been compared
to a basin...The bottom of the basin lies at
altitudes ranging from 800 to 1000 meters
above sea level, whereas the bordering moun-
tains in the north scale heights of 1600 and
2000 meters.. .Mountains approximately 3000
meters high form the (northeast) border of
the plateau. The summits of Mt. Ararat, an
exception, reach 5,000 meters and more." (3)
The highlands to the east and southeast melded with
mountain ranges of neighboring countries (See Map II-1).
Several large rivers flowed from this rim of peaks (among
them the Tigris and Euphrates, the Seyhan, Yegilirmak,
Menderes, and Gediz) to the coastal plains and inner Asia.*
Except for the littorals that furnished export cpps
of tobacco, fruit, and cotton, this land had been of
relatively little economic significance to the Ottoman
Empire. For centuries, even before the Turks,.it served
mainly as a thoroughfare over which armies and caravans
passed between Europe and Asia. (See maps 11-34,5).
*In 1958, Turkey was said to have the second highest
hydroelectric power otential next to Norway among
European countries. 4)
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The Empirets riches came more from her far-flung terri-
tories than from Turkey itself.
Two major urban areas- -Constantinople and Smyrna--had
dominated this truncated remnant of one of the world's
largest kingdoms. Both were on the far western coasts.
Outside of these centers was a hinterland of 40,000 peasant
villages. some completely isolated from contact with
civilization; others-oriented around market and military
towns.
B. Istanbul and Izmir as Dominant Centers
Since 1453 and the fall of the Byzantine Empire,
Istanbul (Constantinople) was both the Ottoman capital
and the major commercial center. At the height of Ottoman
power, Istanbul had such great cities as Baghdad, Jerusalem,
Damascus and Beirut as satellities to the east; and
Salonika, Sofia, Tripoli, and Tunis to the west and south.
During the 19th century, when contacts with European
culture increased, Istanbul also became the locus of most
industrial development and westernizing influences within
the Empire.
Industrialization came late to Turkey and was still
rudimentary by the start of World War I. Tokin (5) places
the number of firms at 282 in 1915, of which 55 percent
were located in Istanbul and environs and 22 percent in
Izmir (Smyrna). About 60 percent of these operations were
engaged in food processing or textiles, all locally-
consumed products. (6)
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Most were owned and operated by foreigners or members of
minority groups.* Turks themselves were rarely engaged in
industrial pursuits, as entrepreneurs or workers, or in
commerce. Indeed, lack of an entrepreneurial tradition was
one of the most severe handicaps to establishment of a modern
Turkish state. The Turk had been farmer, warrior, and civil
servant--but rarely merchant, industrial worker, or entre-
preneur. Moslem tradition held sharp strictures against
engaging in activity for monetary gain, and the Ottoman elite
looked down on those who worked with their hands or for
profit. (7)
A few large Turkish operations did exist, however. All
were government-owned, employing several hundred workers
each and were located in Istanbul and vicinity. They had been
*This small industrial development was primarily undertaken
by Europeans whose nations had received economic concessions
or by members of the large resident Greek, Armenian, and
Jewish minorities of Istanbul and Izmir. Even the most
productive olive groves, tobacco, and grape farms of the
Aegean and Black Sea tended to be owned and operated by
non-Turks.
The Armenians left during the period of pre-Republican
persecution. After 1923, Kernal exchanged over 1,260,000
Greeks for 400,000 Turkish residents of Greece. The important
community of Istanbul became the only Greek group for whom
deportation was not compulsory. (8)
Many of this group remained and formed--with the Jews--a
nucleus of private entrepreneurship under the Republic in
Istanbul. The Republican government bought out most
holdings of European foreigners.
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inspired by the Empire's desire to equip itself with military
supplies, although some civilian goods were also produced. (9)*
The government also held a monopoly over the processing and
export of Turkey's most important agricultural commodity,
tobacco.
While its position as capital and main entrepot gave
Istanbul prominence, the wealth of Izmir came from an
agricultural hinterland. The Aegean was Turkey's most
highly developed agricultural region, from which
fruit, tobacco, cotton and other crops were sent abroad.
Izmir was the export center for this produce and developed
some related processing industries. Unlike the capital,
whose population came from all corners of the Empire and
Europe, Izmir was predominatly a Greek city with Greek
commercial and industrial classes. Izmir was ravaged by
fire during the Greek-Turkish conflict, so that by 1923 almost
all of Turkey's remaining industry was at Istanbul.
*These state-owned plants comprised the following:
Izmit--clothing, especially military
Feshane--clothing, fezs, blankets
Zeytinburnu--cotton, silk, striped cloth, hosiery
Basmahane--underwear
Hereke--velvet, damask, satin, taffeta
Beykoz--military shoes and books, cartridge boxes
and sword belts
Tophane--rifles, small arms
Incirkoy--porcelain, glass, coffee and tea cups
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Concentration of foreigners at Istanbul made the capital
seat of Westernizing influences within Turkey. A number of
secular institutions of higher education were established
during the 19th century to prepare leaders for a modern
society.* The first was a war college (1834); followed by
an institute of public administration for training the
bureaucracy, the law, medical and other professional schools,
and in 1900 the initial unit of Istanbul University. (10)
*Religious schools, or Medresse, for training the Moslem Clergy
had long been established throughout Anatolia. Istanbul had,
however, traditionally acted as the Empire's main secular
training center. A characteristic that distinguished the
Ottoman elite from most others in the history of empires
was its emphasis on educational rather than family background
as the chief means of entrance. This tradition dated back
to the 16th century and Suleiman the Magnificent. Suleiman
began the practice of selecting at an early age, young boys
from all over the Empire to be trained in special schools
for later service in the bureaucracy and army. The boys were
to be chosen for their ability and intelligence alone. Many
were non-Turks and many came from peasant stock. They were
taken from their families, brought to Constantinople for
training, and the most able given high posts. They remained,
however, virtual slaves of the crown. Eventually, the system
broke down through corruption, but relatively free entrance
into the governing elite could still be gained at the Empire's
demise. Thus Mustafa Kemal, son of a minor provincial govern-
ment employee, could attend the military academies and achieve
the rank of General. Frey (11) summarizes the picture as
follows:
"In general, few doors of opportunity were denied the
Muslim youth of whatever origin, who could speak and
write properly; on the contrary no talents ordinarily
availed the youth who could not. The fundamental
distinction between peasant and elite was that based
on education."
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Several foreign language high-schools or Lycees were
founded as well. Two of the most prominent were the
French-sponsored Imperial Ottoman Lycee, or "Galatasaray,"*
and the American Robert College. These, and a few of the
better provincial lycees and military academies, gave the
first training to men who would proceed to the institutes
of higher learning and eventually pass into the elite.
Kemal was himself a graduate of the War College, and
many of his fellow-reformers had attended the institutions
of Istanbul. Stimulated by their education, they were yet
appalled by other aspects of the capital's atmosphere; the
corruption and conspicuous display of the government,
the presence of foreigners whose economic concessions gave
them more rights and fewer responsibilities than Turks;
the bureaucratic and powerful Moslem clergy. These men
became aware of the great gulf between the life of Istanbul
and the poverty and ignorance of the masses outside.
Their revulsion against this life directly contributed
to the later decision to build a new capital far from
Constantinople onthe Anatolian Plateau.
*Bernard Lewis makes the following comment that categorizes
the influence Galatasary came to possess.
"As the need for administrators, diplomats, and
others with a Western education and a capacity
to handle Western administrative apparatus became
more and more pressing, the graduates of Galatasary
came to play a preponderant role in the politics
and administration of the Ottoman Empire and,
after it, of the Turkish RepublIc. The Imperial
Ottoman Lycee has no playing fields, but not a
few of the victories of modern Turkey were won
in its classrooms." (12)
C. Internal Transportation and Communications
An extensive military telegraph network covered the
Empire and put officials of all parts in communication with
the capital. However, efficient overland transportation
was limited and also served to perpetuate the dominance
of Istanbul and, to a lesser degree, Izmir.
Turkey in 1923 possessed some 4,240 km. of single
track rail line, almost all in the western third of the
country. Since the mid 19th century a railroad had linked
Istanbul with Europe. Later, German, French and English
concessionaires built a line from the Asiatic side of the
Bosphorous to connect Istanbul (Via Eskisehir, Afyon,
Konya, and Adana) with Damascus. (Map 11-7). Two spurs
extended, one east to Ankara, one west to Izmir and
Bandirma. The only other length of track was from Kars
in the east to the Russian border, built by the Russians
themselves.
The concessionaires had received mineral exploitation
rights along the system, but in general the railroad was
intended to move goods and passengers through Turkey rather
than to assist in domestic economic development. Inan's
analysis of pre-republican railroad construction concludes:
". .the railroads constructed in the terri-
tory of the Ottoman Empire were only partially
in tune with the national interest. They
were guided by financial and economic
considerations that did not always correspond
with the needs of the country." (13)
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Roads, chiefly following the ancient caravan routes,
connected the main cities and towns (Map II-6). However
only 1,000 km (less than one-quarter the length of the
railroad) were passable under all weather conditions, and
the remaining 8,300 km were badly-broken tracks. (14)
While the 350 km between Istanbul and Ankara could be
covered in less than 24 hours by train, for example, in
the best of weather a motor vehicle needed more than
three continuous days for the trip. The farther east one
went, the worse travel conditions became. Except for the
telegraph (used only by the army and public officials),
whole sections of the country were effectively isolated
from the capital and from each other.
D. The Villages
Beyond the urban frontiers of Istanbul and Izmir,
was a land peopled mainly by primitive peasants, only
loosely bound together by the Moslem religion and forced
service in the Ottoman Army. Despite the sharing of a
common language, no sense of national identity or
"peoplehood" existed before the Republic. According to
Robinson:
"Contemporary observers noted that the
ordinary Turk asked who or what he was
might answer 'I am a Moslem,' not 'I
am a Turk.' An intellectual might de-
clare 'I am an Ottoman,' but never a
'Turk,' a term of derision reserved for
the country bumpkin." (15)
Isolation marked the life of the peasant and his
village. Topography throughout Anatolia was rugged except
in the coastal areas, and communications were poor.
One commentary on the scene states "instead of one
Turkey there were a hundred--or a thousand--little Turkeys." (16)
In these villages, peasants tilled with a wooden plow,
sowed by hand, and threshed with a threshing sled in the
same fashion as did Anatclian peasants 2000 years before.
Family fields averaged about 3-5 hectares, and provided about
10 people with work and sustenance. (17) Land was largely
family-owned, except in areas (particularly along the
coasts) where rich "Agas" held property on rights from the
Empire and kept tenant farmers in serfdom. In context of
Turkey's total agricultural picture, however, the fiefdoms
of the Agas were far less than the territories of individual
families. Robinson comments:
"There was good reason for this private
ownership of land, for land was in fact the
only meaningful wealth of the Turk...It
gave a person security of life despite
war, economic crisis, unemployment,
currency debasement, inflation. The land
was still there; one could still eat." (18)
Rural overpopulation was hardly a problem at the
beginning of the Republic. Villages were widely dispersed,
and the country's overall population density was only 17.9
persons per km2 at the first census of 1927.* When a
family or village needed more land, land could be taken
with impunity so long as the demands of the next village
did not conflict. "The only limit on the amount of land a
*There were, of course, variations from the general pattern.
Central and Eastern Anatolia were more sparsely settled
than the fertile coastal regions, particularly along the
Black Sea.
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farm family could cultivate was the animal and manpower
it could recruit." (19) Both the aspirations and the
expectations of Anatolian peasantry were quite low. So
long as land could be obtained, there was no need or
thought of moving to cities. Indeed, as we note in
Chapter III, the Republican government was unable to
attract enough labor to the urban industries it constructed.
Under the Empire, the peasants profoundly mistrusted
government. For government betokened conscription and
tax collection, both to be avoided. Mistrust heightened
the peasants' desire for isolation. As a result, even
where rail lines and roads existed, there was effort to
shun contact with the outside world. Frey comments on the
"pains taken in many instances to locate...
villages in extremely isolated and
inaccessible spots, where the tax collector,
gendarme and conscription agent were less
likely to make their presence felt. From
government mainly harm was expected." (20)
We learn also that
"tax revenues per capita and per square
kilometer tended to decline in direct
proportion as the distance from Constan-
tinople increased, even after making
necessary allowances for variations in
natural resources and development." (21)
National allegiance did not exist. As a substitute,
the Moslem religion, expressed by the hocas or priests, was
the one binding force beyond allegiance to family and
village itself. And the Moslem religion recognized no
national boundaries or temporal states. All Moslems were
one people whose allegiance went to the Caliph as
Mohammed's messenger on earth.*
*The Ottoman Sultan was also Caliph of all the Moslems.
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Kemal was therefore faced with an enormously difficult
task of unification at the start of the Republic. On the
one hand mistrust of government and the isolation of peasants
had to be ended if Turkey were to survive as a nation.* On
the other, an image of a temporal state had to be given
sufficient appeal to supplant the image of an all-wise,
universal Caliphate which Kemal had set out to destroy.**
*During the Ataturk period, there were many signs of unifi-
cation difficulties; revolts from the Kurds of the eastern
highlands, sporadic uprisings of religious fanatics,
brigands looting in the southern mountains. (22) Government
forces invariably conquered, but even as late as 1937,
Linke points out the problems of subduing the mountain
people, in the case Lazes of the Black Sea region:
t... a wild mountain tribe who had for hundreds of
years resisted all attempts to tame them. They
lived in independent communities often in almost
inaccessible valleys or hidden in the mountains;
proud and hot-headed, all armed in spite of heavy
penalties and upholding the law of vendetta. Now
the government had taken up the challenge and
was trying its utmost to make them submit to a
higher order." (23)
**Although the position of Sultan was abolished with the
Republic, the Caliphate remained until 1924 when in one
stroke Kemal obliterated centuries of Moslem tradition.
Further measures to contain the Moslem hierarchy and
outlaw extremist sects followed. There was never, however,
an attempt to ban the religion itself. Ataturk claimed to
be a Moslem. He was against not the religion, but its
excesses and interference in temporal affairs. (24)
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E. The Towns
Istanbul and Izmir were the national centers of
Turkey, but a great number of towns, some quite large,
existed in Anatolia and Thrace. (Map 11-7) They were
distributed along the rail line and the caravan routes or
were ports serving a limited hinterland. Although remote
from the modernizing influences of the capital, these
towns had at least tangential relations with the outside
world. They were market centers for "isolated regional
economies" and as such acted as the sole contact points
between the villages and some form of civilization. All
told, 67 communities over 10,000 in population existed at
the 1927 census. Map 11-7 indicates that these communities
were distributed throughout the nation, with the heaviest
concentration at the west and the sparsest to the east.
Tables 11-1, 2 and 3 depict the distribution of total
and urban population by gross geographic region* for Turkey
in 1927. Although this pattern basically existed in.1923,
the reader should remember that figures for Central
Anatolia include the new development at Ankara.
The figures underscore distinctions revealed in
Map 11-7. Most of the large-city population is in the
Marmara and Aegean regions, with Istanbul and Izmir dominant.
No cities over 50,000 are in the Black Sea and (before
Ankara) the Anatolian regions. Yet each region has a
fairly significant number' of large towns, becoming sparser
towards the East.
*Please see Appendix A for the rationale behind the break-
downs by gross geographic region.
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Table II-1
Distribution of Population by Region in Turkey for 1927
Total Pop. in 000
Marmara
Aegean
Central Anatolia
Mediterranean
Black Sea
S.E. Anatolia
E. Anatolia
Total
2,590
1,533
3,127
1,152
3,201
754
1,354
13,711
Pct. of Nation
18.8
11.2
22.7
8.5
23.3
5.5
10.0
100.0
Table 11-2
Distribution of Population in Cities over 10,000
by Region for 1927
Pop. in Cities
10,000 & over No. of Pct. of
Region in 000 Cities Reg. Pop.
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anat.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anat.
E. Anatol.
Total
953
315
346
222
183
113
102
2,234
14 36.5
11 20.5
13 11.1
7 19.3
12 5.7
5 15.0
5 7.6
67 16.4
Pct. of Nat. Pop.
in Cities 10,000
and over
43.0
14.1
15.4
9.9
8.1
5.1
5.4
100.0
Source: Census (Genel Nufus Sayimi) of 1927. Base figures
above have been compiled and reproduced in Rugen
Keleg, T rkiyede §ehirlegme Hareketleri, 1927-1960,
Faculty of Political Science, Anakara, 1961,
Appendix, p. 85 FF.
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Table II-3
Distribution of Population in Cities over 50,000 by Region
for 1927
Pop. in Cities Pct. of
50,000 & over No. of Reg. Pop.
Region in 000 Cities Total Urban
Pct. of Nat. Pop.
in Cities 50,000
and over
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anat.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anat.
E. Anatol.
Total
753
154
75
73
0
0
0
2 29.0 78.0
1 10.0 49.0
1
1
0
0
0
51,055
2.4 21.5
6.3 33.0
0 0
0 0
0 0
7.7 27.0
72.0
14.6
7.1
6.3
0
0
0
100.0
Source: Keles, ibid
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Many of the communities had roots stretching back
for centuries to times when the cities of Anatolia and
Thrace had been among the most flourishing of the ancient
world. All had lost their former glory.* Some (Kayseri,
Ankara, Sivas, Diyarbakir) had been main stopping places
along the traditional east-west caravan routes. Several
(Erzurum, Eskisehir, Ankara, Sivas, and Diyarbakir) were
also major military bases for the Ottoman armies.
A number of the towns acted as distribution points
for raw materials produced within their hinterlands and
shipped overseas without significant consumption or
processing inside Turkey. Thus was Adana a center for
cotton-growing, Afyon for opium, Samsun for tobacco,
Bursa for silk, and Ankara for mohair.
Others were centers of handicraft production, much
of it conducted by non-Turkish minorities. Konya, Isparta,
and Kayseri produced hand-loomed Turkish rugs of world
fame, while Kuthaya made fine porcelain and Gaziantep
work of beaten copper and brass. Zonguldak was a mining
center for coal discovered in the region during the 19th
century.
Productive activities in these communities illustrated
that Turkey did have resources to be exploited outside of
the comparatively developed Marmara and Aegean areas.
*Such as: the ancient Greek colony of Trabzon; the Pontic
capital of Amasya; Paul's Tarsus; Konya, capital of the
Seljuk Empire that preceded Ottoman Turkey; Edirne,-the
Ottoman capital before Istanbul. Most of the Hittite,
Phrygian, and Ionian cities of early history had fallen
into ruin by Ottoman times.
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Nevertheless, in Turkey of 1923 this production in no way
resembled modern industry. It was either the work of
individual skilled artisans or an exploitation of the
earth with primitive technology.
The Turkish population of these provincial towns
were military commanders and their staffs, Ottoman bureau-
crats, landowning families, a few merchants, some artisans
and the Moslem Clergy. They were quite different in
orientation from counterparts at Istanbul. For few had
been exposed to the more modern of the concepts slowly
Mraking their way iito.Turkey.
Indeed, it was the town, not the village where the
greatest danger to Ataturk's campaign of national inte-
gration and reformism lay. For it was the town, not the
village, where women were veiled with the "carsaf," and
the town, not the village, where the strongest centers of
Moslem tradition existed:
"Heavily influenced by religious leaders and
economically based on the status quo, these
groups (the town elite) were resistent to
social change. They tended to block national
economic integration, for they feared out-
side competition and the challenge to their
authority inherent in that competition.
Their conservatism was supported by the
larger landowners and religious leaders,
who likewise gained authority and prestige
in the relative isolation of the provincial
town.
Together, this small town "middle class"
provided the hard core of reaction to Kemal's
later social innovations." (25)
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But the people of these interior communities and
their hinterlands were also the bulk of the military and
political support for the revolution. Most of this
revolution had been fought on the Anatolian plateau,
while Istanbul and Izmir were under allied occupation.
The townspeople had no love for foreign domination or
the economic hegemony of Constantinople, and here lay an
element of strength on which Ataturk could capitalize.
It was when the economic and cultural implications of
Turkish nationalism began to dawn, that Ataturk stood
to encounter resistance.
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II. The Origins of a Decentralization Policy
" it was necessary to proceed by stages,
to prepare the feeling and the spirit of the
nation and to try to reach our aim by
degrees, profiting meanwhile by our exper-
ience...Our general behavior has never deviated
from the lines laid down by our original
resolution, nor from the purpose we set out
to achieve...but we never disclosed the
views we held. If we had done so we would
have been looked upon as dreamers and
illusionists .. .The only practical and
safe road to success lay in making each
step perfectly understood at the right
time...this is how I acted."
--- Ataturk (26)
Thus spoke Kemal in reference to his conduct during
the war of liberation. Ataturk was a military man who
had mastered both the strategy and tactics of modern
warfare. He was also to apply this sense of directing
all efforts towards a larger objective in his carrer as
civilian leader.
Kemal's goal, which he followed with amazing constancy
for the 15 years from 1923 until his death in 1938 and
the succession of Ismet Inonu,* was to create a Turkish
nation, economically and politically independent of
foreign domination, yet oriented towards Western Civilization.
It was to be a nation in which Western concepts of educa-
tion and culture played dominant roles. Given Turkey and
the Turks as they existed in 1923--a battle-scarred,
bankrupt land with a 10 percent literacy rate** and no
#tnonu was a general during the War of Independence and had
served as Ataturk's Prime Minister for most of the 1923-38
period.
**This was the figure obtained in the 1927 census.
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tradition of national consciousness--this loomed as one
of the most difficult modernization efforts ever attempted
before or since. "No revolutionary leader," says Muller,
"has gone faster and farther...on so many different fronts.
None has had to contend with a more massive, hostile
tradition." (27)
The development policies implemented over succeeding
years were among the most important tools with which
Kemal hoped to fabricate this modern, western-oriented
nation.
Yet Ataturk's dream for peacetime Turkey was perhaps
even more visionary than that of winning the war. He
therefore continued his habit of rarely articulating the
broad rationale behind specific actions. It is left
to the critics and observers to interpret the meaning
behind many of the bold steps taken. Four such steps
were measures that promoted economic and cultural develop-
ment outside the traditional centers of Istanbul and
Izmir. They were:
1. Creation of a new administrative and cultural
capital at Anakara.
2. Transformation of many provincial towns into
modern cities by making them governmental and
cultural centers fortheir respective hinter-
lands and by initiating extensive municipal
construction projects.
3. Extension of railroad lines to these provincial
towns, thereby connecting them with Ankara and
the Western coast.
4. Establishment of large industries owned and
operated by the state in many interior centers.
Although these programs comprised the major investment
efforts of the Ataturk (and later Inonu) period, they were
not expressed as part of a consistent decentralization
policy. We must, therefore, "read between the lines" to
re-construct the rationale for a development effort that
appeared to be based on the spread of modern productive
and cultural activity. Six factors are suggested below,
roughly in order of importance.
1. The severe problem of unification and the need
to bring all parts of the nation under the
government's control. Wartime allegiance against
a common enemy had begun to draw the Turks
together. But now that the enemy had been
defeated, new techniques were needed by which
the nation could be held together and effective
government established during peacetime.*
*Many dictators faced with similar unification problems
(i.e. Soekarno, Nasser, Castro in contemporary times)
have tried to establish a "national" spirit by deflecting
resentment against an imagined aggressor. It is a sign of
Ataturk's genius that he did not choose this course after
the Greek war. Instead he tried to concentrate energies
exclusively on the internal build-up of the nation itself.
He said:
"In order that our nation should be able to live
a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is
necessary that the state should pursue an
exclusively national policy and that this policy
should be in perfect agreement with our internal
organization and be based on it." (28)
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2. The desire to Westernize Turkish culture and
to introduce the education and value-patterns
of a modern economic state. This end could be
achieved only if modernizing influences spread
out of their incubeIn Istanbul and Izmir.
3. The imbalanced pattern of modern economic develop-
ment depicted above. Industrialization had been
confined to the two Western centers and their -
hinterlands. Kemal could choose to build on
the already established base of these centers,
but if he did, interior resources would probably
remain unexploited. Little was known about these
resources, yet small probes had indicated that
interior Turkey was rich in minerals (coal,
copper) and held greater potential for industrial
crops (i.e. cotton for textiles) whose full
development could lead the nation towards self-
sufficiency.
4. The revulsion against Ottoman life and its
symbolic seat at Istanbul felt by Ataturk and his
close associates. Here there is a seeming
contradiction. Kemal wanted to direct his people
towards Western civilization and culture, but he
intended to do it by "abandoning" the center of
all previous Western influences. Yet one can
not overestimate the degree to which the few
intellectuals who made the revolution felt that
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Turkey must start completely anew and eliminate
those ties with its past which were decadent.*
A Turkish commentator summarizes this attitude:
"The new Turkey completely rejects its history
of the last six centuries, a history often
glorious but one which carried too many bad
habits, too many reactionary forces. Thus
felt the new leaders.
The cessation of functions of the old
capital is a necessary condition of this
rejection, this clean break. The new regime
wants to have its capital where it can breathe,
free of the atmosphere, of the structure, of
the habits which are deeply anchored in the
old." (29)
5. Fear of invasion. After the Treaty of Lausanne,
Turkey and the allied powers still held each
other in mutual mistrust. Russia, long an enemy,
during its Bolshevik period was alternating
between attempts to assist and attempts to subvert
the new Turkish nation. (30) Thus, the government
became security conscious (although again it did
not use this fear to stimulate aggressive drives
among the people). Istanbul and Izmir, as well
as Thrace and the other coastal areas were in
exposed positions vis a vis amphibious attack.
*Ataturk.by no means rejected the entire Turkish past,
however. He tried to establish roots for the Turks in
Hittite and Sumerian history, saying that these peoples
were the true ancestors of modern Turkey and that the
Turks were not really nomads from Central Asia who
gravitated to Anatolia during the Middle Ages. The two
main government development banks were called Eti (Hittite)
and Sumer (Sumerian), and the Hittite lion was re-introduced
as a national symbol. Today one can approach Ataturk's
tomb along a great promenade flanked by stone replicas of
the Hittite lion.
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Defense was therefore a significant consideration
in leading the government to develop the more
sheltered interior. We see Celal Bayar (the
Minister of Economy) in particular use it as an
argument for location of state industry in
Anatolia.
"In extraordinary circumstances, for example
in case of mobilization, we would have no
factory which could produce goods for
Central Anatolia." (31)
This xenophobia also contributed to the
government's desire that Turkey become less
dependent on industrial imports and move towards
self-sufficiency.
It is the writer's own impression, however,
that defense was often used as a "public"
justification for location of investment that
might otherwise be unpalatable to people in the
western centers unsympathetic to interior
development.
6. The wartime support of Anatolia. Here is where
most of the Greek-Turkish conflict was fought.
The townspeople and peasants of Anatolia supported
the Kemalist armies. To them Ataturk owed a debt
which was not lightly discharged.
Out of these considerations, a development policy
emphasizing decentralization was eminently logical. Backed
by vast numbers of dedicated followers, but armed with
only a very few Istanbul and foreign-trained people to
carry out the modernization process, Kemal then faced
the problem of designing a strategy for the effort. To
a military man, the towns of Anatolia and Thrace provided
excellent control points. If the bulk of hit resources
and modernizers could be concentrated in these towns, the
towns might be transformed to a degree where they could
radiate the message of New Turkey to the countryside.
Once the mentality of the towns was changed, and once
communications were improved among the towns and a
national capital, then the reformist gospel might have a
chance to spread.
Although the towns harbored the most articulate
reaction to Ataturk's liberalizing ideas, these communities
which were distributed throughout the nation and in
reach of the rural masses, provided the only physical
opportunity for the new regime to reach its people with
the new gospel of nationalism, to govern them effectively,
and to make a start towards a modern economic state.
The transformation would not begin with the peasantry.*
Ataturk took a calculated risk that their low levels of
*Frey points out: "It was by no means an immediate attempt
to remold the society by starting with the peasant masses.
Such an attempt was not in keeping with the history of the
Turkish revolutionary movement or the psychologies of Its
leaders. Moreover, the task was simply too immense for
such an approach. As in most emergent nations, a smaller
handle was necessary, a lever more easily grasped." (32)
...the immediate goal was not the fundamental improvement
of the peasant's lot or the grant to him of increased
power. Those were for the future." (33)
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expectation and their ability to expand farmland in sparsely
settled country would keep the peasants from growing
restive while the major task of building new urban centers
was under way.* The Kemalist development was to be
"forced from the top" via a network of modern urban
centers throughout the land.**
*This is not to say Kemal ignored the peasants. Indeed,
many agricultural reforms were intr'oduced. The authority
of the Agricultural Bank and its lending power were
increased. Several state industries (Ch. III) were geared
to processing agricultural produce, and their demands,
particularly for sugar, resulted in substantial improvement
of nearby rural living standards. Special schools were
established in the late 1930's (Village Institutes) to
train teachers for rural work. However, relatively little
actual investment was devoted to rural areas during the
one-party governments of Ataturk and Inonu. Figures are
difficult to obtain, but a U.N. survey (34) states that
investment in agriculture did not go beyond 3 percent of
total public expenditures annually, compared with 8-9
percent for railroads and a similar amount (after 1933)
for industries.
**Frey terms the "essence" of the Ataturk revolution
its "concentration on the extension and consolidation of
this beachead to make it secure beyond all possible
challenge, This effort involved the final expulsion of
religion and the medresse-trained individuals from the
temple of politics and the attempt to make the uncongenial
cities and larger towns of Anatolia habitable for the new
class of Westernized Turkish intellecturals." (35)
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CHAPTER THREE
POLICY AND PROGRAMS UNDER THE REPUBLICANS, 1923-1950
I. Ankara as National Center
"It was a question of the future legally
to fix the seat of the Government of New
Turkey. Considerations of all kinds
categorically demanded that this seat
could only be in Anatolia and at Angora.
Geographic and strategic position was
of the very first importance."
--- Ataturk (1)
A. History
Ankara in 1920 was a mud-brick town of 25,000 people,
subsisting on a declining mohair trade and its role as
a military base. It lay well within the barren central
plateau-. 'No place could be a more unpromising capital
for a new nation.
Ankara's history dates back to a village in the
Hittite period. Under the-Phrygians-it received the name
of Ancyra and then had several owners before becoming '
capital of the Roman province of Galatia. Ankara commanded
a strategic pass on the main east-west trade route for
the Persians, Romans, and later Ottomans (Maps 11-3,4,5)
and as such held some military significance.
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Although it may have reached a population of 100,000
during the Roman period (2), in Ottoman times Ankara
shrank back to an importance much less than Konya, Kayseri,
and Sivas as a strong point on the plateau.
Ankara did have an important commercial position
during the Empire, however. It became the center of
mohair production, and the Angora goat takes its name
from the region. Turkish mohair won world renown. The
hand-loomed fabric was much in demand until competition
from South Africa during the 19th century and the intro-
duction of machined textiles to Europe.
In an effort to revive the mohair trade, European
concessionaires extended a spur from the Constantinople-
Damascus railroad to Angora in 1892 (3). But war was
already near, and the rail line did not prevent further
economic decline in the region.
B. The Decision
After the Balkan wars and subsequent defeats, about
1912 the Ottoman government thought seriously of moving
its seat of control (4). The field of battle was coming
closer to Constantinople, which was particularly vulnerable
to attack.* Among the inland cities suggested were Konya,
Kayseri, and Kuthaya. Angora was not even considered.
Constantinople remained, however, the official capital
of Turkey until the onset of the Republies.
*Had the British fleet before the battle of Gallipoli in
1914 realized that the Turkish batteries on the Dardenelles
were out of ammunition, they would have sailed up the
straits to take Constantinople probably without a shot,
thereby proving the government's fears correct. (5)
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During the revolution, Kemal first assembled his
political and military supporters in two successive
"temporary" capitals, Erzurum and Sivas. But neither
of these was close enough to the battle lines in Western
Anatolia. They also had poor communications with
Constantinople where other adherants of Kemal still
tried to gain support from the Sultan and his assembly
in the struggle against the allied surrender terms.
Ankara was then chosen as the main control point for the
Greek war because of its proximity to the front, its
position on the railway, and the support of its people
for the Kemalist movement. (6)
The assembly was dissolved at Istanbul in 1920 and
joined Kemal at Ankara. In 1923, as part of the
Republican constitution, Ankara was finally declared as
the permanent capital.
This decision was not unopposed. Many members of
the new Assembly, including those who regarded the revo-
lution as a means of dislodging foreign invaders but were
not prepared to eliminate the Sultanate, favored keeping
Istanbul as capital. Several objected to Kemal's authori-
tarianism and felt that the physical presence of a
government in Istanbul would curb his powers.
"A return to the straits, they felt, would
be symbolic of the continuity of Turkish
governments. Once the Chamber of Deputies
was re-occupied, the Ghazi's authority
c uld be check-reined." (7)
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Yet Ataturk prevailed. He was determined to wipe out
any trace of Ottoman decadence in the new Republic. He
was equally determined to give the Turks a capital in their
own heartland, one which could be easily defended in
conventional war, yet could stand as a symbol of Turkey
for the Turks.* The surroundings of Ankara were barren and
primitive. Farming might never be productive in the
region, nor were there natural resources to provide a base
for industrialization. Economically, the decision bordered
on madness, but Ataturk's decision was not made on economic
grounds.
He took a calculated risk on capturing the imagination
of the Turkish people, and his choice paid off in an
outpouring of national dedication. The prevalent Turkish
view of Ankara was expressed by one civil servant who said
to Linke:
"We'll show the world that if we choose to
do so, we can build a modern town right
in the middle of the desert. They shan't
ever call us uncivilized again." (9)
*This attitude bears striking similarity to the "frontier
spirit" of American Westward expansion and the attitude
of some 19th century Venezuelan writers who, according
to Friedmann, believed that the true heartland of Venezuela
lay not in Caracas but in the Guayana Region where one
could grapple with nature free from the foreign influences
of the capital. Yet there is also a distinct difference.
For Ataturk looked to establish a new urban culture in
interior Turkey and did not glorify the virtues of a
"pure" rural society. Gates comments:
"Istanbul had a foreign culture; it was not Turkey.
While the revolution implied the adoption of much
that was European, it could not have succeeded
had its center been in the old capital. At long
last, the government is at home amont its people." (8)
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John Dewey, in an early visit to the new capital,
expressed what he felt to be the climate of the city as
follows:*
"In comparison with the efforts being put
forth, Constantinople seems not old but
tired; here we get the impression that man
and nature have met neither in harsh
hostility nor in a surrender of man to
nature, but in a challenge of athletic
combat. The very immensity of the task, its
seeming hopelessness, have awakened new and
fresh vigor. We readily abandon ourselves
to a mood in which everything that greets
the eye becomes symbolic." (10)
Thus Ankara became the seat of new parliament buildings
and government offices and housing for civil servants.
*In general, however, foreign reaction to the Ankara decision
was extremely negative. Even though the government gave
free land for embassies, in the early years few were built.
Diplomats preferred to stay in their villas on the Bosphorous
and make arduous weekly trips to Ankara for consultation.
But this was not to last long, as more and more governmental
functions developed in Ankara and forced foreign attendance.
Toynbee praises the effects Ankara had on Turkish politicians
during the early t20ts (It "turned their minds inward upon
themselves and drove deeper into them the particular
Western impiessions they had already received") but con-
cludes that on the whole the transfer of the capital had
been a bad thing. He cites the decline and neglect of
Istanbul which had become "a provincial seaport town" and
castigates the substitution:
"The removal of the capital to that outlandish spot
if politically justifiable has proved to be economically
questionable. Seldom has the political government of
a state been so completely divorced from the commercial
life of the country. Even two years after the
establishment of the Republic, the President had not
paid a visit to Constantinople...The result of this
aloofness has been apparent." (11)
Not all the Turks were overjoyed either. Even such a
staunch supporter as Halide Edib was skeptical about Ankara's
permanence.(12) The parallel between these negative re-
actions and those of many Brazilians and foreigners to
Brasilia as a replacement for Rio de Janeiro is striking.
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C. Centralized Controi--The "Natural Resource"
of Ankara
Had Ankara been capital of a federated nation (the
role played by Canberra, Ottowa, or Washington) in which
regional and central powers were comparable, the area
might not have experienced its subsequent growth and
diversification. Kemal establisned, however, that all
major public policy decisions would be made at Ankara
and then carried out in the provinces by officials
directly responsible to the capital. Thus, Ankara was
endowed with a "resource" which guaranteed its dominance
over national life. The mud-brick town on the plateau
became the decision-making center of a nation.
Many of Ataturk's reforms were departures from
Ottoman tradition; centralized government was not. This
form of control was essentially the same as prevailed in
the Empire during the 19th century and emanated from Istanbul.*
*Bernard Lewis (13) has chronicled the struggle within the
Ottoman hierarchy to deterinine an effective'form of govern-
ment for the Empire. Over the centuries, systems varied
from centralization to extremely lax decentralized power
with provincial rulers exercising control virtually
independent of the Sublime Porte. During the 19th century
"look towards the West," however, France and the French
system of government appealed to the Ottoman rulers.
This French system, under which an assembly and executive
exerted strong central control carried out on a local
level through appointed prefects and sub-prefects was
finally adopted with some modifications. The Empire was
divided into districts of varying sizes whose chain of
command reported directly to Istanbul. The "professional
bureaucrat," long an acceptable social role for Turks,
took on new significance. But despite an Empire wide
telegraph system, the generally poor communications cited
earlier prevented central government from exercising
effective power down to the local level.
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The Republic retained centralization for three
important reasons:
1. It existed. For the revolutionaries to attempt
creation of a radically new state and a new form
of government simultaneously would prove too
immense a task. Ataturk was a visionary, but
also a pragmatist.
2. Need for control. The country was not yet unified
in spirit. Tight reins were needed over what
decisions were made or not made, and parts of the
nation could not be allowed to "go it alone. "
3. The paucity of trained talent to carry out
modernization. Only a few men and women were
capable of producing plans and giving orders
(in education and economic development as well as
administration). They had to be concentrated at
the center and in easy communication with each
other. Field cadres had to be given limited
responsibility and to report directly to the
center to forestall. mistakes about- policy,
implementation. *
*Akcura summarizes as follows:
"The Turkish Republic deliberately opted for an
extremely centralized regime...
The State wanted to unify a country which politically
had never been unified. It proposed to eliminate certain
forms of life that had been apparent. But competent
personnel were wanting. The suspicion against religious
and social reaction was strong. Thus the "absolutist"
attitude developed, opposed to every form of decentrali-
zation." (14)
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At Ankara a single-chamber Grand National Assembly
held complete legislative and executive powers according
to Article 5 of the Constitution. In fact, Ataturk and
later Inonu, as the Assembly-appointed President, wielded
much of the power.
The main difference between this system and its
Ottoman predecessor was the degree to which government
actually penetrated everyday life in the provinces. Ataturk
established welfare functions for the first time. The
Ministry of Public Works was now to have responsibility
for extending infra-structure to all parts of the country.
New banks and development agencies were founded.
Most of these operations would have representatives on the
provincial level, responsible both to the parent agency
and the provincial governor for carrying out programs
developed in the capital. Ankara was the nerve center.
When roads were built, all roads would lead to Ankara.
The hierarchy of local government which reported to
Ankara began with the provinces or "Vilayets." There were
52 of these in 1923 (now 66), each with a Vilayet center
and each governed by a "Vali" appointed by the Ministry
of Interior in Ankara. Vilayets were divided into "Kazas"
or counties, broken further into "Nahiye" sub units.
Each of these had an Ankara-appointed administrator as well.
A "physical" result of this power centralization and
the increasing role of the State, saw representatives of
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central government established in just about every city
and town, large and small, throughout the nation. Their
dependence on Ankara for orders, approvals, and budgets
further drew the countryside into contact with the capital
and gave Ankara a form of effective political dominance
over the nation which Istanbul had never possessed.* The
railroad-oriented transport program (p. 132) was partially
intended to solidify this dominance and bring the capital
into easy contact with the outlying regions.
*It is helpful to quote at length from Lewis' description
of the hierarchical system:
"In the theory of Turkish law the vilayet and its sub-
divisions thus provide the local government of the country.
In fact the control of the Ministry of the Interior in
provincial affairs is very strict. The Vali, Kaymakam and
others are all ministry-appointed permanent officials.
The vilayet budget is provided from the centre; it may
be supplemented by loans, but not by local taxation, which
the vilayet council has no power to impose. The council,
an elected body, meets normally for forty days in the year,
under the presidency of the Vali.
The kaza is not a legal person, and has no elected
assembly. Its administrator, the Kaymakloam is a subordinate
of the Vali, but is a central government official appointed
from Ankara. The nahiye, the smallest sub-unit of the
vilayet is administered by the Mudur, also a central
government officer, but on a different ladder of promotion
from the Kaymakam and Vali. He presides over a nahiye
council, consisting of the local officials and technicians
together with one elected representative from each village
or municipality. Finally there is the village, established
as a legal entity for the first time by the village law
of 18 March 1924. The villagers elect a muhtar and council
of elders, in which the schoolteacher and imam are ex
officio members. Although the muhtar is an elected official
who represents the villagers, he is also in effect and
usually in the first instance, an administrative officer,
representing the central government in the village and
carrying out whatever instructions reach him through the
chain of command." (15)
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Yet Kemal was not content with giving Ankara political
and administrative functions. If it were to replace
successfully the image of Istanbul, Ankara must become a
cultural capital as well.
D. The Cultural Center
Steps to transform Ankara into a national center of
learning and culture had the characteristic 'elan of the
Ataturk touch.
In 1926, Kemal abolished the Moslem laws and courts
that had governed sectarian life. In their place came the
Swiss civil law, the German commercial code, the French
penal code, and the Italian health code.. .with some
revisions but essentially the same as they existed in
Europe. Few Turks could understand these, and lawyers
became a necessity. Thus a new law school was established
in Ankara to which any aspiring barrister was obliged to
come.* Soon the Institute of Public Administration
(Mulkiye) was taken from Istanbul and became a Political
Science Faculty in Ankara to train the new bureaucracy.
By 1936 Ataturk could declare:
"A medical faculty is now underway to lay
a foundation for the future of higher
education and Ankara University. I want
now to envigorate a new connection with the
fine arts. It will give me great pleasure
to talk of a conservatory and a theatre
academy in Ankara. Every phase of fine
arts...brings great advances to the people
of the Republic in their cultured and
industrious life." (16)
*Until the Istanbul curriculum was also revised, p. 164.
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A conservatory and theatre did come in the '30's.
They were followed by five museums, more university
faculties, sport fields and stadia, a youth park,. and an
opera house, as well as hospital and medical facilities.
Dominating all of these institutions, on a high knoll
above the city, was the largest of Turkey's "People's
Houses" (see p.32 6 ), a center for adult education which
offered a wide variety of activities.*
Newspapers were founded and a state radio station
inaugurated and allowed to play music only from the
Western classics.
On the one hand, these operations provided many of
the amenities of urban life which made existence in Ankara
bearable and which even Istanbul did not possess. On the
other, they were mutually-reinforcing in a successful
effort to create a vigorous cultural and intellectual
center for the new nation. Their personnel were
cosmopolitan people who would not otherwise have come to
Ankara, modernizers whose skills contributed to the
permanence and growth of the city. (17)
Perhaps the only significant activity not fostered
during the 1923-50 period was religion. No new mosques
were constructed while the city was growing from 25,000
to almost 300,000 citizens.
*Kemal employed a great number of foreigners in establishing
these educational and cultural institutions such as John
Dewey for education, Paul Hindemuth for Music, Sadlers
Wells Ballet for the Ballet, prominent European jurists
for the law.
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1. The Plan
As part of his concern with the "symbolic" contri-
bution of Ankara, Ataturk wanted the city itself to be an
example of planned, Western-style development. A special
competition among selected European architects was held
in 1927 for a master plan, and the Austrian Dr. Herman
Jansen received the award. He then supervised construction
of the city according to the plan until the outbreak of
World War II. (18)
Jansen's scheme lacked the grandeur and architectonic
beauty of Brasilia and Chandigarh. Indeed, the 1930
Germanic architecture to which it led was quite undis-
tinguished. But his concept of broad avenues, low density,
and much green space was completely new to Turkey and
about as antithetical to the twisted streets and congestion
of Istanbul as any scheme could be.
Jansen laid out sites for public, institutional,
and private uses and programmed utilities for a 1980
population of 300,000.
The government also established a continuing Ankara
planning commission, directly responsible to the Minister
of Interior, with complete power over development,
including the right to expropriate and subdivide land.
Jansen was made a member of this commission. During the
1927-1950 period both public and private construction
had to be approved in accordance with the plan. Ankara
was a boom town under enormous expansion pressures, but
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the government was able to achieve some success in directing
and channeling its growth.*
E. Agriculture and State Industry
Despite the seemingly poor prospects for agriculture
or industry in Central Anatolia, the government decided
to attempt at least some diversification of Ankara's
economic base.
Ataturk was particularly concerned that the capital
be provided with produce and that technical assistance
be given to peasants in the region. He therefore
established a large demonstration farm and forest at
Ankara's northern boundary. His will decreed that the
land never be turned to other uses. It remains today as
a green barrier to urban growth. (20)
*Ankara did have severe problems, particularly in the
latter part of the Republican period and during the War.
Jansen's plan was too small (its 1980 population target
was almost reached'in 1950) as Ankara continued to
attract population beyond all expectations. (In 1950,
less than 25 percent of its population had been born
in the province.) Housing could not keep up with the
demand, and the problem of squatters began to be acute.
These difficulties should, however, be seen in context
of the government's groping yet sustained effort to
increase Ankara's attractiveness. For as Bischoff puts
its: "Ankara was the first city that the Turks ever
built themselves." (19)
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The farm did succeed in developing a wide variety of
crops for sale in the urban market. Its carefully-managed
dairy herd made Ankara (even in 1960) the sole area other
than Istanbul where safe, pasteurized milk could be
regularly obtained. We have only impressionistic data
on the farm's effectiveness in.influencing private
rationalization of agriculture. Nevertheless, the wide-
spread fruit and vegetable cultivation, tree-planting and
dairying in villages near the capital is hardly paralleled
elsewhere on the plateau. If not the farm, then the
growing urban market did have some substantial influence.
In 1930 an Agricultural Faculty was also founded at
Ankara University. It, too, conducted demonstration
programs outside the city.
As for industry, a large cement mill was established
in the 1920's to provide building material for the
construction program. It was followed by a brewery. The
major public industry in the region, howiever, was to have
no relation to local resources or consumption needs. It
was nonetheless suited to the region's functions. This
was armaments and munitions.
Ankara became a national military headquarters, and
the government decided to consolidate its source of weapon
supply in the immediate area. Plants were established in
Ankara itself, but mainly in the satellite town of
Kirikkale, 30 kilometers to the southeast. By 1950,
Kirikkale had a population of 15,000, mostly attached to
the weapons plant. (21)
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F. The Attractions for Private Enterprise
Ankara had no natural resources whose exploitation
might act as the basis for creating a growth region.
Nevertheless, by 1950 the central government activity had
succeeded in attracting substantial complements of private
fabricators, businesses, and service operations to the area.
In 1950, the city alone held 22,000 workers in industry
and construction, representing almost 20 percent of its own
active labor force and 5 percent of the Turkish total.
ThiLr6samore than Ankara's entire population, thirty years
before. Next to Istanbul and Izmir, Ankara had become the
nation's third largest industrial center. (22) Perhaps
less than 10 percent of these workers were employed at the
government plants.
Many operations were directly related to the growing
Ankara market and, according to Akcura (23), of the
traditional, small-scale rudimentary type. Yet the market
for such processes as printing, pharmaceuticals, and auto
supplies had also become larger than Ankara itself. Other
Anatolian cities began to grow, due to government's efforts,
and transportation between them and Ankara improved.
Ankara, rather than Istanbul, was now the most accessible
major city for entrepreneurs wanting to cultivate new
markets in the interior but reluctant to locate outside a
cosmopolitan atmosphere. The significant fact is that a
new group of entrepreneurs did materialize in Central
Anatolia once the opportunity for profit began to exist.
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Many offices of commercial and industrial firms
operating in the western cities also established themselves
in Ankara. Access to government officials was crucial, for
Ankara officials made the important decisions on taxes,
customs duties, or import quotas that determined much of
a firm's profits. (24)
Along with the government and commercial offices, the
factories and institutions, came shops, restaurants,
entertainment facilities and people to perform professional
services. Ataturk did some "pump-priming" in these areas,
too, during the early years. The first hotel was
government-built and government-owned; and the President
personally brought a Russian chef to start the first "good"
restaurant in the city. But as time passed, there was a
spontaneous development of service activities. For Ankara
was providing a relatively large and wealthy market to be
tapped. By 1950, the province held under 5 percent of
Turkey's total population yet accounted for almost 12
percent of all personal income tax payments. * (25)
It is interesting to note that this diversification
of economic activity did not occur in the first years of
Ankara's establishment. Akcura's figures indicate that
expansion in industry and commercial services was not
significant until late in the 1930's. (26) By this time
the basic governmental and cultural activities had been
established and were employing a sizeable number of people.
*Personal income taxes were not levied on peasants and
others in the agricultural sector at this time.
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The city-building had long since begun. Transportation
lines and urban utilities had been installed to sustain
urban development.* This phenomenon bears out the
hypothesis stated in Chapter I, that a growth region must
experience a "first round" of development in which basic
resources are profitably exploited and main elements of
infra-structure are installed before diversified activity
can occur. In Ankara, the basic resource which drew to
it new forms of development was the consolidated power of
central government itself.
G. The Lesson of Ankara
Statistical data are scanty and an evaluation can
only be tentative, but by 1950 Ankara was evidencing all
of the growth region characteristics depicted in Chapter I.
1. Urbanization. The city itself had increased
in population from 20,000 in 1920 to almost
300,000. In 1950, less than 25 percent of its
residents had been born in the province of Ankara.
2. Basic Industry. Government was the basic
industry. Despite the skeptics, Ankara had
survived to become a viable national capital.
3. Industrial Complexes. Ankara had become the
country's third largest industrial center.
*During the '30's a municipal water supply from Cubuk
reservoir 10 km distant and a coal-burning electric
station were constructed to provide essential urban
utilities.
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4. Income and Services. For Turkey, incomes in
Ankara appeared relatively high, and a substantial
growth in services had occurred.
5. Education and Infra-Structure. Ankara was the
nation's cultural capital, with a wide variety
of educational services available only there.
Although shortages in housing and municipal
utilities were apparent, the shortages were not
severe enough to prevent further growth.
6. Rationalization of Agriculture. Through the
Ataturk farm, other governmental efforts, and
the development of an urban market, the area
around Ankara was producing a variety of cash-
crops.
7. An Atmosphere for Development. Ankara had
succeeded in becoming the symbol of new Turkey.
Its attractiveness, growth, and diversification
all indicated that it possessed some character-
istics of an atmosphere conducive to development.
None of this development could have occurred, if the
government had failed to devote an enormous amount of
energies and investments to building up the capital and
its assets.* Government's attention was concentrated and
was itself diverse. Not only public buildings and transport
lines, but also cultural and educational facilities,
*Unfortunately we have no record of the funds expended, but
can only assume they were substantial,
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industries, agriculture, and even entertainment were all
public concerns. Ataturk's goal was to create a viable
center that might replace both the public activities and
the public image of Istanbul. He launched a multi-phased
effort, involving many discrete yet related sectors, to
accomplish the task.
This was not a single, short-term "push" of energies
and investments. The effort was sustained over a thirty-
year period, and only half-way through the period was the
build-up of assets sufficient for spontaneous, private
investment to begin.
To a large degree, "special" administrative super-
vision was applied in expeditiig the public phases of
development. The President made Ankara a "project" of
highest priority and devoted to it his personal interest.
The Minister of Interior, through his special Ankara
planning commission, was intimately involved with the
details of Ankara's growth. Both concentration and
continuity of effort were maintained as the capital
grew and became a new development area in the Anatolian
wilderness. Development of Ankara, however, was but a
single phase of the Republican government's attempt to
spread economic and cultural change from their initial
points of concentration along the Western coast. For a
fuller assessment of decentralization activity we must now
examine the attempt to transform provincial communities,
their communications, and their economies.
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II. Transformation of Provincial Communities
Ankara represented an opportunity to construct an
entirely new Turkish culture in a place unspoiled by
earlier associations. The old town was completely
enveloped and subdued by the new activity and people.
In provincial communities, however, the task was
somewhat different and far more difficult. Ataturk wanted
to transform these conservative market towns into
bastions of the new nation and the civilization for which
it stood; but these towns could not be wiped out or
submerged. Only a few modernizers and investments were
available for each, and these had to be inserted into
existing social and physical structure. Reaction and
ignorance were long rooted in many of the provincial
centers, and the job of "transformation without inundation"
thus presented almost insurmountable obstables.
Nevertheless the transformation effort was extended
to localities throughout the country, mainly the 60-odd
towns of over 10,000 in population. Specific programs
included the grant of corporate status to municipalities,
widespread municipal construction projects, and establish-
ment of new educational and cultural institutions.
A. Corporate Status
If Turkeyts development was to stem from the city,
the city had to possess a separate identity. Under the
Sultans, municipal entities did not exist.
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"Just as there was no state, but only a ruler
and his agents.. .so there was no city but only
a conglomeration of families, quarters and
guilds, each with their own chiefs and leaders.
...and the town never became a legal or political
entity--neither as a fief, nor as a commune.
Those charged with its government were not
municipal officers, nor yet feudatories; still
less were they civil servants in the modern
sense. For the most part they were royal
officers, with revocable, delegated powers from
the sovereign; or else members of the religious
class, charged with certain duties of prevention
and enforcement, where the provisions of the
Holy law were concerned." (27)
Some corporate status was achieved for Istanbul late
in the Empire, and a law was promulgated in 1870 to
establish municipal councils for provincial cities.
This was never enforced. (28)
In 1930 the government passed a Law of Municipalities
under which every community over 2000 in population was
given "belediye" status. A municipal council was to be
elected, from whose membership a mayor would be chosen.*
To assure the belediyes' suborditation to the central
state, provincial governers held veto power over election
of any mayor they found unacceptable.
Under these corporate arrangements, municipalities
had more duties than privileges. They were required, for
example, to establish public libraries, playgrounds and
public parks and to make maps and town plans. Each was to draw
up a five-year capital improvement program. Local fire
and sewage control would be municipal responsibilities, and
*Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, however, had appointed mayors
who were also the provincial governors.
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the towns were also to regulate commerce through issuance
of licenses and to establish slaughterhouses.
The larger municipalities had to build hospitals and
nurseries. Such public facilities as night clubs, casinos,
theatres, museums, as well as low-cost housing were made
optional for belediyes of all sizes.* (29)
This municipal legislation was a major advance over any-
thing that had gone before. It provided an opportunity (and
the responsibility) for local people to participate in the
affairs of government for the first time. But it was still
"forced from the top" on communities, many of whom found the
laws far beyond their understanding or capability to execute.
The Turks were being forced to be free and civilized and
cultured and were being forced to adopt the symbols of a
modern state perhaps before they were ready.
Even if the towns understood their duties, local financial
resources were kept so limited by law (30) that few of the
required works could be handled completely by the communities
themselves. As a result, much of the actual financial and
planning responsibility rested with the Ministry of Public
Works in Ankara.** Yet forced or spontaneous, changes in
the physical character of the towns proceeded rapidly.
*One can imagine the sharp break with spartan Moslem tradi-
tion implied by the night club and casino provisions.
**In 1933 a Belediye Bank was established to make loans on
municipal improvements and handle much of their design. A
housing loan bank, Emlak ve Eytam Bankasi, had been
inaugurated in 1927, mainly for financing of housing and
public works in Ankara. It also operated in other cities.
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B. Municipal Construction and Beautification
Ataturk himself was the guiding spirit behind much
of the early municipal improvements. He frequently
travelled from town to town even before the belediye act,
exhorting the populace to take pride in their surroundings
and to construct parks and buildings that signified their
transition to a modern society. The following remarks
from a trip to Konya in 1925 are indicative of his
approach.*
"It has been 10 months since I last visited
Konya, and I see many praisworthy signs of
progress. You began and completed the con-
struction of many enterprises in a short
time. These signify the growth of a
civilized city, worthy of envy. .. Hard
working and enlightened citizens of Konya,
your city is especially deserving of the
title 'civilized'". (31)
Again and again in these speeches, the word medeni,
meaning 'cultured' or'civilized' occurs, We recall
Frey's comment (p. 98 ) on Kemal's desire to make the
provincial towns palatable to the western oriented
intellectuals charged with transforming their ideology.
Ataturk hoped that by changing the physical character of
the towns into something closer to the West, this might
be one means of producing civilization or culture.
*Konya, the former Seljuk capital and home of the Whirling
Dervish sect had been among the most reactionary of the
large towns and probably still was when Ataturk made his
speech. Nevertheless, through exhortation and praise, the
leader hoped to accomplish a great deal.
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Under the enthusiastic dedication of Kemal's
followers, aided by the State Treasury, a good deal was
actually accomplished to effect a physical transformation.
In 1937, Mihajlovic could marvel at the accomplish-
ments:
"Over the space of 8 or 10 years, the
Turkish minicipalities have built 4,041
official buildings, 3287 public buildings,
have developed 352 parks, 261 sport fields,
190 public promenades, 477 markets, 152
abattoirs, 120 monuments,~2 poor houses,
24 hospitals, 26 dispensaries, and 44 clinics,
In addition, 116 cities and towns have been
electrified, and 212 towns supplied with
running water. Besides, the municipalities
have constructed 1417 bridges and 4,560 km
of paved or tarred streets." (32)
He cites a five-year plan for municipal construction
inaugurated in 1934.* A later report by the Ministry of
Public Works notes that between 1930 and 1948, some 240
urban maps and 300 town plans were completed. (33)
The official buildings constructed during the period
were for the most part "government houses;" city halls,
county buildings provincial headquarters--each of which
was a real innovation for it symbolized the new status of
the community and its relation to the national government.
The buildings were to house the multifarious public activities
never before conducted by the Ottomans; and for all of its
*One of the boldest steps among these improvements was
erection in almost every sizeable community of a statue to
Ataturk. Kemal ordered this partially out of vanity, but
mostly out of a desire to break down another Moslem tradition
... strictures against representative art. Since general
agreement existed on his importance, statues of Ataturk
would have an easier time being accepted than any other
type of art.
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"outside" officials brought to the provincial towns, the
government built housing as part of its plan to transform
the environment into something "palatable" for the
modernizing elite.*
Despite the limitations of people and resources,
extensive physical transformation was attempted throughout
the nation. Comments by Lilo Linke on three widely-
separated provincial centers (Erzurum, Malatya, and Sivas)
indicate the scope of these efforts.
Erzurum" "The new town is rising only a few hundred
yards away, with broad new roads and young
trees.. .As in a suburban settlement,
houses have been built for officers or
civil servants and their families, and
immediately behind them begins the loose
chain of public buildings, many of them
only half completed... each one a strong
contrast to the old Turkish style.
Malatya:
'Just to show people here new methods of
construction and to prove to the foreigners
that they are not the only ones who can do
such things,' said the major pointing'-at the
yellow facade of the new college for teachers,
the first concrete building in the Turkish
East." (34)
"A few of the new houses were built of con-
crete, with cement brought from Istanbul via
the port of Mersin. It was a cheaper method
of building than carrying the stones from the
mountains. The apparently obligatory new
park was pretty with blooming acadia trees
and a pavilion at the side of an ornamental
pond.. .It cost 10,000 Turkish pounds.
*In addition to the actual administrative officers, there
were now representatives at the orovince and county level
of the ministries of health, edubiation, agriculture, etc.
all charged with implementing programs developed in Ankara.
Local military posts were extremely important, particularly
at the provincial centers, and the military commanders and
their staffs also had programs to conduct in adult educa-
tion.
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Linke also notes that the railway station
was built three miles out of town and that
the city will be developed towards it. (35)
Sivas: "I felt confused. The modern station, the
broad avenue, the post-war facade of the
hotel; and---ragged men and women with their
primitive means of transportation and
certainly an equally primitive life--were
they merely two different stages in a
natural development, or two worlds following
two parallel roads that would never meet,
or were the up-to-date things I had seen,
strewn about at random by an inconsiderate
government beyond the means of the country?" (36)
Linkets last comment is perhaps the most significant.
For in it she conveys the puzzled and equivocal.reaction
of many Turks themselves to this forceful demonstration
of government's committment to a civilization for them
still strange.
C. Cultural Change
A build-up of secondary and technical education in
the provincial cities received high priority. Paralleling
it was the location in every town of a "People's House,"
a community center from which the message of Kemalism
was dispensed to young and old alike.
Expansion took place in primary education during
the period, but the bulk of government effort went into
increased opportunities for higher training. The govern-
ment reasoned that Turkey needed a greater number of
skilled and literate workers before attempts at mass
education could become profitable. Table III-1 below
graphically illustrates the educational emphasis of the
Ataturk-Inonu programs.
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Table III-1
Indices of Number of Students
at Various Educational Levels, 1927-1946
Year Primary Middle Lyc'e Teacher's Trade University
1927-8 100 100 100 100 100 100
1935-6 157 294 598 56 248 175
1945-6 316 387 1200 331 2090 450
Sources: Frederick W. Frey, "Education and Political
Development in Turkey," M.I.T. Dept. of
Political Science, 1962, p. 22.
These lyc'ees, trade, and secondary schools of other
types were invariably located in provincial or county
seats. Maps 111-1, 2, 3 indicate the location of secondary
schools in 1935. Although the concentration in Ankara,
Istanbul, Konya and other large cities is apparent, every
provincial center from Thrace to the far east had some
form of secondary school by that date.
Higher learning was, however, confined to Ankara
and Istanbul. Any aspiring provincial had to seek univer-
sity training in one of these two major cities, a fact
which served to reinforce their attraction and dominance.
A plan for an Eastern university in Van did not materialize.*
*Webster comments:
"Since the Kurdish revolt in the spring of 1937,
the Government has announced its intention to
sponsor a special degree of educational enter-
prise in the southeastern provincea. :A proniinerit
feature of the plan is to make Van the cultural
center of that region, starting with lower
schools and eventually as soon as a constituency
is prepared, opening a university." (37)
Note the importance implied for education as a means of
control.
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Adult education was also an important activity in
the outlying towns. Between 1927 and 1934 a large number
of "Folk Schools" were established to teach people how
to read and write the new Roman alphabet. According to
Webster, about 2.5 million people over 12 years of age
attended these schools. (38)
By far the most significant institution for adult
education was the "Halk Evi" or "People's House."
Barbara Ward termed the Halk Evi "the instrument by
which the social unity of Turkish society is to be
secured." (39)
These houses were open to all citizens and concerned
themselves with teaching language, literature, history,
fine arts, dramatics, and even sports. They taught
western music and held exhibits. Their prime function
was to spread awareness of a Turkish heritage along with
Western culture, and thereby aid in promoting national
unity.
Roots of the Halk Ev went back to a 19th century
organization called "Turkish Hearth" - established to
foster Turkish nationalism. Ataturk transformed the
institution into a complete community center offering a
wide range of activities. Nominal responsibility for
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operating the centers went to the Republican Party, rather
than the government itself.*
The Halk Ev was an "urban" institution. Its pene-
tration to all parts of the country can be seen in
Map 111-4. By 1939 some 367 were constructed and in
operation. They were located in every Vilayet capital
and in most towns of 5,000 and over. (42)
* "Their nearest parallel in the United States is found
in such institutions and buildings as YMCA's or
churches or schools which are also centers of
cultural activity for the entire neighborhood, with
one main difference--the largest room in a Halkevi
is not a gymnasium but an auditorium, usually
with a stage suitable for dramatics and sometimes
an orchestra pit. Here are held concerts,
lectures, plays, and dances. Other rooms provide
for adult education classes, art and hobby
exhibits and workshops, a library, and offices
for the director and his staff." (40)
Ataturk's own feelings about the importance of these
installations were expressed in a 1931 speech inaugurating
a new building in Aydin.
"The Party is the tutor of the people; science,
economics, politics, fine arts all such areas must
be cultivated and developed in the fatherland.
The Hearths, originating in the duty of the
Party to explain its program for the fatherland,
perform the greatest service for the ideology...
It is along this road that the people carry out
their responsibilities together." (41)
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Given the primitive, reactionary character of Turkish
minicipal institutions at the start of the Republic, there
was an admirable boldness to the People's House program.
It fulfilled an extremely important role in the acculturation
process and exposed many townspeople to modernizing
influences.* Since the Halk Ev was a Republican Party
institution, however, it was doomed to elimination as
the multi-party period emerged. After World War II,
local Republican officials began to use the institution
more for propaganda than for education. Shortly after
the Democratic party took power in 1950, the government
abolished the Halk Evleri as subversive propaganda centers.
The buildings were then turned over to general public
purposes. (44)
One clear indication of effectiveness for both the
People's Houses and the provincial education programs was
the rise in literacy. In 1927, only 10 percent of the
population could read and write. By 1950 the proportion
*The Halk Evleri had a division of "village welfare."
This division did not, characteristically enough, directly
teach or aid villagers. Rather it was intended to teach
the city people about Turkish village life and to organize
groups of "students" who might go into nearby villages
to teach or provide assistance. Again this was a matter
of "forcing development from the top" where the emphasis
lay on winning the minds and allegiance of the town
dwellers who would then proceed to diffuse the new ideas
over a larger area. (43)
Towards the beginning of World War II, the program was
extended to villages, but only after it had begun to
show promise in the towns.
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had risen to almost 35 percent. In towns over 10,000 in
population, moreover, the average rate of literacy for
1955 was 65 percent.*(45)
*Although this is a 1955 figure, it probably reflects the
literacy disparity between towns and villages existing in
1950.
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III. Railroad-Oriented Transport Development
The Republican government set out to build an
effective interior transport network. Major emphasis
fell on extending the railroad inherited from the Empire
to provincial centers throughout the country and to
regions with important natural resources. The work
began during the early 19201s.* By 1950, all but two
of the cities whose population had been over 25,000 in
1927 (Bursa and Urfa) had a rail connection, and most of
the towns which had been over 10,000 in size. Ankara was
no longer at the end of a minor spur. It was at the core
of a nation-wide system. (Map 11-6).
Conker gives the following rationale for the
program:
And one o
commented
"The railroads in Turkey are a question of
national defense and of national existence
... The railroads will also allow Turkey to
be administered as a homogeneous whole...
Industry will not be able to establish it-
self or develop except in the regions
served by the railroad." (46)
f the engineers in charge of the construction
to Linke:
"The great aim of our government is to
open up those parts of Anatolia that were
completely neglected under the Sultans.
We want to give an equal chance to all
parts of the country." (47)
*Most of the existing rail network had been owned by
foreign concessionaires. The government did not
expropriate these holdings outright; rather it entered
into negotiations for payment over a number of years.
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First extensions during the '20's connected Ankara
with Kayseri. The line was extended to Sivas in 1930,
and the Divrigi iron ore fields and Erzurum by 1939.
Meanwhile, the tobacco port of Samsun was tied to Ankara
by rail. A major route was laid to Zonguldak and the
coal deposits, and another down to the east through Malatya
and Elazig to Diyarbakir and the Ergani copper fields.
From Adana, via Gaziantep and Maras, a line went northward
to the Diayarbakir connection. Additional routes to the
Aegean were also established.
Herschlag criticizes Turkey for an overemphasis on
railroad construction. He points out that local road-
building material was-plentiful while steel for rails
(until the opening of Karab'k mill in 1938) had to be
imported; that the single track nature of the system held
only limited capacity; and that the high cost (estimated
by Conker as 200 million TL in 1935) might have been
spread more effectively over a wider network of highways. (48)
These criticisms contain a good deal of merit.
However, it is also true that a bias towards railroads was
much in keeping with the government's development aims
and military orientation. Rail afforded a means of both
linking key cities with the capital and moving bulk
industrial products and minerals such as coal and copper.
Given the still-present threats of revolt and the fear of
invasion, during the 1930's rail transport was the quickest,
most efficient means of moving large troop convoys.
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Characteristically, the railroad was not primarily
designed to assist the peasants by pulling villages closer
to their potential markets. Agriculture received some
benefit,* but in general the program reflected government's
"urban" orientation. Herschlag notes that the program
did have significant effects:
"The number of railways passengers increased from
4.8 million in 1927 to 25.6 million in 1939, i.e.
by 433% while total population increased by only
30%. Goods transported by railway were estimated
at 919,000 tons in 1927 and 3,828,000 tons in
1939, i.e., an increase of 316%...
...At the end of the Thirties, the country's rail-
way system was still far behind developments in
the West, but its progress during the brief
period.. .was more rapid than that in other
countries. The Government also succeeded in
balancing the budget of the railways and even
accumulating yearly surpluses. As a result of
the extension of the railways, agricultural pro-
duce became more diversified and plentiful...
the value of land in the vicinity of the railway
increased significantly; old centers of former
caravan routes, e.g. Bolu, lost in importance
at least temporarily, while new transit or
junction centres emerged along the developed
network." (49)
Road building was not ignored, however. Indeed the
Republican Party formulated a specific road policy (50)
to complement the rail system. Highways were to be
built perpendicular to the railroad at key points in order
to expedite farm-to-market product transfers. Although
such a policy might be hard to implement (and was), the
*For example, before the line reached Erzurum, grain had to
be imported from abroad for the East via Black Sea ports.
Now it could be sent from the wheat-belt of Anatolia. All
of the sugar factories (p.141) as well as thm other state
industries were given rail connections to aid in product
distribution.
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government did recognize a complementarity between trans-
portation systems and tried to design a solution giving
each element its proper role. This was in distinct con-
trast to the transport policy followed during the 1950-60
period (Ch. Four)- where'highways received relative emphasis
far greater than that of the earlier rail program.
The 10,000-odd kilometers of roads in 1923 had in-
creased to about 42,000 by 1940, only 11,000 of which were
passable in all weather- conditions. Total public investment
in roads and bridges between 1930-39 was 77 million TL,
less than one-third that of rail construction. By 1938,
railway investment constituted 66.4 percent of all public
investment in transportation.
*After 1940, little in the way of road-building was initiated
until the commencement of the U.S. highway assistance pro-
gram in 19483 (Chapter our).
According to Herschlag, the best roads "were those in Thrace
between Istanbul and the Bulgarian border; in north-eastern
Anatolia between Trabzon and the Iranian border (nb Trabzon
handled shipping for Iran.) and along the shores of the
Straits to Izmir. The vast ruvral Anatolian area, in par-
ticular the plain east of Ankara, was ilargely neglecte."' (52)
**Some harbor construction was also initiated, mainly at
Istanbul and Izmir. . Toynbee tells of early efforts
to make the ports of Izmir and Mersin competitive with
Istanbul (53). Major improvements were also made to the
coal port at Zonguldak and the tobacco port'-of Samsun.
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IV. Spread of Industrialization
"Without economic (development) a weak state
can not be saved from poverty. It can not
attain civilization, comfort, happiness.
There is no civilized state which does not
think of its economy before its army and
its fleet."
--Ataturk (54)
Ataturk wanted the Turkish interior to industrialize
as well as the coastal cities. The new railroad system
and the local cultural and administrative reforms were
partially intended to expedite the process. Moreover,
much evidence from the early Republican period suggests
that government hoped private enterprise would be the
mainstay of the industrialization effort.
A. Private Enteprise
During a 1923 economic congress at Izmir, the
government laid down a policy of encouragement to Turkish
entrepreneurs. A year later, the Is Bankasi, a private
bank capitalized with funds from Ataturk and other prominent
citizens, was established to make industrial project loans.
The task of economic development was particularly
difficult in these early days. Turkish industry suffered
extensive losses during the war, and many of the minority
group industrialists had left. By 1927, less than 4
percent of the existing establishments employed more than
10 workers each. (55) We have also noted that the Turks
themselves were not accustomed either to undertake
137.
industrial entrepreneurship or to serve as factory workers
and that "the Islamic rule of forbidding risk and profit
aggravated further the stagnation of the economy." (56)
Another hindrance, which acted despite the Is bank
and government encouragement, was tariff concessions made
at the Lausanne conference. In return for the territorial
apportionment, Turkey was forced to keep the low Ottoman
tariffs until 1929. This meant that embryonic local
enterprises could not hope to compete in cost or quality
with imported goods. Thus, for the first few years,
relatively little industrialization took place.*
In 1927, however, the government promulgated a
"Law for the Encouragement of Industry," which offered
sweeping incentives to private entrepreneurs.** The
element of risk was sharply reduced, and the provisions
were geared to encouraging development away from Istanbul
and in the interior.
*It was in this "interim" period, before Turkey could begin
to control its own economic destiny, that Ataturk made most
of his dramatic social and cultural reforms: abolition
of the Caliphate and the Medresse, abolition of the fez,
strictures on wearing the veil, introduction of Western
law, introduction of the Western calendar and of Sunday
as the day of rest, etc.
**This law, too, was not without precedent. The Ottoman
government had tried a similar approach in 1913 that failed
with the onset of World War I.
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Provisions of the new law included the following:
1. State-owned land would be granted free for the
construction or expansion of Turkish-owned
industry...up to 10 hectarces.
2. Industries that met with government approval
would be exempted from certain taxes and customs
duties and given a 30 percent reduction on
rail and sea transport rates.
3. Government would subsidize up to 10 percent
of the value of the final production costs.
4. City, provincial, and national government agencies
would be forced to buy the domestically-produced
goods, even though imported products might cost
less.
5. Entrepreneurs who established an entirely new
industry would be given monopoly privileges for
25 years.
6. The approved firms could claim bonuses or price
reductions in purchases from existing state
factories. (This last provision was dropped
in 1929 when it was discovered that many firms
were starting, claiming the bonus, then selling
the product to other operators and closing
their operations before they began.) (57)
Although non-Turkish minorities could own the
establishments to qualify under the law, foreigners could
not, and most employees and managerial personnel had to
be Turkish.
Immediate results were striking. In its first year,
some 342 firms qualified under the law. By 1932, there
were 1,473 establishments with 55,321 employees operating
under its provisions. (58) National income, largely as
a reflection of industrialization, rose by over 10 percent
between 1927 and 1929. (59)
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After this initial spurt, however, government became
quite concerned. National income grew relatively little
between 1929 and 1935 (Table III;-2 below)7 The rumber of
firms began to decrease, and by 1939 were down to 1,144. (60)
Factories established under the law were producing consumer
goods rather than exploiting the country's natural
resources. They were also congregating in Istanbul,
other citLes of the Marmara region and Izmir, while
relatively little industrialization was underway in the
interior. Moreover, the great depression had begun in
Western countries, and the government feared that its
supply of imported raw materials and manufactured goods
might be endangered. All of these considerations led to
re-examination of the role for public enterprise in
industrial development.*
Table 111-2 below presents Herschlag's estimates on
the growth of national and per capita income before World
War II. The relatively large increase after 1935 may
be largely attributed to government's new activities as
an industrial entrepreneur.
*Alexander comments:
"At first the new state relied upon a policy of
encouragement to private enterprise. As the
entrepreneurial class was still in its infancy,
the result of this policy was disappointing.
Impatience with the slow pace of economic develop-
ment, the impact of world depression and the recep-
tivity of Turkish officials to schemes involving
government control induced the Turkish government
to embark in 1934 upon a policy of industrial
development through the establishment of state-
owned enterprises." (61)
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Table 111-2
National and Per Capita Income 1927-39
(at 1938 prices)
National Income Population Per Capita Income
Year in Millions of TL in Millions in TL
1927 1,000 13.6 73
1929 1,147 14.2 80
1935 1,315 16.2 82
1938 1,589 17.2 92
1939 1,652 17.5 98
Source: Z.Y. Herschlag, Turkey an Economy in
Transition, Van lieulen, The 1Hague,
160, p. 164.
B. Public Enterprise
"The Industries which the state or individuals
shall establish for the industrialization of
the country shall conform to a general program.
The items of the State program shall follow
one another in such a way as to render the
country an industrial unit.
The industrial undertakings shall not be con-
centrated in certain parts of the country,
but shall instead, be spread all over the
country taking into consideration the
economic factors."
--"Republican Party Program, 1935"
1. Precedent
We have noted that the Ottoman period held some
precedent for public enterprise. The Republic took over
management of the Ottoman State Industries, which were
placed under an Industrial and Mining Bank in 1925. The
government also assumed control of the Ottoman Tobacco and
Salt monopolies, and extended the Monopolies to include
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matches (1924) and alcoholic beverages (1926). However
these actions did not represent any significant new
public entrepreneurial activity. (63)
Such activity began on a limited scale in the late
120's and dealt entirely with operations located outside
the Istanbul area. The government decided to replace
previous dependence on imported sugar by encouraging
farmers to grow sugar beet and by establishing four
mills--at Alpullu in Thrace (1927), and Usak (1927),
Eskisehir (1933) and Turhal (1934) in Anatolia. Before
the first five-year plan of 1934, only two other state
factories were erected; a small jute mill at Izmir and
the cement plant at Knkara for construction of the
capital. Location of these plants and those inherited
from the Empire is shown on Map 111-5. (64)
2. The Urge to Plan
Government became convinced that a much more ambitious
program of public ownership was needed. Private enter-
prise would still be encouraged, however, and the
authorities hoped a viable mixed economy would result.
Unlike the Soviet or socialist systems; Turkey reached
this decision from a seemingly pragmatic evaluation of
its economic circumstances rather than any commitment
to a particular ideology.
As Hanson notes:
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"In Turkey, therefore, we see very clearly
the 'objective' as distinct from the
ideological factors that may cause the
government of an underdeveloped country to
place great emphasis on the public sector
... this government did not begin life with
any clear ideas about economic development
...the Turkish revolutionary movement was
devoid of (economic) ideology... Hence
circumstances, rather than ideology dictated
the new regime's early economic efforts." (65)
Russia's emphasis on economic planning did, however,
impress Ataturk, He decided to follow her example. Two
five-year industrial plans were drawn (1934, 1938) as well
as a four-year plan of mineral exploitation in 1936.
These plans were not based on some numerical targets
for production levels, national income, import substitution,
etc., in the fashion of contemporary development plans.
Even if such sophisticated documents had been envisioned,
statistical data for background studies was almost non-
existent. Rather, the plans contained target listings of
industry, mines, and infra-structure which the government
considered desirable for reasons noted'below. (66)
Foreign experts, including a number of American
economists and transport specialists,* were called to
advise on preparation of the programs, Foreign financial
*Some disagreement exists on the influence of these consul-
tants in determining the policy of the five-year plans.
But, according to the New York Times, "it is on the basis
of their reports and th'e investigation of Premier Ismet
Pasa and the Minister of Economy Celal Bey, that President
Mustafa Kemal's youn6 republic is mobilizing for the big
economic drive." (67) One might expect that the produc-
tion targets were influenced by the foreigners, but not
necessarily the location decisions.
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assistance, however, was not generally employed.
Turkey wanted self-suffiency and was willing to pay with
austerity. Except for a British and a Russian loan, the
programs were financed domestically through heavy taxation,
issuance of credits, etc.--until the advent of post war
U.S. aid. (Chapter IV)
After the first five-year industrial plan was issued,
the government established two special development
corporations to implement the programs and take responsi-
bility for preparing future plans. Their title of "banks"
was somewhat a misnomer. Sumer Bank had charge of
strictly industrial operations, while Eti Bank was primarily
responsible for mining and power development. The two
agencies were headquartered in Ankara. Their decision-
making power was to extend through construction** to actual
conduct of the enterprises, and all plant administrators
were to refer back to the parent corporations on major
operational decisions. The Banks marketed their products
and could also provide barking services to private enterprise
and other state agencies. Sumer Bank in addition assumed
management of most Ottoman-inherited factories.
**Transportation lines and other major infra-structure allied
with the operations remained the responsibility of the
Ministry of Public Works
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C. Objectives of the tatist Program
Four specific objectives of relevance to this
discussion were reflected in the character and location
of state enterprises during the Etatist period.
1. Industrial self-sufficiency through mobilization
of domestic resources.
2. Development of the Turkish interior.
3. Use of the state enterprises as forces for
social and cultural change in the areas where
they were located.
4. Attraction of private enterprise to interior
locations once public plait had "paved the
way."1
1. Self-Sufficiency
The plans called for establishing industries and
mines that would substitute for imports. Little or no
thought went to eventual export potential. Rather the
emphasis lay on exploiting local resources for local
needs.*
Highest priority went to the following: industries
that utilized raw materials produced in Turkey (textiles
for example. Although Turkey had been a major cotton
producer, the raw cotton was exported and most finished
*There were, however, some significant failures in
execution which made operations inefficient and forced
plants to use imported raw materials. The Izmit paper
plant was supposed to use Turkish pulp, but only many
years after its founding was the forestry agency well-
enough established to supply the domestic pulp in
sufficient quantities. Woolen mills used only imported
wool tops since Turkish wool is coarse and suitable only
for homespun and carpets. While these enterprises pro-
duced goods that were in demand in Turkey, their contri-
bution to over-all economic development was less than that
of enterprises using Turkish raw material." (68)
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cloth imported); operations that extracted and processed
minerals found in Turkey and their byproducts (iron,
coal, chrome, copper, sulphur). Other selected plants were
to produce hitherto-irmported consumption goods, even
though raw materials were only partly available in Turkey
(paper, cardboard, rayon, glass, ceramics, agricultural
implements).
In the first five-year plan, some 20 operations were
envisaged. They represented processes whose products
comprised over 40 percent of the country's imports. (69)
Capital requirements for these factories were far greater
than private enterprise seemed able or willing to finance.
By 1950, government agencies had constructed about 50 state
factories. Their location and type of production are
shown on Map 111-5.
2. Development of the Interior
From Map 111-5, several conclusions can be drawn.
1. Practically all establishments are outside of
the Istanbul area, and the great majority outside
the Mlarmara and Aegean regions.
2. With some exceptions,* the plants are located in
cities and towns that were over 10,000 in
population during 1927.
*Yet few of the exceptions were completely rural areas.
Eregh% and Nazilli, for example, the sites of major tex-
tile plants, had been towns only slightly below 10,000 in
1927. Kirikale (munitions) and Karabuk (steel) were per-
haps the only sites chosen in the planning period where
no previous development had existed. But Kirikkale was
founded as n satellite town to Ankara, and even Karabuik
(Chapter~l3§ was only a few miles from the small market
co-iuinity of Safranbolu.
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3. Practically all have rail connections.
4. The development is dispersed rather than
conc entrated.
5. Little development occurred in Thrace, the
far eastern regions, the eastern Black Sea,
and the Mediterranean coast.
Some processing enterprises were definitely held to
their sites by raw material availability--e.g. sponges at
Bodrum, tobacco at Samsun, tea at Rize, sulphur at
Keciborlu, textiles at Adana, fire-brick at Filyos. A
number--e.g. glass, cement, and some monopoly products--
were located close to the large urban markets. These
sites could be justified on economic grounds.
Other plants, particularly the large number of tex-
tile mills and the Karabuk steel operation, seemed sited
completely for purposes of defense or equity. For they
were far from sources of raw material and markets.*
Defense was probably the most significant factor in
*Kayseri was a hundred miles from the cotton area but was
selected as site for the largest textile mill. An indica-
tion of the "equity" considerations involVed' is found in
the remarks of a Kayseri hotel keeper to Ekrem. (70)
"Allah bless these factories. If it were not for
them what would we poor tradespeople do? You see
how crowded the hotel is? Well, a few years ago,
the djins were playing ball in my place.
He went on to explain that Kayseri seemed a doomed
city. There was a period of great poverty and lack
of work. Then the government built the airplane
factory and later the huge cotton mill, and money
flowed once again into the city."
The steel plant was put at Karabuk, 100 km inland from
the coal seams to protect it from possible Russian coastal
attack. According to Parker and Smith, Kayseri and
Malatya were "neither actually in the cotton growing
district but both sufficiently near it for raw materials
to be transported without much difficulty and far enoulghaifrom
the coast to be safe in event of invasion." (71)
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keeping public enterprise from the border areas.
This was clearly a decentralization policy based on
dispersion of industry rather than selective concentration.
By 1950, only two outlying areas showed indications of
related complexes of public-sponsored industries; Izmit
where paper and cellulose plants had been established,
and Zonguldak province where coal mines, a steel mill,
and a refractory brick plant were in operation. The
government was evidently trying to "seed" many interior
communities with modern industrial activity. Hopefully
these plants, along with the rail access and the attempted
transformation of cultural patterns in the towns would
lead to the genesis of new urban and industrial centers.
A rationale for this distribution is best articulated
by the Turks themselves. Ozbek comments:
"The government of the Republic, in full
awareness that the creation of an industry
is, before all, an affair of economics,
nevertheless is not uniquely inspired by
preoccupations of this order. Alongside
of these it must take equal account of the
high political and military interests of
the nation. It has, moreover, not lost
sight of the need to create great industrial
centers where agglomerations of population
can establish themselves and enlarge the
volume of their activities." (72)
Celal Bayar, Minister of Economy and chief architect
of the development plan defended the location choices
before the assembly on June 8, 1936. He cited both
national defense and the paucity of development within
Anatolia as the two main factors influencing the decisions.
149.
"The conditions under which our factories must be
established are completely different (from a pure
capitalist system). If we allowed things to take
their natural course...the majority of the fac-
tories would seek out conditions most favorable
to their own interests and not to those of the
nation. They would fix on the banks of our
oceans and stay there like turtles.
In extraordinary circumstances, for example in
case of mobilization, we would not have a single
factory which could meet the needs of interior
Anatolia.
There have been over ten requests to the Minister
of Economy regarding creation of cotton combines.
But the sites which all these people desire are
located not more than a meter from the sea shore.
When a time of national need arises there are
demands put on the authorities responsible for
national defense which can in no measure be
compatible with the desires of these private
entrepreneurs so uniquely concerned with personal
preoccupations.
Thus the state, in setting forth its economic system
for today, for tomorrow, for the defense of the
country and for the national economy, must take
account of national military needs and those places
that are prosperous or economically barren. In
making its industrial plan, it has consequently
chosen these sites...
Today we are at Eregli, at Kayseri. Tomorrow we
will be at Sivas, at Van, at Diyarbakir, etc." (73)
Clearly the government was pledged to produce goods
and materials of economic value to Turkey, but was willing
to forego economic considerations in choosing sites for
what it considered higher goals of interior industrial-
ization and national defense.
A further factor related to these sites hampered
production. After the plants were ready, they could not
attract a sufficiently large--not to mention skilled--
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permanent labor force. Townspeople still had their
prejudices against manual labor. Peasants, given the
still primitive agricultural techniques and the avail-
ability of sufficient land for far-ming with these methods,
were neither induced nor forced into steady industrial
employment. Many villagers came to the plants only to
return home for harvest and planting. Kerwin remarks
that the laborers had to be "enticed" to the factories. (74)
Hershlag notes::
"The agricultural laborer or peasant left for
town at the end of the harvest, or sometimes
during protracted periods of agricultural
depression, in order to supplement his and
his family's income. Many.. .came, for instance,
to the textile plant of Kayseri under the
influence of stories about attractive new
working and living conditions, but a large
proportion of them suffered from homesickness
or ran away to their villages for fear of
widespread fever diseases.. .This situation
caused a shortage in the constant, and, in
particular, skilled industrial labor force." (75)
Often the situation at Kayseri was so bad, that
schoolboys had to be pressed into service. The same
complaints occurred at Zonguldak, Malatya, and elsewhere.
It had been diffictit enough to get managers and super-
visory personnel to the plants.* But the problems of
finding sufficient everyday labor were acute. Shortages
continued almost to the end of the one-party period.
*Foreign technicians were employed at the start (Kayseri
was built with a Russian loan and technical assistance,
Karab*k by the British) and to train the Turkish managerial
staff. To hold the Turkish managers, an' even more
elaborate system of fringe benefits was established than
for the workers (seefbllowing section), but shortages
continued.
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3. Cultural Change
The state plants were themselves intended as forces
for cultural and social change in the interior communities.
Factories and their activities were attempts to break
down conservatism in provincial towns. They were also
to stand as examples of the new Republic's achievements
and goals. (76)
For the most part, these plants were~ biilt some
distance outside the existing communities, intending that
the towns would grow to meet them with modern residential
and industrial areas... thus shaking off the "form" of the
old as well as its content.
No expense was spared in this paternalist-Ic effort
to make a new world around the factories. There were
large housing areas for supervisory personnel and many
of the workers; sport fields and theatres, "bachelor
pavillions" to house transient laborers, organized classes
for adult education. Many of the larger plants had
schools. Some sent skilled workers and potential managers
abroad for further training. Housing and services,
including food, uniforms, dry goods, etc., were often
supplied free or at a low, subsidized cost. In its zeal
to create these new factory communities, the government's
development of the simpler residential and recreational
areas was often more efficient than its conduct of the
factories themselves.
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These cultural activities and fringe benefits added
greatly to costs; but government justified the expense
as part of its concerted effort to revolutionize the
mentality of its citizenry. In examining this aspect
of public industrialization, a contemporary Turkish
commentator suggests:
"It should be remembered that the industrialization
which took place after the establishment of the
Republic had a very strong social character. State-
owned plants were considered as the best way of
bringing social improvements to certain regions.
That is why some of them, in the light of present-
day conditions, appear to defy sound principles
of economic location. Such principles are not
the only ones by which they should be judged.
It must be remembered that these establishments,
with their cities for workers and their social
facilities played a big part in raising the
material and cultural standards of the community.
It was in the cinema halls of certain plants,
for instance, that people first learned what
moving pictures were." (77)
4. Attraction for Private Enterprise
Government hoped that its plants, by providing an
"umbrella" of infra-structure, might entice private
entreprise to locate in the interior. The 1927 industrial
encouragement law was still in effect when the main
Etatist program began. Its broad incentives were readily
available.
But private enterprise did not show any significant
interest in following along. Except for the small movement
to Ankara, private industrialists tended to remain in the
traditional development centers of the Western coast.
Bayar comments on this fact in his defense of the first
153.
plan. (78) In the introduction to the second five-year
program of 1938, he again questions the reluctance of the
private sector to join with state enterprise:
"Some industries, particularly the textile plants
have set aside land. Inside this land, they have
announced that factories are welcome. The Kayseri
textile mill, the Eregli mill and several sugar
factories are holding this land for occupancy
according to the industrial encouragement law.
But no private entrepreneur has come to establish
a factory." (79)
But there was good reason for the reluctance. During
the 1930!s two considerations prevented any noticeable
extension of private -enterprise, itself new and faced
with the difficulties of the Depression, into interior
cities.
1. Government seemed willing to absorb the costs of
production far distant from both raw material
sources and the main urban markets. Even with
the incentive programs, this friction of
distance was too much for private firms to bear
and still turn a profit.
2. Ankara was the only new development area where
public efforts had been sufficiently concen-
trated to create a sizeable local market and
enough infra-structure and amenities to be at
all comparable with Istanbul and Izmir.
After the 1930's additional factors were involved:
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1. The industrial encouragement law was abolished in
1942. Thus all special incentives for interior
locations were ended.
2. Inonu's regime levied an infamous tax, the Varlik
Vergisi, on businessmen during the war. In theory,
the tax was to be applied to all firms, but in
practice it rested most heavily on minority groups.
The remaining Greeks, Jews, and Armenians were in
the forefront of the Instanbul entrepreneurs, and
many businesses were wrecked during the period. (80)
3. The special bureaucracy trained to manage the state
industrial enterprises had begun to take on the
character of an entrenched power group with vested
interests in protecting the monopolistic character
of their operations. Thornbug [81) discusses this
trend and its effects on discouraging private
entrepreneuship.
All of these considerations tended to shake the confi-
dence of private enterprise in the reliability of government
policy and promises. As in most developing nations, these
entrepreneurs were extremely risk-conscious and loath to
embark on any operation that did not afford quick and sub-
stantial return. For them to invest in the hinterland
seemed folly.*
*An important, though not numerically significant, exception
was the cotton farmers of the Mediterranean coast. In the
"Qukorova" region around Adana could be found the largest
and most profitable cotton farms of Turkey. During World
War II, they made large profits on cotton, and even before
had enjoyed high price supports, Some went into the tex-
tile industry by establishing gins and mills in the Adana
area. (82)
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No statistical analyses of entrepreneurial location
were, to our knowledge, made prior to 1950. Alexander's
study of the mid-'50's, however, probably reflects what
existed as the one-party period ended. He estimates that
50 percent of Turkey's private industrial entrepreneurs
were in the Istanbul area, and 75 percent in the Marmara
and Aegean regions. (83)
D. Effects of Etatism--Industr and Agriculture
"The Turkish economy may be said to have been
in equilibrium in 1950. There was no evi-
dence of inflationary pressures in that year,
and the import surplus was small."
--Alec P. Alexander (84)
Despite shortcomings in the Etatist program, a
domestic Turkish industry had been established. It was
operating and substituted local production for many
commodities which would otherwise be imported. By 1950,
Turkish industry employed some 126,000 workers in plants
over 10 workers each. (85)
Between 1938 and 1950, value of industrial production
increased by 43 percent. In 1938, industry and mining had
accounted for 11 percent of Turkey's national income, while
in 1950 the share had reached 16 percent. (86) According
to Rostow (87), Turkey had begun the take-off into self-
sustaining economic growth during the Ataturk-Inonu
period; and the "leading sector" which induced this take-
off was probably the import-substituting domestic industry.
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Growth occurred in both public and private sectors.
The large state plants* employed 53,000. Yet private
industry, which had been virtually created from nothing
during the period, accounted for 54 percent of the workers
in "large" enterprises. Despite the recurrent labor
shortages, it appears that a fairly substantial component
of factory workers had been amassed.**
*About a similar number of people were employed in the state-
run mines, forestry-enterprises, farms, and allied opera-
tions. Hershlag notes that in 1955, the average worker
component in the state plants was about 600. Many, such
as the steel and textile mills had several thousand
workers each. (88)
**The state had complete monopoly in the production of coal,
cellulose and paper, chemicals, iron and steel, tobacco,
salt, tea, matches, sugar, alcoholic beverages except wine,
and over the communications network. Private enterprise
controlled metal working, wood processing, food, wine,
most cotton ginning, flour, construction, toys, and
furniture. There was both state and private activity
in textiles, cement, brick and tile, chrome, and lignite
mining, and leather. (89)
By 1950, over 800,000,000 TL had been invested in the State
plants. Sumer Bank, in 1949 owned and operated seven
cotton textile mills; five woolen textile mills; plants
for rayon, hemp, fire brick, paper, the iron and steel
industry, two cement plants and two brick and tile
operations. In addition it had shares in cotton gins,
retail stores, an insurance company, banks, and other
enterprises.
ETI bank operated coal, lignite, chrome, copper and sulpher
mines as well as an insurance company and a commercial bank.
The Agricultural Bank ran state farms, cotton gins, soap
and vegetable oil plants, the Rize tea industry, and
handled marketing cooperatives for hazelnuts, figs and cotton.
Sumer, Is, and Agricultural banks jointly controlled the
sugar factories, while the Is bank (now a quasi-governmental
enterprise) operated the glass bottle and silk weaving
factories. In addition a special combine had been established
to control the armaments industry. There was the large
state monopoly enterprise with some 47 separate operations.
A special agency was established to explore for petroleum,
and under the forestry directorate over 120 lumbering
enterprises were under way.
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Although government industry did not induce a spread
of private investment to the interior, it did stimulate
development of a Turkish enterpreneutrial class at the
larger centers. Robinson points out that several
private firms began to flourish as competitors to the
state plants (e.g. texties) because their costs were
lower and they obtained the benefits of government price-
fixing on these commodities. Karpat (90) discusses the
important role of government enterprise in stimulating
secondary processors and commercial entrepreneurs:
"The semi-processed goods sold by state enterprises
were finished in privately owned shops; for instance,
shoe stores used leather manufactured by state
enterprises to make all kinds of wearing apparel
and sell it at the free market prices, although the
state also began to sell its own shoes, usually
of a lower quality. Furthermore, consumption
goods, especially the monopoly products...were
sold through privately owned firms with some
profit margin left to the dealers. Trade as
a whole, especially exports and imports, was left
almost exclusively to individuals, while the
state limited itself to supervising--rather
rigidly-such activites. The conclusion is that
statism provided certain sections of the population
with additional income and employment-possibilities."
These private merchants and traders were, unlike the
industrialists, not limited to the major centers; but also
developed in the provincial towns to handle their growing
commercial affairs.
Karpat also cites the effects of government enterprise
in creating new markets for certain agricultural commodities
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(cotton, wool, sugar beet, tobacco, tea) that were
processed in its factories and notes:
"...the state was thus able to create a large
demand for some materials which had never been
in much use before, with the result that an
additional number of people found anployment
and that the income of independent producers
increased." (91)
1. Distribution of Industry
Public industrial activity had resulted in a
significant decentralization of Turkish factories. Before
the Republic, Istanbul and Izmir held vitual monopoly
over industrial development. By 1950, however, Istanbul
with 105,000 workers in industry and construction held
only 25 percent of the nation's total in these fields.
Izmir was the second city with 7.2 percent of the total,
and Ankara third with 5 percent. The five largest cities
of Turkey (including Bursa and Adana) in 1950 contained
only 42 percent of the country's work force in industry
and construction. (92)
All told, state enterprises had been located in some
35 communities throughout the country. Some of the pro-
vinces outside the five major centers which contained
sizeable components of production workers in 1943
(figures are lacking for 1950) were as follows: (93)
*Workers in enterprises employing more than 5 people in
places over 5,000 in population.
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Zonguldak 35,000*
Eskisehir 12,000
Malatya 9,000
Kuthaya 7,000
Kocaeli (Izmit 6,000
Aydin (Nazilli) 5,000
Kayseri 5,000
Samsun 7,000
Sivas 6,ooo
Elazig 8,000
Had state enterprise not existed, these interior
communities would probably not have been exposed to modern
industrial activity. Nor would such resources as coal,
iron ore, sulphur, domestic lumber, and cotton have been as
extremely exploited. The resistance of private entrepre-
neurs to invest in interior sites and resources was so
strong, that in 1950 a sharp dichotomy in ownership
existed within the locational framework. Private industry
dominated development in Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara--
the only significant interior point of attraction. Public
enterprise was supreme in the other centers.
2. Austerity
This development had been effected at great cost.
While the nation itself was in a more financially-stable
and self-sufficient position than in Ataturk's time,
overall standards of living remained quite low.
National income rose 25 percent between 1938 and 1950.**
Per capita income, however, increased by only 2 TL at
*includes the coal mines.
**in 19 48 prices
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constant 1948 prices. This meant a growth of less than
$1.00 at official rates of exchange. Per capita income
in 1943 had been estimated at $157.00. (94)
The state plants were producing, but largely in-an
inefficient manner; and heavy costs were involved in
maintaining their social facilities and in compensating
for the transport disadvantages of factories remote from
markets or raw materials. To accumulate the necessary
domestic capital for constructing and continuing these
enterprises government resorted to what Robinson calls
"the device of keeping consumption down forcibly through
rationing, taxation, and forced crop collection." (95)
This was a continuing period of austerity, and most
heavily taxed were the new urban industrial and commercial
entrepreneurs whom government development policies had
helped to create.
Ironically enough, these entrepreneurs became the
greatest source of urban opposition to the Republican
government's economic policies. As the multi-party era
dawned after World War II, this group formed a hard core
of support behind the Democrats of Adnan Menderes and
Celal Bayar (himself now disenchanted with policies he
helped frame) who favored free enterprise and the elimin-
ation of government restraints. Robinson notes:
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"No longer was private enterprise without
spokesmen. A new class of Turkish busi-
nessmen and merchants had appeared both
in the cities and the provincial towns...
It was this new middle class that consti-
tuted the core of urban support for the
Democratic party." (96)
3. AGriculture
But conditions were worst in the agriculture sector.
Agricultural products continued to be the source of export
revenue. However, little public investment had been
devoted to this critical sector. A UN survey estimates
that a yearly average of only 3 percent of the budget had
been invested in agriculture, compared with 8-9 percent
each for railroads and industry. (97) As Muntz pointed
out in 1950:
"...unfortunately the fundamental importance of
agriculture has been neglected in favor of indus-
try and public works. Large sums have been spent
on industry which, lacking the foundation of a
healthy and efficient agriculture has resulted
in an ill-balanced economy. Great efforts are
now being made for agriculture, but it is to some
degree as if a man had made a roof but no walls
to his house, and now has to support the roof on
his back while he builds the walls." (98)
Between 1929 and 1939, the "real value added" in
agriculture increased by 20 percent. (99) Hershlag notes,
however, that this increase came primarily through expansion
of cultivated land rather than productivity improvements.
"No rise in net output per earner could be registered during
that period," he states.
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Between 1938 and 1950, moreover, the value of
agricultural production rose only 11 percent, while
industry and mining were growing by 43 percent. Over
these 12 years, agriculture's share in national income
dropped from 62 to 54 percent. (100) Yet by 1950, well
over two thirds of the Turkish labor force was still
engaged in farming.
As Bernard Lewis so penetratingly puts the problem:
"Kemalism had brought the revolution to the
towns and townspeople of Turkey, but had
barely touched the villages. A second,
silent revolution was now reaching the
deeper layers of the pation and starting
a new trahsformation. (101)
It was no accident that the Republican Party develop-
ment programs had barely touched the villages. Ataturk
determined that major emphasis would first go towards
creating urban industry and inter-urban transport. He
gambled that the peasants could wait while this task was
being accomplished. After World War II,. however, agri-
cultural conditions had deteriorated so badly that it
appeared the peasants would wait no longer. They, too,
gravitated to the Democratic Party, which was more than
willing to press their suit. "The Democrats greatest
untapped source (of power)," says Lenczowski, "was the
conservative countryside, to which the Republican Party,
urban minded and reformist, had never paid adequate
attention." (102)
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V. A Note on Istanbul and Izmir
Despite continued efforts to spread growth away from
the Western coasts, the Republican government discovered
the economic importance of its two traditional development
centers was so great that Istanbul and Izmir could not be
completely neglected. Resources were devoted to improving
conditions at Istanbul and Izmir, and their advantages as
growth centers were thereby heightened.
Although actual data on investments are lacking,
several specific projects can be cited:
The two cities remained Turkey's chief harbors; Izmir
for export of agricultural produce, and Istanbul for import.
Importation of foreign machinery to install in the state
enterprises enhanced the latter's role. Thus, major
improvements were made to the port facilities in each city.
While Ankara university was under development, Istanbul
also received more university facilities, including a
modern law school during the 1930's. A special Istanbul
Technical University was founded, as well as a School of
Design. Only in Istanbul was it possible for a Turkey
to be trained as an engineer or architect.
Much effort went into rebuilding Izmir after its
destruction during the Greek war and in establishing a
Turkish commercial class to replace the Greek exporters.
During the 1920's, Izmir also became the site of -a yearly
international industrial fair, which continues today.
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A large park and permanent exhibition facilities were
constructed to house the fair.
Then, too, government assumed ownership of the
Ottoman state enterprises in Istanbul. Certain market-
oriented state industries were added (glass, cigarettes,
textile finishing) deemed unsuitable for interior sites.
Production for the monopolies and a cloth mill were
established in Izmir. Although these plants represented
only a small part of the public development effort, they
nevertheless enhanced the two cities' position as
industrial centers. (See Map 111-5)
Such ventures, and allied investments in water and
power supplies, were signs that the government could not
afford to abandon its traditional nuclei of development
even while it was attempting to stimulate new growth areas
in the interior. Public improvements added to the complex
of advantages these centers already possessed for
entrepreneurs and the modernizing elite. Only in Ankara,
of the new areas stimulated by the Republicans, were the
advantages comparable. (103)
Robinson comments on the attractiveness that these
three national centers now possessed:
"Numerically the movement was perhaps in85fnificanto,
but not otherwise. These people came in three main
groups; the scholars who were attracted by Ankara
and Istanbul Universities and forever dwelled within
their shadows; the wealthy landowners and businessmen
who were drawn by the luxury and glamor of the city;
and finally the MP's who, once having tasted the
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elixer of modern Ankara, were loath to return to
their home towns, even if ultimately deprived
of their parliamentary seats. It is small
wonder that Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir progressed
and flourished, while the rest of the country
moved forward at a much more sluggish pace." (104)
Despite the removal of national administrative power
to the interior, the two coastal centers continued to
prosper. By 1950, Istanbul province alone was contributing
over one-third of the income tax payments to the national
treasury. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir together accounted
for well over 50 percent of these revenues. (105)
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VI. The Pattern of Urbanization in 1950
Changes in the pattern of urbanization reflected
both the character and results of decentralization pro-
grams conducted under the Republicans. Statistical
information on population shifts between 1927 and 1950
appears in Tables 11I-3,4,5 and 6. The pattern of
urbanization is itself depicted on Map 111-7, and may
be compared with the 1927 pattern on Map 11-7.
Two striking conclusions are evident:
1. The rate of urbanization was relatively slight.
2. Mhere significant urbanization did occur, it
was in areas selected by government for con-
certed effort at social and economic trans-
formation.
Between 1927 and 1950, Turkey's total population in-
creased by 53 percent to almost 21 million. During this
period the proportion of total population contained in each
major geographic region remained relatively the same.*
*Slight increases had occurred in the Mediterranean and
Eastern Anatolian regions; the former due to annexation of
Hatay province from France in 1933 which added the port of
Iskenderun and the city of Antioch (Antakya) to Turkey.
Growth in the east may have stemmed from immigration of
peasants from other parts of the country to farm this most
sparsely-settled part.
Although some immigration of foreign-born Turks had
occurred during the period, its effect on overall population
increase was negligible. Most of the population transfers
after the Greek-Turkish war had been completed by 1927.
For all intents and purposes, natural increase had accounted
for the population growth.
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In 1927, 16.4 percent of the total had been resident
in cities over 10,000 in population. By 1950, the figure
had climbed only to 18.8 percent.
A. Rural Stability
Despite the extensive urban investments, the
peasantry had evidently remained on the land. This was
exactly what Ataturk had anticipated in emphasizing
creation of a viable urban social and economic structure
before major efforts to deal with the severe rural pro-
blems. Land had been sufficient, at least in the early
years, for peasants to expand their holdings while
retaining traditional primitive practices and limited
aspirations. Since major transport emphasis fell on
constructing the inter-urban railroad, communication
between much of the rural districts and even the pro-
vincial cities was still difficult. This acted as a
further brake on migration.
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Table 111-3
Distribution of Population by Regrion in Turkey for 1950
Region
Marmara
Aegean
Cent. Anatol.
Meditei
Black Sea
S.E. Anatol
E.Anatol
Total Pop
in 000
3,814
2,206
4,739
2, 052*
4,608~
1,121
2,411
20,971
Pct of Nation Pct of Nation
in 1927 in 1950
18.8
11.2
22.7
8.5
23.3
5.5
10.0
100.0
18.2
10.6
22.6
9.9*
22.0
5.3
11.4
100.0
Table 111-4
Distribution of Population in Cities
over 10,000 by Region for 1950
Region Pop in Cities No of Pct of Reg Pct of Nat Pop
of 10,000 and Cities Population in Cities of
over in 000 10,000 and
over
'27 '50 '27 '50 _27 '50
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anatol.
Mediter*
Black Sea
S:& Anatol
E. Anatol.
1,413
542
817
348
171
205
3,943
14 20 36.8 37.2 43.0 35.7
11 18 20.1 24.3 14.1 13.8
13 22 11.1 17.2 15.4 20.7
7 12 19.3 21.5
12 18 5.7 7.6
5 3 15.0 15.2
5 8 7.6 8.5
9.9
8.1
5.1
4.4
67 106 16.4 18.8 100.0
11.4
8.9
4.3
5.2
100.0
Source: Census (Genel Nufus Sayimi) of 1927 and 1950.
Base figures above have been compiled and repro-
duced in Rusen Keleg, TQ'rkiyede Qhirlesme
areke-tleri, 1927-19' , ault of~liica
Science, Ankara, Appendix, p. 85 ff
*Figures for the Mediterranean region in 1950 include the
province of Hatay ceded by France in 1938.
Table 111-5
Distribution of Population in Cities
over 50,000 by Region for 1950
Pop in Cities
of 50,000 and
Region over in 000
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anat.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anatol.
E. Anatol.
1,087
240
561
190
59
0
53
2,189
No of Cities
'27 '50
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
5
Pct of Regional Pop
Total
'27 '50
2 29.0 28.5
1 10.0 10.9
5 2.4 11.8
2 6.3 9.2
Urban
'27 '50
78.0 78.0
49.0 44.0
21.5 69.0
33.0 42.5
1 0 1.3 0 17.0-
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 2.2 0 25.6
12 7.7 10.5 47.0
Pct of Nation Pop in
Cities'50,000 and over
1927 1950
72.0
14.6
7.1
6.3
0
0
0
100.0
50.0
11.0
25.6
8.7
2.7
0
2.0
100.0
Source: See Keles, ibid.
H
0
0
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Table III-6
Percentage Growth of Total, Rural,
and Urban Population by Region
1927-1950
Pop in Cities Pop in Cities
Reg;ion Tot Pop over 10,000 over 50,000 Rural Pop
Marmara
Aegean
Cent Anatol
Mediter.*
Black Sea
SE Anatol
E Anatol
NATION
29
44
52
32
44
46
53
72
135
102
90
51
100
76
45
56
650
Infinite
0
Infinite
108
* includes Hatay
21
37
41
72
42
48
77
50
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According to our calculations,* less than 10 percent
of the expected natural increase in rural areas migrated
to the cities between 1927 and 1950.
*This must be taken as a very rough estimate. Computation
of such a statistic from potentially unreliable data of
necessity involves certain assumptions. We have no infor-
mation on the differential between natural increase in
rural and urban areas. Therefore, we assumed these were
essentially the. same during the 1927-1950 period.
(Such an assumption probably overestimates the urban and
underestimates the rural rates.)
We further assumed (see footnote supra.) that the total
Turkish population growth during the period could essentially
be attributed to natural increase, with iniiigration from
abroad a relatively insignificant factor.
The average annual rates of population growth (calculated
from figures in Keles, op. cit.) between census years were
as follows:
1927-35 2.13 percent
1935-40 2.00
1940-45 1.06
1945-50 2.20
Computed on the basis of the entire 1927-50 period, average
annual increase was 1.9 percent.
We then applied this 1.9 percent figure to urban (places
over 10,000 in population) and rural populations in 1927,
compounding it annually to 1950 to estimate the population
for each which might be expected without internal
migration.
Actual Figures in 000 Expected in 000
1927 1950 Diff. Nat Inc.Expected Diff.
Tot Pop 13,648 20,947 7,299 7,299 0
Urban 2,234 3,943 1,709 1,190 +503
Rural 11,414 17,004 5,590 6,096 -506
From these calculations it would appear that approximately
500,000 people, or 3.5 percent of the rural natural increase,
were absorbed by the urban areas.
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Although rural population had remained relatively
stable, by 1950 there were signs of an imminent explosion.
Land was running out. Between.1940 and 1950, rural
population had grown by 16 percent. Between 1938 and 1950,
however, the proportion of land under cultivation had
risen from 19.1 to only 20.7 percent of Turkey's total
area. (106) After 1938 it appeared that rural population
was being absorbed by a further fragmentation of small
holdings rather than through additions to farm area.
Thenl too, the rate of population growth rose sharply
after the war (footnote supra). While rural population
remained on the land under Ataturk and Inonu, the safety-
valve of additional farm land for additional people could
be counted upon no longer.
B. Urban Expansion
Most marked urbanization had occurred in the interior
regions where development efforts had been focussed.
Marmara region in 1927 held 43 percent of the nation's
population in towns over 10,000 and 72 percent in cities
over 50,000. By 1950 these figures had dropped to 35
and 50 percent respectively. The Aegean, too, had slipped
somewhat.
Gains occurred in all other regions; particularly in
Central Anatolia (from 15.4 to 20.7 percent of total urban
population and from 7.1 to 25.6 percent of that in cities
over 50,000). Seven cities had emerged into the 50,000
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and over class since 1927, all of them outside the
Marmara and Aegean areas.
Within the Marmara itself urbanization had not
significantly increased. It remained about 35 percent
of the regional population. All other regions, however,
had evidenced higher rates of urban growth, again most
sharply in Central Anatolia whose city population rose
from 11.1 to 17.2 percent of its total.
Istanbul and Izmir continued to attract population,
but Ankara had drained a good deal of attraction from the
two traditional centers. The three cities accounted for
over one-third the total increase in urban population,
and 50 percent in cities over 50,000. Nevertheless,
Istanbul was only now regaining her pre-revolution size
of 1,000,000 and had shown a substantially smaller growth
rate than the national figure of 53 percent. Izmir's
rise was slightly above the overall national figure.
City 1927 Population 1950 Population Pct. Inc.
Istanbul 690,000 980,000 42%
Izmir 155,000 240,000 58
Ankara 75,000 290,000 290%
The eight cities other than Ankara whose growth
significantly exceeded the overall national figure had each
been a target of major public development activity. All
were on the rail line and all had major state industries.
Six were provincial capitals, and Eskisehir was a major
military base. All but Izmit were outside the Marmara
region.
City
Eskisehir
Eregli
Izmit
Karabuk
Kirikkale
Malatya
Nazilli
ZongiRuldak
1927 Pop 1950 Pop Pet. Inc.
32 90 280
7 18 160
15 36 130
0 10 Infinite
0 15 Infinite
20 43 130
9 25 180
12 59 390
None of these rapidly-expanding urban areas was in Thrace
or the far eastern regions. This was perhaps a direct
reflection of the defense-inspired public policy to steer
development towards the center of the country and away
from the borders. Indeed, Edirne, the main city of
Thrace, but a few kilometers from Bulgaria, actually
declined from 35,000 to 30,000 people over the period. (107)
As far as urbanization and industrialization were
concerned, it appeared that the trend was definitely
away from the traditional centers and into the interior.
This was a trend directly produced by public development
activity.
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VII. 1923-1950, A Summary Evaluation
The year 1950 marked a turning point in Turkish
history. For the first time, a completely free election
was held, and the party of Ataturk and Inonu allowed itself
to be voted out of office. After a quarter century of
authoritarian, paternalistic rule, Turkey had become
a democracy.
The Democratic party government of Adnan Menderes
and Celal Bayar was to inauguarat e many new policies in
its 10 subsequent years of leadership, including some
major changes in programs which promoted decentralized
development. Therefore, we might pause at this point
in the discussion for a summary evaluation of accomplish-
ments since 1923 in the spread of growth from the
traditional centers.
Actually two ways to approach the subject are open:
first, an evaluation of achievements in terms of Ataturk's
initial objectives as stated in Chapter Two; second, an
examination in terms of the framework for creating growth
regions outlined in Chapter One. Since Ataturk had other
reasons for promoting the spread of development besides
a desire for new growth areas, both approaches are needed.
A. Fulfillment of Ataturk's Objectives
In Chapter II we suggested six objectives behind the
original decentralization policies. To a large measure,
these were achieved by 1950.
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1. National unity. The very fact that free
elections could be held in 1950 indicates that Ataturk's
goal of a unified nation had been met. A spirit of
nationalism pervaded Turkey. It was apparent both in the
cities, where government had placed most of its development
efforts, and in the villages.* For almost three decades
the Turks had shared a "common" experience, first of
winning independence and then of being ruled by leaders
whose widely-diffused public utterances constantly stressed
that the Turks were a people unto themselves. Ataturk's
statues and pictures as symbols of this nationhood were
widely displayed. Military service was yet another means
through which the message had been carried. (103) And
undoubtedly, one could consider the state industries,
the welfare programs, the physical changes to the towns
and cities of Anatolia as tangible demonstrations of a
concerned government that contributed to this growing
sense of national identity.
Enough administrators had been trained to staff Vilayet,
Kaza, and Nahiye bureaus with men who--if not always
imaginative--were able to implement the laws and policies
handed down from the center and to command local acquiescence.
*Paul Stirling, who made the first intensive post-war
analysis of village life could write in 1950:
"The villagers today are conscious of their membership
in the Turkish nation. Under the Ottoman Empire, the
villagers thought not in terms of a nation with a
national territory, but of themselves as a group
distinct from their neighbors on grounds of language,
religion or both.. .No European invention seems to
have spread more rapidly than nationalism." (109)
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No significant unrest had occurred since before World
War II. Brigandage had disappeared. Most minorities were
assimilated.* The rail system, the telegraph, radio, and
even the telephone kept the provinces and the capital in
communication. Turkey in 1950 seemed united both in fact
and in spirit.
2. Westernization. Here, too, had been successes,
but not of an unequivocal nature. Western alphabet, laws,
calendar, radio, education and dress gave a new form to the
society and eliminated many vestiges of the old, reactionary,
Ottoman-Moslem system. Ankara as a lasting symbol of the
new state, was in most repects a western city. The network
of schools, people's houses, and factories throughout the
land had certainly equipped thousands with some basic tools
of western civilization--thousands who would not have
come in contact with the new culture had it been allowed
to remain incubated at Istanbul or confined even to Ankara
itself. The modernizing elite was enlarged. Classes of
industrial workers, entrepreneurs, and managers were growing.
Yet as Lewis pointed out, the revolution had barely
touched the peasants who made up the bulk of Turkish
society. Nationalism they imbibed. Westernization was
still something far away.
*The nomadic Kurdish tribesmen of the eastern regions were
still a constant source of concern, and these regions would
continue to be restricted for travel through to the present
day. But revolts as wuch were no longer feared.
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Nor was it certain that efforts to modernize the
outlook of provincial towns were effective. Many external
forms had been changed, but a conservative religious
reaction was growing in 1950 and indeed may have aided the
Democrats' victory. (110) None of these towns had been
operated upon with the degree of concentration and
continuity that prevailed in Ankara. Only a few
modernizers were injected into their traditional economic
and social structures, and there was resentment against this
set of new ideas being "forced from the top." As late as
1960, Karpat could comment in his analysis of Turkish
social life: "The town is the cradle of dogmatism, of
ossified Islamic concepts, which make it an almost
invulnerable fortress of conservatism." (111)
It was also true that any aspiring-provincial had to
leave the towns after his Lycte education and come to
Ankara or Istanbul for higher training. The "elixir" of
life at the centers kept many from returning to the pro-
vinces to establish themselves in a now-incompatible
environment.
Westernization had taken effect by 1950, but its
spread was incomplete.
3. Spread of Development. No longer was industrial
development confined to the main, traditional centers.
These continued to grow, but large factories operated in
many cities throughout Anatolia. Much in the way of the
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nation's own natural resources was being exploited. Infra-
structure had been installed to act as a basis for further
development in the interior. The nation was not completely
self-sufficient, but had attained a favorable trade
balance by substituting domestic products for many which
would otherwise be imported. Turkey's standard of living
was still far below that of Europe and the United States,
but Ataturk set out to establish a basis for modern
productive activity and that basis had been assured.
Perhaps the greatest source of disappointment was that
interior public enterprises and their infra-structure had
not led to the expected burgeoning of allied private
industry. Such industry had stayed in the coastal centers,
with some activity in Ankara which seemed to offer enough
possibilities for profit and amenities to warrent risk.
Indeed, only in Ankara, of all the areas where government
had devoted development efforts, were there signs of
spontaneous growth.
4. The Ottoman Image. Ankara had replaced the
image of Istanbul as the political and cultural center of
the nation. This was no mean achievement and had involved
heavy outlays of investment and careful attention by the
top decision makers for a continuous period of a quarter-
century. Yet, despite the transfer of governmental
functions, Istanbul and Izmir retained enough basic
advantages and drew enough public investment to hold their
positions as Turkey's chief nuclei for commerce and
industry.
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5. Defense. Industrialization of the interior
was partially motivated by security considerations. By
1950 Turkish industry was dispersed and located in many
areas relatively invulnerable to attacks launched from
the ourders. Yet no attacks had come. Dispersion of
industry, moreover, away from markets and raw materials
proved a costly matter to maintain. After World War II
techniques of aerial warfare were reducing defense
advantages the interior sites might possess. Were
security alone the reason for scatteration, the added
costs might not have been warranted.
6. Support of Anatolia. Much was done to convey
that Anatolia was the mainspring of new Turkey. Anakara
became the capital, and Anatolia now had industries and
a railroad, schools and some limited measure of self-
government for its citizens.
On the balance, it appeared that the initial objectives
behind Ataturk's choice of development policies, a choice
that involved spreading economic and social change from
Istanbul and Izmir, had come a long but incomplete way
towards realization.
B. The Energence of Growth Regions
Ataturk did consider emergence of new growth regions
as an objective. Political and strategic considerations
held, however, at least equal significance. While
political and strategic aims were largely achieved, the
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development of growth regions left much to be desired.
In some respects this juxtaposition of objectives provea
incompatible.
Ankara became the single area outside the established
and still significant coastal centers where a process of
dynamic growth and change seemed rooted. Ankara was an
amazing venture, but its development involved little actual
resource exploitation of long term significance to Turkey.
The transfer of national decision-making power to this
spot, which acted as the basis of Ankara's transformation,
could not be reduplicated elsewhere as a development tool.
The care, concentration, and sustained attention
applied to Ankara might have been applied also to areas
important for their resources. They were not, however,
because political objectives determined dispersion of
the remaining effort as widely as possible.
In no area outside of Ankara was the build-up of
related industrial and infra-structure investments
sufficient to provide external economies comparable with
the traditional centers and Ankara. Government gave small
doses of attention and investment to a large number of
towns and cities, hoping thereby to achieve both political
integration and economic growth.
Unification was accomplished, but despite investments
to exploit resources and install infra-structure elsewhere,
none of the other provincial centers gave evidence of
significant power to attract or generate new enterprises.
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Many governmental investments had not been suited to their
sites, even though the products produced had value to the
nation. These projects could not hope to attract further
growth.
The original incentives offered to private entrepre-
neurs had been insufficient to counter disadvantages of
interior locations, and eventually any incentive program
at all was abandoned; thus reinforcing reluctance to
invest outside the Marmara and Aegean. Moreover,
agriculture, whose complementary development with industry
is as critical within a growth region as it is within the
nation itself, was largely neglected.
Although physical facilities were installed and
factories did produce, the dynamic interior industrial
regions which Ozbek and Bayar had envisioned did not
materialize; and the government was able to maintain its
dispersed development pattern only at great cost under
continued conditions of austerity.
Yet Turkey in 1950 was quite a different nation from
Turkey in 1923. A foundation for change had been laid.
The country had new pride in peacetime accomplishment.
Now no longer so concerned with promoting unification and
national cohesion, government might be able to give
unalloyed attention to economic development as a major goal.
If economic growth were to become the main consider-
ation, changes to the programs affecting regions outside
the three centers would be essential. Some of these out-
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lying areas which now possessed basic industry and
infra-structure might conceivably become valuable nuclei
of further growth--with a more careful and concentrated
approach to their requirements.
The real question was what a democratic government,
brought to power in opposition to the one-party regime,
would do with the existing foundation. Would the policy
of dispersion continue? Would some of the peripheral
areas now be brought to a stage of dynamic development?
These are the matters to be considered in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLICY AND PROGRAMS UNDER THE DEMOCRATS, 1950-1960
"The budget is a plan."
-- Adnan Menderes (1)
I. Three Chan~es in National Circumstances
During the 1923-1950 period, public development
policy could be categorized as urban-oriented and directed
towards creation of economic and social change. in interior
communities. No such easy classification is possible for
the 1950-60 decade.
The decade saw three changes in Turkey's national
circumstances which profoundly influenced the cha'racter
and location of development activity. First was
inauguration of an experiment in democratic government.
This government, desiring to respond to the popular
majority, took as its watchword growth throughout the
nation and in all sectors of the economy. Second, was
emergence of Turkey as a full but poor partner in the
Western military alliance. Although post-war foreign aid
had been forthcoming, Western financial and technical
assistance took on new momentum during the 1950's. The
ease in obtaining large sums from abroad allowed
0D
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government to further its broad-scale development policy
with relatively little restraint. Third was an internal
population explosion that brought a 10-year increase
numerically equal to that from 1927 to 1950. Peasants
began to leave the countryside in droves, placing enormous
pressures on Turkey's urban areas and on the ability of
her non-agriculturS economy to absorbe new workers.
The decade saw great rises in both the level of
public spending and incentives for private entrepreneurs.
In terms of efforts to create growth regions government
concentrated much attention on the three main centers of
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir; yet, in addition, it
dispersed public investment in industry, agriculture,
coLmmunications, other infra-structure, etc. throughout
the Tu'rkish interior at a scale unparalleled during the
Republican period.
Economic development did become the primary goal of
the Democratic government, but the approach adopted was
one of trying to develop the entire nation "at once and
quickly." In the process, coordination between agencies
charged with phases of public investment, which had begun
to weaken during the Inonu administration, suffered a
severe breakdown.
This chapter is devoted to an exposition of the
programs during the 1950-60 decade which affected spatial
distribution of development a Turkey. Of additional
concern will be the nature of the coordination breakdown
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between public agencies and its possible effects on the
growth of outlying regions. Tentative conclusions drawn
from the analysis will be explored in detail during the
Zonguldak chapters to follow.
Before beginning the discussion, however, some
attention is needed to the three changes in Turkey's
"national circumstances" which occurred after 1950.
Although more within the purview of a political scientist
than a planner, they must at least be cited as important
background to decentralization policy during the decade.*
A. The Democratic Experiment
For a period before the 1950 elections, Inonu's
Repiblian party attempted to adjust its public image
and policy to coincide more closely with the opposition
Democrats.** Yet these modifications came too little
and too late for the Turkish voter who had long stored up
resentment against the Republicans and now held a franchise
which he could exercise. The Menderes administration was
the first ever to take office on the basis of popular
*The reader is referred to the works of Robinson, Hanson
and Frey cited supra for discussion of the political origins
and significanance of these changes.
**For example, the government exempted agricultural income
from taxation in 1949 and began the agricultural and high-
way programs (p199ff) which were intensified under the
Democrats. After a 1943 economic congress in Istanbul,
the government liberalized its attitude towards private
enterprise. Pressures in these directions came not only
from the Democrats, but also from the American and other
foreign missions who favored agricultural investment and
liberalization of the economy. (2)
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choice between opposing parties. It was also the first
to rely on '-the popular will" to stay in office. In
past decades, the authoritarian Republican regime could
underemphasize agriculture and living standards of its
peasant majority in favor of urban and industrial invest-
ments. The Democrats could not do the same and expect
to survive. A one-party state had been able to adopt
austere financial programs to limit consumption and
imports and to tax heavily private entrepreneurs. A
popular government, responsive to powerful elements of
society whose desires had hitherto been blocked, might
not expect to retain power with an austerity image.
Menderes and the Democrats seemed sincerely interested
in responding to the popular will and improving the lot
of those whom the Republicans had suppressed or ignored.
Certainly the overwhelming re-election of the party and
its leadership in 1954 and again in 1958 indicates that
most Turks believed the Democrats were indeed the party
of the people. Whether Turkey was ready for Democracy
is another question, and unfortunately one which can not
be answered here.
To win and retain popular support, the Democrats adopted
a main development objective which called for achievement of
such high growth levels in all sectors of the economy that
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the Turkish living standard would soon equal that of the
West.*
President Bayar himself said in 1957:
"We in our country are working to follow
the example of American development. We
hope that thirty years from now when our
blessed country will have a population
of 50 million, it will be a little
America." (4)
Out of this commitment to fast across-the-board
development came public programs which endeared the
Democrats to the Turkish voter (rural and urban) and
which led to high inflation, international debt, and
eventual collapse the government. Taxation on the
farmer and the businessman was sharply reduced. Import
quotas were raised. High levels of credit were offered
to agriculture and industry, along with price supports.
When the administration saw that even these programs
were not leading to the desired growth rates, once again
came a turn to direct public spending to create jobs and
productive facilities. All of these actions were compressed
within a span of such a few years that even Western ob-
*Robinson comments: "The economic target of the Menderes
administration could be defined quite clearly; it was to
bring the country within range of the industrial states
of the West in terms of productivity and standard of
living within a meaningful time. It would buy no- economic
development program that committed Turkey to perpetual
inferiority with the industrial West." (3)
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servers accustomed to rapid development were dazzled.*
As part and parcel of the revolt against austerity,
the Democrats abandoned economic planning, which had been
a keystone of the earlier political system. Planning
symbolized the Republican concept of public control over
economic decision. It had to be downgraded as a sign
of commitment to free enterprise and individual decision-
making. Unfortunately, the downgrading of planning
extended to relations between government agencies them-
selves as well as between private and public enterprise.
The budget, as Menderes noted in the citation that begins
this chapter, became the plan. Expenditures were to be
programmed on an ad hoc rather than a long term basis,
and consideration of ways to dovetail programs of various
agencies were largely neglected. This factor, as much as
*Robinson notes: "The foreign expert, American included,
had fallen from grace through his apparent failure to
appreciate the necessities of the Turkish situation.
Twenty new cement plants, ports, dams, highways, all at
once? It could not be done. No country had ever moved
forward so fast." (5)
Some illustrative statistics at this point may be helpful.
1. Public investment as a percent of total investment
fell from 43.05 in 1950 to 38.8% in 1954. It then
increased to 48.0% in 1956.
2. Public investment as a percent of the national budget
rose from 12.3% in 1950 to 31.55 in 1956, representing
a spending level of 180,000 000 TL in 1950 and
1,041,000,000 TL in 1956 (6)
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any other, contributed to the difficulties of development
in potential growth regions outside the main centers.*
B. World Involvment
The Democrats could not have conducted such accelerated
development programs without substantial foreign aid.
These funds came in response to Turkey's assumption of in-
ternational military obligations in the Western defense
system. Between 1950 and 1962, $831.8 millions in outright
grants were tendered by the U.S. Total American economic
assistance including loans and sales under PL 480 programs
involving soft-currency payment, amounted to $1,615.9 mill-
ions over the period. American expenditures on technical
assistance alone were $40 millions between 1950 and 1962 (8).
Turkeyts isolation from international alliances had
actually ended late in World War II with a declaration of
war against the Axis powers. Turkey then became a charter
member of the United Nations, and Russia's threat to the
straits in 1946 pushed her firmly into the Western camp.
Under the Marshall Plan and Truman's Greek-Turkish aid pro-
gram, Turkey received military and some economic assistance
during the last Republican years amounting to about $500
millions (9). Economic assistance was originally intended
to terminate with the Marshall plan.
*Hanson analyzes the opposition to Republican party policies
whidh led to the abandonment of planning (7) and suggests:
"The Democratic government in its determination to prove
its 'soundness' on free enterprise, incontinently threw
the baby out with the bath water, by rejecting planning
as well as nationalization. This had unfortunate results
on the economy and involved the misapplication of
American aid."
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But in 1950 Turkey entered the Korean war on the
side of the UN and simultaneously was admitted to the
NATO alliance. World tensions increased, and Turkey's
position athwart the straits and as a southern neighbor
of Russia made her, in the words of one U.S. officer;
"one of the most valuable pieces of real-estate in the
world." The West was willing to pay the high rental
demanded for a "long-term lease."
Turkey's army, which had not exceeded 80,000 during
the 1930's, was destined to become at 400,000 men the
largest land force in NATO. (10) Since this force could
not possibly be maintained through mobilization of
internal resources, by 1962 some $2.2 billions of
American equipment and training aid were granted for
Turkey's use. (11)
Economic assistance was increased by the Western
powers in the hope that Turkey might become self-supporting.
Excellent 1953 harvests (making Turkey for one year the
world's fourth largest grain exporter) further buoyed
Western confidence that the country could act as a
breadbasket for Europe. This aid came both from the US
and other Western nations, as witnessed by a $100 millions
OEEC member country loan in 1958. (12) Thousands of
Turks were sent to study abroad, and thousands of foreigners
came to work in Turkey.
-~ -
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One product of the aid programs was increased contact
between the Turks and the well-to-do foreigners. Turkey
was by far the poorest nation in NATO, and widespread
awareness of the gap added fuel to the government's effort
to match Western standards as quickly as possible.
Most important, however, was that Turkey now had
funds to invest in both development and consumption with
relatively little restraint.* Foreign governments would
pick up the hard currency tab for machinery, construction
materials, and consumption items. Heavy domestic private
and public investment could be fostered with little concern
for fiscal soundness or careful examination of the real
contribution a project might make to the economy. Even
though the allies complained (the U.S. refused a $300,000,000
loan in 1955), eventually the funds seemed to be forth-
coming as payment for Turkish participation in the alliance.
With such relatively easy money in the background, it is
no wonder that coordination between various development
agencies within the government relaxed.
*Robinson describes the officialTutkish attitude as follows:
"Realizing that no country would grant her the loans
and credits needed to finance the import component of
the investment program and cover the purchase of
necessary consumer goods, Turkish leaders adopted the
policy of importing everything possible and worrying
about payment later. Though eventually seriously
undermining Turkish financial prestige abroad, this
policy accomplished two purposes.
One, the physical possession of the needed goods, and,
two, involvement of Turkey's trading partners to such
an extent that they felt compelled to grant further
commercial credit to help finance additional purchases
abroad if they were to recoup anything of their pre-
viously involuntary credits." (12)
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C. The Population Explosion
Between 1950 and 1960, Turkish population increased
by 33 percent. This was roughly 7,000,000 people,
approximately the same amount of growth as had occurred
from 1923 to 1950. (14) Almost all of these were added
through the process of natural increase, i.e. excess
of births over deaths.* The growth rate, which had been
about 2 percent per year since independence (dropping
only during the war years) suddenly shot up close to
3 percent during the last decade--a level which shows
no signs of diminishing. Birth rates rose, and death
rates fell due to eradication of malaria and the diffusion
of preventive medicine. Relevant statistics appear in
Table IV-1 below.
Table IV-1
Estimated National Birth and Death Rates, 1935-1955
(per thousand population)
Year Birth Rate Death Rate
1935 34.6 18.0
1940 35.7 20.0
1945 28.7 18.9
1950 36.6 15.7
1955 40.8 14.3
Source: Orhan Turkey: Tirkiye Nufusu, Siyasal
Bilgiler Facultesi, Ankara, 1960, pp. 49
and 54.
*The only significant immigration from abroad was 200,000
Turkish Moslems whom Bulgaria expelled in 1950 after
Turkey's entrance into the Korean war.
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In the course of this rise, Turkish peasantry began,
for the first time, to leave the land permanently in
significant numbers. Using the same method of calculation
as in Chapter Three, we estimate that some 30 percent of
the expected rural natural increase was absorbed in urban
areas during the decade, compared with less than 10
percent for the preceding 23 years.*
*Between 1950 and 1960 Turkish population rose at an
average annual rate of 2.85 percent. Since figures on
differential birth and death rates are unavailable, we
again assume that both urban and rural areas might be
expected to evidence the same yearly increment. Again,
we are probably underestimating somewhat the rural and
over-estimating the urban natural increase.
Figures are in 000.
Actual-Expec
1950 1960 Difference Expected Nat Inc Diff.
Tot Pop 2,947 27,602 6,55 6,55 0
Rural 17,004 20,814 3,810 5,556 -1,746
Urban 3,943 6,988 3,045 1,288 +1,757
According to these calculations, urban population absorbed
roughly 31,5 percent of the expected rural natural increase.
The calculations do not allow for the influx of 200,000
Bulgarian refugees, however, whose presence after 1950
might reduce the expected rate of natural increase. Since
such a method is satisfactory only in indicating general
magnitudes, the estimate of rural-urban migration ihight
be scaled down to about 1,500,000 people, or 30 percent
of natural increase on the farm.
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More than 3,000,000 people were added to the popu-
lation of cities over 10,000. From our calculations,
it would seen that over half this number may have been
peasants and their offspring.
Rapid urbanization suddenly became a critical factor
in Turkish development. The number of cities over 10,000
in population rose from 106 to 145 during the decade.
Those over 50,000 multiplied from 12 to 27. (See Tables
IV-10,11,12)
Although many communities were inundated by rural
migrants, the most striking population increases occurred
in the three main national centers. Ankara, Istanbul,
and Izmir together accounted for roughly one-third of
the growth in all cities, or about 1,000,000 people.
Ankara itself more than doubled in size. The other two,
unlike their experience from 1927 to 1950, evidenced
proportional population increases significantly higher
than in the nation as a whole. Growth figures for these
three centers were:
1950 Pop 1960 Pop Pct Increase
Ankara 289,000 646,000 123
Istanbul 983,000 1,460,000 48
Izmir 240,000 396,ooo 65
Percentage rises for the nation, rural areas, and
cities were:
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Nation 33 percent
Rural areas 23 percent
Cities over 10,000 77 percent
Cities over 50,000 111 percent
This population explosion acted as further pressure
on the Menderes government to make promises for economic
development and to adopt a spending level that could
fulfill the promises. Job creation, both on the land and
in the cities was essential.
The sad outcome of this effort was, however, that
significant government programs enacted to keep peasants
gainfully employed on the land actually backfired by
expediting the farm-to-city movement. Passage from rural
areas throughout the nation to the three centers of Ankara,
Istanbul, and Izmir soon became a relatively simple
matter; and major public projects to increase attractive-
ness of these centers contributed to their expansion.
Much of the public industrial decentralization in the
latter half of the decade can therefore be regarded as an
attempt to head off the flow to the major cities by
providing work opportunities' in proVincialxc cent ers close
to areas of emigration. But this is already moving ahead
of the discussion. We had better turn now to an examin-
ation of the programs themselves; first to the efforts in
agriculture and highway transportation, each conceived
with other objectives, but each of which contributed
heavily to rural-urban migration.
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II. Agriculture
A wide variety of agricultural programs were intended
to improve both productivity and the farmer's financial
position. Tax exemptions passed in 1949 by the Republicans
were kept and increased, and price supports were raised. (15)
Tractors and other mechanized farm equipment were imported
in large amounts. Credit possibilities via the agricultural
bank were expanded to such a level that the Bank's dis-
bursement of 242 million TL in 1948 was raised to 1,068
million TL in 1952. When many farmers defaulted on the
loans, the agovernment forgave the amounts due. (16)
Government-constructed irrigation systems, which had
covered only 420,000 decares in 1950, increased to 2.5
million decares by 1960. (17) Land distribution, made
to some 33,000 families by 1950, was extended to a total
of 365,000 families by 1959. (18) All told, yearly
public investment in agriculture rose from 96 million TL
in 1950 to 860 million TL in 1960. Its proportion of
public development expenditures was second only to
communications over the period.
200.
Table IV-2
Proportion of Agriculture
in Economic Development Expenditures
1950-60
Year Agric. Investment Percent of Govt.
in Millions of TL Epend. on Devel.
1950 96 29.6
1954 175 29.8
1955 270 31.3
1956 350 35.3
1957 523 39.7
1958 593 38.3
1959 764 36.5
1960 860 31.6
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development,
"Turkish Economic Statistics,"
USAID, Ankara, 1962, p. 32.
Despite the spending, Turkey's overall agricultural
position by 1960 had moved from bad to worse. The annual
value of agricultural production rose by 45 percent over
the decade; but this increase did not come from generally
higher productivity. For the amount of land under culti-
vation had meanwhile increased by 56 percent. (20)
Three quarters of the population were still rural, and
per capita rural GNP was only slightly more than half the
national per capit GNP of $185. (21) Since the boom year
of 1953, Turkey had been a net importer of grain. Her
wheat imports from the U.S. amounted to several hundred
thousand tons annually.
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A. Mechanization Backfires
Easy credits, tax exemptions, and land distribution
served to keep some peasants on the land who might other-
wise have left. But the net results of the emphasis on
farm mechanization included displacement of farmers and
the extension of cultivation into lands completely unsuited
to crop culture.
The tractor import program affords one of the best
examples of the difficulties that arose.
The government was eager to introduce mechanized
equipment, and farmers, spurred on by liberal loan oppor-
tunities, were eager to purchase. But the government
had formulated no plan of distribution and no detailed
utilization program to combine mechanized equipment
with fertilizers and instruction in scientific agriculture.
Tractors were sold to all who could buy them. In 1950,
about 12 percent of the total land under cultivation was
worked by tractors. The figure jumped to almost 25
percent by 1957. (22) Table IV-2 below indicates the
magnitude of tractor imports during the period.
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Table IV-3
Tractors in Turkey, 1936-1957
Land Cultivated by Tractors
Year Number of Tractors in 000 of hectares
1936 961 72
1948 1756 132
1950 16585 1244
1951 24000 1800
1952 31415 2356
1953 35600 2670
1954 37743 2831
1955 40282 3021
1956 43727 3280
1957 44144 3310
Source: Keles, op. cit. p. 35
Fully one-half the imports did terminate in the most
fertile farmland of Turkey; in the Marmara, Mediterranean
and Aegean regions. These areas had the largest and
already most scientifically-managed farms and were also
targets for the major efforts at irrigation. (23)
Yet one-third came to the dry-farming and pasture
lands of the Central Anatolian plateau. Here ownerships
were smaller, irrigation practically non-existent, and the
utilization of fertilizers slight. The immediate result
was extension of wheat and sugar-beet cultivation into
marginal land, previously used for pastureage.* In a
*Although the supply of livestock increased, between 1950
and 1956 the amount of land in pastureage and prairie fell
from 49 to 38 percent of Turkey's total area. (27) A
severe problem of overgrazing resulted and contributed both
to erosion and declining quality of livestock. For details,
see FAO Mission report, op. cit., Ch. IV.
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sample survey of villages on the plateau undertaken by
the Ankara University Political Science Faculty, it was
discovered that cultivated land increased by 42 percent
between 1948 and 1952.(25)
Yields rose until the boom year of 1953. Subse-
quently, weather conditions worsened with insufficient
rainfall. The deep-furrowed cultivation made possible by
tractors contributed to loss of top soil on both the
good and marginal lands. Erosion became increasingly
serious. Per hectare wheat production had been 942 kg.
in 1950, had risen to 1,295 kg. in the good season of
1953, and by 1960 was down to 983 kg. (26)
Meanwhile, thousands of peasants were put out of
work. Except for some unnecessary sugar beet cultivation,*
the grain culture of the plateau had not given way to
diversified farming which--even under mechanization--
might be more labor intensive than cereals.
Rosen, who conducted one of the few detailed studies
of the Turkish labor situation, estimates that some 350,000
peasants were sent into the migrant stream between 1950
and 1955 due to installation of mechanical equipment. (27)
Robinson reaches a similar conclusion through examination
of several areas where tractors were introduced. He
estimates that each tractor displaced an average of eight
*The government's program of factory construction (p. 232)
gave positive encouragement for increases in sugar beet
cultivation--for which there was neither a domestic no'
a profitable foreign market.
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people. (28) After 1956, tractor imports were practically
eliminated, but by then the major difficulties were already
pronounced.*
Even in the fertile coastal regions, where both
irrigation and mechanized farming were fostered> yields
were disappointing while cultivated land increased.**
Cotton and tobacco production, for example, was not
significantly higher in 1956 than in 1950.***
*Other serious problems presented themselves with the
tractor program. The equipment came in so quickly that
few mechanics were available to make repaits. Many of
the machines broke down and were useless. Tractors also
became popular means of transporting villagers to towns
and thus received added wear as transport vehicles. Then,
too, over 50 different types of machines were imported from
the U.S., Canada, and 'Germany. Spare parts were not
interchangeable, and the Turkish farm equipment factory
at Adapazari (while markedly increasing its production of
secondary implements) was unable to fabricate substitutes.
Since 1956 this situation has improved, but much damage
was done in the early years. (29)
**Lack of proper maintenance helped defeat much of the
irrigation effort. USAID officials have described to the
writer one of their largest reclamation projects during
1962, the Bornova plain outside of Izmir where soil had
become saline due to faulty maintenance of a major
irrigation system.
***Relevant statistics on cotton and tobacco are:
Area Sown Produc. Yield/ha
(in. 000 hec) (000 Metr. Tns) (Metric Ths)
1950 1956 1950 1956 1950 1956
Cotton 448 637 1181 1651 .26 .26
Tobacco 128 172 93 116 .74 .64
Source: Developments Respecting Turkey, 1956-57,
op Cit., pp. 216-7
1. lint only
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In 1959, a FAO mission made an extensive survey of
Turkey's agricultural situation. The mission recommended
a sharp cut-back in the land under cultivation, a re-
conversion of fields to forests and pastures, crop
diversification and stepped-up irrigation. The report
recognized that such a program would further displace
marginal farmers, but felt there was no other solution
to Turkey's growing food problems. (30)
The Menderes administration had inherited a serious
agricultural situation. This crucial sector of the
economy had received comparatively little public invest-
ment or incentives over the preceding quarter century.
Since the government's main political support came from
the countryside, it felt bound to make speedy and dramatic
efforts at improvement. Difficulties were of such a
magnitude that even a careful investment program might not
have seen certain success, but the course followed led to
largely negative results. Productivity had not increased
substantially. Thousands were displaced from rural areas,
and the problem of overcultivation steadily worsened.*
*Even the land distribution program, while holding some
significant number of peasants in the countryside, led
to worsening conditions. A total of 2.5 million hectares
of tillable land and 1.2 million hectares of grazing fields
had been distributed to 365,000 families by the end of 1959.
The plots averaged out at 5 hectares of crop and .9
hectares of grazing land per family. A.J. Meyer (31)
points out how these small parcels could only be farmed
through inefficient methods and were barely able to meet
a subsistence level for their owners.
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III. The Highway Program
Our estimates put rural-urban migration during the
1950's at the order of 1,500,000 people. Even if
displacements by farm mechanization were two to three times
what Rosen and Robinson computed, mechanization alone
could not have induced a transfer of this magnitude. One
important contributing factor was the highway program,
which became the single largest item of expenditure in
the public development budget.
Relatively little rural-urban shift had occurred
during the Republican period; partly because room for
agricultural expansion still existed, and partly because
the emphasis on railway construction did little to decrease
the isolation of most villages. Mechanized fanming and
rapid population increase eliminated the "lebensraum."
Construction of an excellent farm-to-market road network
joined with improvements to the national highway system to
reduce the isolation. Civilian motor vehicles, imported
in large quantities under the U.S. aid program, provided
the means of transport; and movement from village to city
became infinitely easier than ever before.
Accelerated migration was hardly the highway program's
objective. It had been undertaken for two main purposes:
1. To provide the nation with a transport system
suited to a modern military machine which
depended on high mobility.
2. To make marked improvement in agricultural
produce distribution.
. 'M -1 
- -- _ , , ;Z __ - _. - - --- I - - - W
207.
These objectives were achieved over the decade,
and accelerated rural-urban movement appeared as an
unexpected by-product.
In addition, the highway development effort helped to
further dominance and growth of Ankara as Turkey's main
interior center and supported the positions of Istanbul
and Izmir as major development areas.
A. Origins and Objectives
The U.S. military mission in 1947 recommended that
Turkr abandon her emphasis on railroad construction and
undertake a major road-building program with American
assistance. The single-track rail system connected most
urban centers but could not meet military maneuverability
needs of a nation now under Soviet pressure--and one which
was to possess several major Western bases. Rolling stock
was also of poor quality. Without an adequate network
of farm to market roads, moreover, the Americans felt that
Turkey could neither handle her own food needs nor realize
her potential as an important grain exporter to the West.*
Also in 1947, a U.S. Bureau of Public Roads team came
to Turkey under the direction of Deputy Commissioner
H.E. Hilts. The Hilts report became blue-print for the
actual program and recommended that national roads to
increased by 5,000 km. and provincial routes (the farm-to-
*Lehman notes: "To the American mission in 1947 it seemed
evident that effective transport for Turkey's farm output
hinged on development of a network of modest all-weather
roads to complement the existing rail system." (32)
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market connectors) by 30,000 km. The report also suggested
establishment of a Turkish highway department, using
local contractors and engineers.* Work was to be staged
over a number of years.
Both the Inonu government and the U.S. aid agencies
bought the Hilts program. Work began in 1948 within the
Turkish Ministry of Public Works, to which a BPR technical
assistance mission was attached. In 1950, just a short
time before the change in administration, a semi-autonomous
highway department, Devlet Karayollari, was created within
the Ministry.. A large professional staff was recruited,
many of whom were sent to the U.S.A. for advanced training.
The military considerations which shaped the program
can be seen on Map IV-4. Here the main national highway
system is shown, as it appeared in 1960 after 12 years of
work. A striking conceptual similarity between the
highway plan and the railroad developments of the 1930's
is apparent.
Ankara is the hub of each system. During the 1930's
Ataturk extended the rail lines from Ankara to provincial
centers throughout the country in part as a means of
providing communication and control. After World War II,
the speed and mobility which highways afforded became
all important.
*This was over oppostion from some American military
personnel who, in the interests of speed, felt the job
should be done by Americans. Hilts felt a Turkish agency
was the only means of guaranteeing that work would be
sustained over long periods of time. (35)
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As the Western outpost on the Russian border, it was
particularly crucial that Turkey have a top-quality
national highway network connecting the borders with major
military bases and the national control center. Main
military installations tended to be in the large provincial
centers (Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbakir, Samsun, Adana, Konya,
Eskisehir, Izmit, Edirne). The harbors of Istanbul and
Iskenderun became chief entrepots for the flow of military
equipment from abroad;* and Izmir was made the supreme
headquarters for NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Ankara was both general staff headquarters and, with its
satellite city of Kiriddale, the main domestic munitions
producer.
Although the writer has never seen an explicit
presentation of this rationale (other than the general
military objective), connection of the strong points
seems to have been a primary goal. Highways were also
used to short cut or by-pass the railroad in providing
more direct connections between centers.** Main emphasis
in this phase of the system was on widening and surfacing
rather than the construction of completely new lines as
*First priority for a national highway link under the
1947 program went to a 600 mile link between the military
entreport of Iskenderun and the main eastern base of
Erzurum. (34)
**Muntz (35) lists eleven road sections in 1950 amounting
to 1333 km which were given top priority for new construc-
tion or improvement. Of the 11, eight represented lines
which were to parallel almost exactly an existing railroad
and the remaining 3 were short cuts between cities already
connected by rail.
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in the provincial feeder network.* Many of these national
highways existed before the program as roads or caravan
routes.
As Lehman puts it:
"The...Democratic party had promised better
roads to everyone, presumably to be provided
at once, and would have liked to fulfill its
promises by conjuring up a completed road
system overnight." (36)
Government pressure on the highway agency to fulfill
the promises continued well beyond election campaigns.
Notes from the BPR team director in the early '50's indi-
cate how strong this pressure had become:
"For some time... the Ministry has been considering
the extension of the highway system by the addition
of anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 kilometers. This
is the result of strong pressure brought by the
Democrats as they made a peint of village and province
roads in their campaign for election and now they
are swamped with demands. We are resisting the
extension of the system as a National System and
are suggesting that & complete study be made of the
secondary needs and then establish reasonable
mileage of secondary highways, with provision for
the improvements of secondary roads while the study
is being made. This has been received favorably
in many quarters but the pressure is very strong
and Veedi (Diker, Director General of Highways)
himself,,..sugsested at one time the 200,000 kilometer
figure." (37)
Intense government interest combined with the U.S.
commitment to make the highway program probably the most
successful (in tenms of its objectives) American technical
assistance operations conducted in Turkey.
*Two of the most interesting ancient roads were the Ankara-
Istanbul connection via Bolu and the Ankara-Adana line via
the Cilician Gates, through which Alexander passed. Before
the road program, the main Ankara-Istanbul road had been
via Beypazari. The new line restored Bolu to prominence.
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B. Investment
The program began modestly. Some $5,000,000 of the
$100,000,000 allocated to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine
in 1948 was devoted to highways. The 12.8 million TL
budgeted by Inonu for roads rose to 39.0 million TL in
1949 and 67.0 million TL in 1950. Although substantial
sums, they were minor compared with disbursements after
1950. (38)
Table IV-4
Investments in Highways 1950-60*
A. B. C.
Percent of Percent of Govt.
Amt. in TL Investment in Investment in Econ.
Year in Millions Communications Development
1950 65 57.5 20.3
1951 95
1954 186 76.0 31.6
1955 314 76.0 36.2
1956 361 75.2 36.5
1957 501 87.0 38.6
1958 518 73.4 33.4
1959 767 80.0 36.6
1960 943 72.5 34.5
Source: Col. A Karayollari- Istatistik Bulteni,
1960 Ba indirlik Bakanligi, Ankara, 1960
pp. 44-5
Col. B+C USAID, op. aCit.,
Ankara, 1960. Percentages derived from
data on p. 32.
*Does not include personnel and administrative
expenditures.
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Expenditures on highways rose from 2.9 percent of
the total budget in 1950 to 7.8 percent in 1959. These
sums approximately equalled public agricultural investment
of all types. The American contribution between 1943 and
1959 was $45,000,000. (39)
C. Targets Reached
The Democrats never reached their 200,000 km target.
By 1960, however, Turkey had a highway system far surpassing
that of a decade before.
Year
1948
1950
1955
1959
Table IV-5
National, Provincial, and All-Weather Roads,
1948-1959 (in kms.)
Natl. Rds Prov. Rds Total All-Weather Percent
22,826 21,360 44,186 12,246 28.0
24,306 22,774 47,o8o 17,465 37.0
24,553 30,455 55,008 29,409 53.0
26,783 33,804 60,623 38,374 63.5
Source: Karayollari Istatistik Bulteni, op cit., p. 1
In slightly under 10 years, all-weather roads had
doubled. National highways had been hard-surfaced rather
more than extended,* and the greatest increase in kilo-
meterage occurred in the provincial farm-to-market network.
More than 11,000 kilometers had been added to provincial
roads.
*The length of hard-surfaced roads rose from 7,550 km to
17,745 km. (40)
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All but one of the 54 cities over 25,000 in population
by 1960 were connected by national highways, and all but
20 of the 91 cities between 10,000 and 25,000. These
other communities were, however, linked to the national
system by passable roads not yet surfaced. The program
was far from completion, since roads in mountainous
areas of the East and along the Black Sea were still
sparse and poorly-surfaced, but a great deal had been
done.
D. Movement of Goods and People
In conjunction with the construction, Turkey imported
large amounts of civilian vehicles.
Table IV-6
Motor Vehicles In Turkey by Type, 1948-60
Year Autos Trucks Buses Motorcycles Total
1948 51803 10,596 2,198 1,634 20,231
1950 10,061 13,201 3,185 2,661 29,118
1955 28,599 30,250 6,671 9,510 75,030
1960 37,616 48,094 8,881 8,215 102,806
Source: Karayollari, op cit. p. 17
Note in particular the increase in trucks and busses.
New "transport" entrepreneurs appeared in both the major
cities and the small towns. With liberal credit available,
a man commonly bought a single truck or bus and became a
transport firm. Indeed, the number of these individual
owners so proliferated, that the government became con-
cerned with problems of rate regulation and carrier safety.*
*In 1958 the government commissioned a UN study on these
problems.
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As more vehicles were introduced and travel times
fell between points (p. 219 ), rates for both passenger and
goods transport dropped by one-half or more--even while
overall inflation had set in. By the end of the decade,
most communities near a road were able to offer cheap and
quick vehicle transport both to provincial centers and
Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. Dependence on the slow
and more expensive railroad was reduced. Villagers were
no longer isolated either from the provincial or the
national cities.
And it was here that the program's agricultural
objective backfired. For with worsening farm conditions,
villagers did not amass huge supplies of produce to send
over the new roads to the cities as expected. True,
product transfers were expedited. But in many cases,
highways were extended to villages which had no goods for
the urban markets; peasants found these nearby roads an
easy access to a new urban life. (41)*
*Other factors may well have contributed to the rural-
urban movement in addition to mechanization, the highway
program, and population growth. The great expansion of
the Turkish army saw draftees as a matter of principle
stationed in areas other than their place of origin.
In this way thousands of peasants were brought to cities,
an experience they would not forget on return to the
village. (42) Also, the widespread import of battery
radio sets and the spread of American movies to small
town theatres may have further stimulated the villagers'
desire for mobility. (43) The highways, however, were the
means by which they maie the shift.
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Tables IV-6,7,8 indicate increases of goods and
passenger movements between 1950--the first year in which
Karayollari published traffic surveys using BPR methods--
and 1959.
E. Advantage for the National Centers
The highway program generally increased accessibility
of cities and towns to each other and to their rural
hinterlands. However, greatest "comparative" advantage
went to the three existing national centers of Ankara,
Istanbul, and Izmir. Travel time between these centers
and provincial cities was slashed. Relevant figures for
the times between Ankara and selected points appear in
Table IV-9 below. If it was easy for a villager to come
to a provincial town, cheap bus service made passage to
any of the larger centers equally simple. In these
centers, the most extensive public and private development
was underway, and their aura as loci of opportunity for
both migrants and entrepreneurs increased. (See p. 220)
This is not to say that the highways failed to move
other communities to prominence. (Indeed, the extensive
transport improvements along the Mediterranean coast
undoubtedly were a factor in growth of Adana--a major
military base and the "capital" of cotton production.)
However, greatest advantages were bestowed on the centers
whose advantages were highest to begin with.
Year Highways
ton-kms
1950 957,05
1955 2,405,24
1959 3,253,61
Table IV-7
Highway Movements by Type, 1950-59 (in 000)
Year Vehicle-Kms. Ton-Kms. Passen~er-Kms.
1950 557,385 957,059 2,597,311
1955 1,204,955 2,405,244 10,830,853
1959 1,386,016 3,253,614 9,969,241
Source: Karayollari, op cit. p. 25
Table IV-8
Goods Transport by Various Systems, 1950-1959 (in 000)
Railroads Shipping Airlines
% Ton-kms % Ton-kms % Ton-kms
9 22.3 3,078,266 71.6 261,921 6.1 0
4 34.0 4,366,112 61.7 304,823 4.3 422
4 37.3 5,241,830 60.1 217,564 2.5 1,200
r
0
0
0.1
0~
Table IV-9
Passenger Transport by Various Systems, 1950-1959 (in 000)
Year Highways Railroads Shippng Airlines
pas-kms % pas-kms % pas-kms % pas-kms %
1950 2,597,311 47.2 2,515,511 45.7 388,977 7.1 0 0
1955 10,830,853 71.4 3,917,322 25.8 361,944 2.4 63,737 0.4
1959 9,969,241 66.3 4,588,826 30.5 337,620 2.2 145,233 1.0
Source: Tables 7+8; Karayollari, op. cit., p. 29
Note to Tables:
While the railroad system, benefitting by the overall push for development,
increased both its passenger and goods traffic by about two thirds over nine
years, it dropped sharply in importance as compared with the highways. The
most marked difference lay in passenger movements as the highways rose from
less than half to two-thirds of the total traffic. Internal shipping suffered
severe losses (despite a costly improvement program for small ports. (p. )
Air traffic emerged as a factor in 1955 with expansion of the Turkish
Airlines and domestic airports, but was relatively insignificant. Turkey
was very definitely on the move, and it was moving by road.
It is difficult to explain why vehicle movements grew more slowly after 1955
than before or why passenger movements were down almost 1,000,000 km between
1955 and 1959. A tentative explanation may lie in the general economic
and political conditions which began to deteriorate badly towards the end
of the Democratic period. With deteriorating conditions, fewer people
may have traveled.
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Before ending this discussion on highways, we might
again note that military and agricultural considerations
were chiefly responsible for route selection, construction,
and timing. Other factors--such as industrial requirements--
may well have been underemphasized. Thus we will see in
the case of Zonguldak province, Turkey's most industrialized
region outside of the three main centers, a highway pro-
gram providing inadequate service for important industrial
developments. In contrast, the vast extension of national
and provincial roads into the wheatlands of Central
Anatolia served military mobility needs but may also have
been of marginal significance to the deteriorating rural
economy except as means of transferring surplus population
to the cities. In light of events in the cities during
the decade, the desirability of this transfer is open to
question.
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Table IV-l0
Tsavel. Tine betwecAn gkara and Other Cities
( n hours)-City Railroad Road
Pre '48-'49 '50-'52 '62
Konya 20 8-48 4 3
Istanbul 8-13 20 13 6.5
Kayseri 11 11 7 6
Zonguldak 19 14 8 6.5
Samsun 20 22 15 9
Adana 20 35 18 7
EWskisehir 4-8 ? ? 3
Iskenderun 25 21 9 8
Source: Railroad; writer's own estimates
Highways; 1962 figures represent writer's
experience
Other figures: "The Development of
Manufacturing Industry in Egypt,
Israel, and Turkey," op. cit., p. 19
Robert Kerwin, "The Turkish Roads Program,"
Middle East Affairs, April, 1950,
p. 200.
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IV. Concentrated Development at Ankara, Istanbul, and
Izmir
Negativism towards Istanbul--which had characterized
early Republican development policy--gave way during the
'50's to an official desire that the former capital become
a showplace of modern Turkey.* All three of the main
centers were now chief targets of public interest.
Improved highway access and roles as important NATO bases
increased their advantages as main development areas. Other
public programs were devised that bolstered their advan-
tages still further.
A. Incentives to Private Enterprise
Government incentives to private enterprise favored
activity in the three main centers, particularly Istanbul
and the towns of the Marmara Region. A management insti-
tute under Harvard Business School auspices was established
at Istanbul University. A special Productivity Center,
offering technical assistance programs to businessmen was
set up in Ankara, with branch programs in Istanbul and
Izmir. Perhaps the most significant incentive of all
was the Industrial Development Bank, with headquarters
and sole office at Istanbul.
An IDB was proposed in the 1950 World Bank Mission
report on Turkey. Establishment came shortly after the
Democrats took office. The World Bank, U.S. aid programs,
and Turkish banks supplied the funds. Extremely low
*Both Ataturk and Inonu chose to cast their votes in national
elections as residents of Ankara. Both Menderes and Bayar,
however, always voted from Istanbul, although neither had
been a resident of the city. (44)
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interest rates were charged,* and the IDB became the
leading source of foreign exchange credits for Turkish
businessmen. An additional function was provision of
technical assistance to client firms.
Private enterprise responded mightily to this liberal-
ized government attitude towards investors. Import restric-
tions were lifted, and credit availability through many of
the public banks was eased.** In 1950, 1800 private firms
with over 10 workers each had employed a labor force of
about 70,000. By 1955, the number of firms had climbed
beyond 4,000 and the number of employees to 140,000. (46)
These overall figures meant, however, that average plant
size was only 35 workers, still an indication of small scale
enterprise. Further cause for concern lay in the imbalanced
nature of the products. Almost 75 percent of the producers
were engaged in the three traditional "soft" consumer goods
industries of food, textile, and tobacco processing. (47)
IDB sponsored firms, however, were quite different from
the average. The larger, more productive private enter-
prises established during the decade tended to be those under
IDB sponsorship. Some 401 were founded between 1950 and 1959.
Only 30 percent of these were in food processing or textiles.
*Seven percent on 3-5 year loans plus a small transactions
tax compared with commercial loans up to 12-20 percent
through other sources. (45)
**Turkish officials have told this writer that a substantial
amount of the agricultural credit was illegally used by
farmers to start small urban businesses and to purchase
consumption goods.
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About 10 percent produced chemicals and pharmaceuticals;
some 25 percent were in repair and maintenance of the
production of spare parts to service the growing number of
vehicle imports, and sizeable numbers were involved in
machinery and metals production ( 5 percent) and in con-
struction materials and ceramics (5 percent). Their aver-
age size appeared to be twice that of Turkish firms in
general. (48)*
Map IV-1 shows the locational distribution of these
401 firms by provinces. Istanbul alone took 205 plants, or
51 percent of the total, while the Marmara region as a whole
obtained 63 percent. Izmir was far behind in second place
with 39 firms. All told, the Marmara and Aegean regions
garnered 75 percent of the IDB firms. The remainder were
scattered throughout the central and southern portions of the
country with concentrations only at Ankara (17 plants) and
Adana (16).
Since the main entrepreneurial concentrations before
1950 were at Istanbul and Izmir, we might expect dynamic
activity at these two centers with a more liberal govern-
ment attitude. However this can only partially explain
the relatively enormous development in Marmara compared
with other regions. Undoubtedly, one important factor
was concentration of IDB resources and personnel at
Istanbul with greatest accessibility to the Marmara
entrepreneurs. No explicit provision was made in the
Bank' s charter for encouragement of enterprises in other,
*Calculations are based on the 50 firms established during
1959.
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less developed regions. Opportunities which did exist
outside the Marmara probably experienced greater diffi-
culties in being mobilized.*
The IDB increased Marmara's existing superior
advantages for private investment and enabled this region
to pull even farther ahead of the others.** Istanbul
province had accounted for one-third of Turkey's income
tax payments in 1950. A decade later its proportion
amounted to 44.3 percent. (50) Here was a clear sign of
"reconcentrated" development at the former capital city
and its environs.
*One example of the difficulty may be a proposal from Mersin
to the IDB which came to the writer's attention in 1962.
This was a proposal for a large industrial grain washing
station. Members of the local Chamber of Commerce were
willing to put up some of the necessary capital. According
to AID economists the project was both well-conceived and
well-organized.
Turkey produces various feed crops for which it does not
have washing or processing facilities. Instead, the grains
are shipped from Mersin to Lebanon where they are prepared
and further exported, with the Lebanese taking the main
profit. The Mersin project would both retain the profits
for Turkey and build foreign exchange. It had been brought
to the IDB in 1958. In response to several communications
from the local Chamber, the Bank had said it was studying
the idea, but no visitation to the site had been made by
1962.
**Private industrial development was so pronounced in
Istanbul, that municipal authorities in the middle '50's
refused to grant any more building or expansion permits
within the city limits until an Istanbul master plan had
been approved. By 1962, a plan had still not been approved
or completed. The ban irked industrialists, but did not
prevent development which spread outside the municipal
boundaries along the road and railroad to Izmit and to
Bursa. (49)
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Significant investment outisde of Marmara, parti-
cularly in the Aegean, occurred where private enterprise
was also established earlier.* Since special incentives
were not adopted to encourage growth outside of these
centers, the natural tendency to agglomerate prevailed.
It may be that improved access to interior markets
via the highways reduced the need for industries with
national markets to locate outside the established coastal
communities. Tumertikin's survey in 1960 (52) for example,
lists the following industries whose plants were almost
entirely confined to the Istanbul area:
leather 86 percent in Istanbul
paper and allied prod. 88 percent
electrical equipment 78 percent
metals 70 percent
Although Ankara drew the third largest concentration
of IDB firms, we are struck by how few they were relative
to both the Marmara and the enormous population increase
which Ankara experienced. Indeed, if income tax returns
are any indication, Ankara's economic growth had slowed
considerably over the decade. The province's proportion
of Turkey's income taxes rose in 10 years only from 11.7
to 12.4 percent; while the city itself was doubling in
size. (53)
*Although location figures for the non-IDB plants are
unavillable, they too may well have shown a tendency to
concentrate in the existing centers of enterprise. For
example, results from a prelimina industrial census of
Izmir in 1955 showed that since 1949, the number of work
places regardless of size had increased by 2,000 and the
number of "industrial" workers by 30,000. (51)
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Employment growth in Ankara came from expanding
public agencies, state enterprise, construction, services,
and a complement of rudimentary service industries
oriented to the local market--a continuation of the type of
activity that had occurred to 1950. Unfortunately we lack
estimates of employment (or unemployment) at Ankara after
1950; except for figures on state industries in the
province. Their personnel of 14,000 in 1960 represented
11 percent of the nation's total in public enterprise.
Much of this was concentrated at Kirikkale, whose popu-
lation grew from 10,000 to 45,000 over the decade. (54)
In 1950, income tax receipts from Istanbul, Ankara,
and Izmir had been over one-half the Turkish total.
Although we have no information on Izmir, it is reasonable
to assume that by 1960 the three centers were contributing
well over 60 percent of the total, a sign that incomes at
the centers, particularly Istanbul, were increasing at
far faster rates than those outside.
B. The Show-Place Concept
Government seemed concerned with making each of its
three main cities a show-place. Particular attention
focussed on Istanbul, where the first modern post-war
hotel in Turkey (the Hilton) was built with public funds,
and a monumental new city hall with plaza was constructed.
Obsessed with the importance of straight, broad avenues,
Menderes (frequently photographed on a bulldozer leading
the action) attacked the narrow, hilly streets of Istanbul
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to give the city a look of Hausmann's Paris.*
Ankara, already possessed with wide main boulevards,
received many lavish edifices to house the expanding
government enterprises. A government-financed hotel was
begun here as well, and remained an unfinished 17 storey
skeleton by 1962. Mosques were built for the first time
in modern Ankara, pleasing the religious oppostion to
the Republicans. Most of the downtown business district
at Ulus Square, containing some 400 shops, was razed to
make way for a huge shopping center and office development. (56)
Izmir received somewhat less spectacular municipal
improvments, although its fair grounds underwent a
thorough modernization and new hotel construction was also
sponsored. Izmir did, however, become the site of a new
university, the University of the Aegean. Each of the
three major centers now had university facilites. In
Ankara, a second major institution was established...this
an English-language Technical Institute under UN sponsorship,
which the government felt would add to Turkish intellectual
prominence throughout the Middle East.
Both Izmir and Istanbul, as major NATO ports, also
underwent harbor expansions which were made available to
civilian shipping.
*Despite the fact that no plan had been prepared for the
city or its thoroughfare improvements, Menderes declared
in 1957:
"The reconstruction of Istanbul has been taken in
hand in full conformity with current ideas of
aesthetics, comfort, traffic facilites, and tourist
attraction...It will be carried out in accordance
with the high standards demanded by Turkish
aesthetic and artistic tastes, and will contitute
a model from every standpoint." (55)
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C. Housing and Land
Government efforts in housing also increased both
amenities and investment opportunities at the three
centers. Here again we lack figures and can only suggest
conclusions based on observations and limited data.
Easy home financing became one of the Democrats' main
appeals to the city dwellers. Zafer, the official party
paper, adopted in this regard a slogan that every Turk
should become a homeowner. (57)
The public banks, the Worker's Insurance Agency, and
the Pension Fund all had low cost loan programs for their
employees (6 percent for 20-30 years), and the government's
housing Bank, Emlak Kredi, handled approximately 20 percent
of the financing for legal dwellings. Investment in
housing during the decade represented 20-25 percent of
GNI and about 35 percent of all investment in construction. (58)
Apartnent cooperatives at the three centers became the
most popular form of urban dwelling unit under the programs.
Costs were high due to inexperienced workmen and materials
shortages. As a result, many of the dwellings were not
completed and others were rented out to the increasing
number of foreigners working at the military and civilian
installations.* Since no residence requirement was placed
on a borrower for a government loan, some significant
*An exact count of foreigners in the three cities was
unavailable. However an official once estimated the number
of Americans in Ankara alone as "several" thousand.
Presence of the foreigners probably also added to the
cosmopolitan atmosphere of the three cities.
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amount of the housing program was turned to private
speculation. The Turkish owner remained in his cramped
quarters or doubled-up with relatives, while reaping the
fruits of his investment. (59)
Opportunities presented by real-estate investment at
the centers appealed to well-to-do provincials as well.
On an inspection trip of a large unfinished Ankara
apartment block, the writer learned of several "cooperators"
who lived in Kayseri, Sivas, and Eskisehir and had evi-
dently preferred to invest in "secure" Ankara property.
Speculation became so popular an outlet for funds,
that (according to Robinson) land prices in an upper-class
residential area of Ankara rose 1000 fold between 1952
and 1955. (60)
Despite the excesses, much housing was provided for
middle and upper income Turks in the main cities. All
efforts at developing low cost housing for the peasant
migrants, however, met with failure.*
Meanwhile, the peasants were constructing their own
units, of mud brick or cinder block, on the outskirts of
each major center. This housing was erected illegaly on
government land and built largely at night to avoid
detection.** By 1960, the Ministry of Reconstruction
*The only major project attempted at Ankara (Yeni Mahalle)
proved too expensive and was turned to middle income
residents. (61)
**According to Turkish law, an illegal dwelling can be torn
down only if detected during the the process of construction.
Thus many of the peasants made bricks during the day,
enlisted their friends for an evening, and erected &t'least
four walls overnight. The word Gecekondu literally means,
"built during the darkness'."
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estimated that some 240,000 of these "Gecekondu" existed
in Turkish cities and housed over 1,000,000 people. About
70 percent were concentrated in Istanbul, Ankara, and
Izmir. (62)
The gecekondu was in general a well-built structure,
far more substantial than the tin and tar-paper shanties
of South America and the Orient. Nevertheless, severe
sanitation problems arose due to the crowding, haphazard
siting, and lack of utilities; and the Gecekondu did
obstruct orderly urban growth.
Government's response to this problem of illegal
housing served to encourage, rather than deter migration
to the centers. First efforts to tear down Gecekondus
met with a public outcry and were stopped. Then Menderes
proceeded to hand over legal land titles to many of the
squatters. A practice was begun of installing electric
lines, roads, and fountains in gecekondu areas. (63)
Living conditions were thereby improved, but the problem
of squatter housing itself went unsolved.
It is also interesting to note that growth in the
three centers exceeded the estimates and provisions of
the physical plans in force at 1950. Supplementary plans
were begun, but not completed or approved, and expansion
proceeded without them.
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D. Attraction for the Modernizing Elite
Thus, many aspects of public development activity
bolstered growth in each of. the three main centers. Easy
acceSs by highway from thetinterior, incentives to create new
enterprises, jobs created by government itself,* broadening
cultural facilities, prominence as military bases,
opportunity for housing all served to make Istanbul, Ankara,
and Izmir the chief national targets for migration and
investment. We might end this discussion by noting that
their attractiveness for "modernizing individuals"
increased as well. According to the census of 1955,
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir provinces together contained
about 14 percent of Turkey's labor force. They possessed,
however, about 40 percent of the nation's "Professional,
Technical, and Related Workers," and one-half of its
"Administrative, Managerial, and Clerical Workers."**
*Unfortunately the writer knows of no studies on unemploy-
ment or underemployment published in Turkey. Nor do we yet
have 1960 census figures on the labor force composition in
the three centers. Although government officials have told
the writer that severe work shortages exist in the centers,
there is just no way of telling how great is their magni-
tude. In any event the migrants continue to come in the
expectation of finding jobs.
**Relevant figures for each province were:
Pct. of Pet. of Pat. of
Lab. Force Prof., etc. Admin., etc.
Istanbul 5.5 21.0 28.5
Ankara 4.5 10.4 14.0
Izmir 3.7 5.8 7.2
13.7 37.2 49.7
Source: Istatistik Genel Mudurlu4O, Genel Nufus
Sayimi, 1955, Ankara, 1960, pp.247,24.
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V. Dispersion of Public Investment
Along with its concern for the three main centers,
the Democratic government undertook to disperse public
investment widely throughout the country. The national
highway network was itself a manifestation of dispersion,
and many additional projects in communications, power,
education, and other forms of infra-structure were
conducted.
Most dramatic was the program of factory construction
depicted on Map IV-2. Between 1950 and 1960, over 40 state
factories were built in almost as many locations, each a
town over 10,000 people. Only one of these plants was in
Istanbul. Three were in Ankara, and all but 12 were
located outside the Marmara and Aegean regions. Data
on many of the specific programs are lacking, so this
discussion will deal largely with an illustrative exam-
ination of the industrialization schemes.
Why, one might easily ask, did the Democrats undertake
such an extensive public industrial effort when their
commitment to free enterprise had been so strong? Three
reasons may be offered.
1. Private enterprise was growing, but at insufficient
rates to satisfy the government's promises of fast, across-
the-board economic growth. Except for the IDB plants,
which were concentrated at the main centers, private oper-
ations continued to be small and in marginal products.
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The government was again faced with a situation similar
to that which generated Etatism twenty years before.
Private enterprise was not doing the desired job.
2. Rural migrants were inundating the three national
centers. Since agricultural conditions and the road pro-
gram sent peasants to provincial cities as well, the govern-
ment may have reasoned that added employment in these
cities would retard the flow to Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara.
Private enterprise showed no signs of an extensive spread
from the most developed regions, so government enterprise
provided the main hope for such employment.
During the 1950's, moreover, the existing provincial
state industries no longer suffered from labor shortages.
Just a few years previously, many operated below capacity
because of insufficient labor. Now peasant immigration
provided more workers than they could profitably handle.
A joint AID-OECD study of Turkish state enterprises con-
ducted during 1961 commented on the unproductive labor
surplus. The study's reaction to employment in the sugar
plants is typical.
"Permanent employees have nearly doubled in number
during the past five years, yet no new units have
been put into operationt If the sugar factories
could operate in 1956 with 4,633 permanent em-
ployees, which they did, there is no excuse for
a present payroll of 8,653." (64)*
3. The Democratic government may well have wanted to
cultivate political support from the outlying regions.
*Eleven sugar plants were constructed between 1950 and
1956, however. See p
234.
Provision of a brand-new factory in a poverty stricken
community was a tangible sign of government interest, and
Menderes or Bayar seemed always to be in attendance when
a new plant was dedicated. (65) Votes were important. Most
of the Turks with whom the writer discussed industrial
decentralization attribute location choices under the
Democrats to political factors. And the Turkish political
analyst Karpat comments:
"There is a sense of urgency for economic
development in Turkey.. .Thus urgency is
evidenced by the fact that the demand for
industrialization and economic development
now comes directly from the people, who are
in need of additional employment outlets.
(Deputy candidates seek office by promising
factories to their constituents, and, once
in office, if influential in the government,
they succeed in keeping their promises, even
if at times the factory has more prestige
than economic value." (66)
Certainly the U.S. aid program, which provided most
or all of the foreign exchange for the new plants made
payment of political debts via factory construction a
relatively simple affair.
These various concerns led to an increase, rather
than a decrease in public development spending. In the
first Democratic years, we have noted (67) that public
investment fell to 38.8 percent of the national total.
By 1956 it had risen to 48 percent and continued at
that level for the remainder of the decade.
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Undoubtedly resource exploitation (see below) was
also a factor. Nevertheless it appears that the Democrats
undertook to disperse public investment at a larger scale
than their predecessors for a somewhat different set of
reasons. Three significant purposes of the Ataturk
program were no longer in evidence: the official
antagonism to Istanbul, the need for national integration,
and the defense against a-conventional-warfare attack. This
last is particularly interesting. For even though-Turkey
became more defense-minded during its international
involvements of the 1950's, strategic considerations
were not offered as a rationale for industrial decena
tralization. Indeed modern warfare may have wiped out
much of the security advantage to interior sites. The
second steel mill, for example, was placed at a port
site directly on the Black Sea (Chapter Siz), while its
predecessor had been located 100 km. inland during the
1930's as a precaution against amphibious invasion.
The government may not have wanted concentration in the
Marmara, but military reasons were no longer tendered
to justify its decisions.
A. The State Industries
The new factories included 10 cement plants, 11
textile mills, 14 sugar refineries, four meat-processing
and packing plants, two oil refineries, and a large
fertilizer operation. In addition, extensions were made
to several existing state enterprises. Complete invest-
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ment figures are lacking, but we can offer some indication
of magnitudes involved. Average worker components were
high: in the cement and sugar plants about 500 employees
per factory, while the meat plants ranged from 300-700
workers. (68) Total employment in state industry doubled
to 128,000 between 1950 and 1960. (49) The amount of
investment already tied up in the three sugar mills un-
finished by 1960 was over 150,000,000 TL, or some
$17 millions at the official rate of exchange. (70)
Two important factors distinguished the character of
these operations from those begun under the earlier Etatist
program.
1. They were not part of an overall development pro-
gram, planned by a single public body, for which priorities
were established. Sumer Bank was still responsible for
Textiles and some other processes, and Eti Bank for certain
mines, but they were joined now by a large number of in-
dustrial development and operations agencies each head-
quartered in Ankara. Several of the state industries
(cement, sugar, meat and fish, fertilizer, steel, coal,
for example) had been detached from their parent organizations
and given separate budgets with only loose supervision from
the Minister of Industry. No overall industrial development
plan was prepared.
2. Many of the new plants were doomed to financial
failure from the outset. They manufactured products for
which there was no Turkish or foreign market. Under the
237.
Republicans, plants located in the interior often diverged
from the most economic sites. Nevertheless, despite the
excessive costs involved, they primatily utilized domestic
resources to substitute for imports; and a local market
for their production existed. Although the Democrats'
state enterprises were also established to use Turkish
raw materials, markets for particular products produced
were already saturated. In the 1950-60 period it was a
common occurrence for a plant to be built suited neither
to its site nor the demands of the economy.
Economic considerations did play a part in some of
the 1950-60 investments. Turkey had been a large cement
importer although raw material abounded in the country,
and cement shortages were particularly acute in the
provinces. By 1960, with only six of her ten new mills
in operation, the country was self-sufficient in this
commodity. (71) Oil was struck at Batman near Diyarbakir,
and a refinery established on the site. A second refinery
was needed in Izmit to process imported crude that still
provided the bulk of Turkey's oil comsumption. Kuthaya
was the most accessible site to nitrogenous phosphate
deposits, which might make Turkey self-sufficient in
fertilizers.
But at the same time, Turkey was in 1950 completely
self-sufficient in sugar production and could not hope to
compete on the world market for exports against cane with
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her more expensive beet derivative. Four plants were
operating in 1950, yet.the government proceeded to build
14 more.* Three of these were halted in an unfinished
state by the revolutionary government after 1960.
Surplus production during the decade had been dumped
or sold on the world market at a loss, and the AID-OECD
sugar industry report concluded that installed operable
capacity was twice what the country could absorb.. (72)
The 11 textile plants* * were built even while
private enterprise was increasing its independent
factories and other government mills operated below
capacity. Here the OECD-AID team pointed out that poor
quality of production made export of the plants' surplus
unfeasible and commented:
"In view of the very apparent over-expansion
with which the Turkish industry is faced, it
is unfortunate that these newer ventures,
encouraged and assisted by the infusion of
government money, were not assessed with a
more realistic appraisal of the market for
textiles in Turkey." (73)
The State Enterprise study also noted that any one
of the four meat-packing plants could have supplied all
of EBK's sales (the state meat and fish agency) during
1960 or 1961. (74)
Major difficulties extended even to operations that
were economically feasible and well-located in regard to
*Construction of the sugar mills also resulted in expansion
of beet cultivation, another mistake.
**Some of these plants had participation from private
capital, although government assumed most of the costs
and risks.
MAP 4 K-i
8 GAR I.-
.'ter aati8 L A C K.'w S E A
GREEC C-
-, Ivry
CARMARA -
d 1'-. aCs UNION
4.
SEAA
C3 Mu
-9*0% A. R-I
, 3e
- - - -- 7V.. - --
-- Cista-&s
4 rR --4
STATE INDUSTRIES CONSTRUCTED
M E D I T R R A N E A N 19501960
L E G E N D
Constructed IM - 14 Textiles * 1m Provincial Capital * Gave,
I Sugar
12 Meat Processing Railroad
a Unfinished or Inoperable,116 15 Cement r*,iivide a eer bvde. Eca.1.
Is Chemicals Regional Boundary
11 Armaments
All -weather National Highway
(asphalt or stabilized surface)
'4
N
I.
I
'4
&
0 239.
resources. Six year construction delays prevented
completion of the Kuthaya fertilizer factory and the
Bartin Cement Plant until the end of the decade. By
1962, Bartin was complete but had no transport link to
its source of raw materials. The steel mill was
embarking on expansion without an assured supply of
coal, and some foreign exchange allocated for coal mine
machinery was not spent as the mine production decreased.
(Chapter '9i) T hese problems' indicated' that the government's
aim to industrailize the interior was not being realized
in an effective manner.
B. Other Programs
Among other public dispersion activities was an
extensive power plant effort which increased capacity
from 400,000 kw. to 1,200,000 kw. in nine years. (75)
Major harbor improvements were initiated at Samsun,
Zonguldak, Mersin, and Iskenderun, and the government
commissioned a survey of 27 small ports. This survey
was not concerned with feasibility of improvements, but
rather with detailing the improvements that would be
made. (76)
Educational programs continued to emphasize increased
lycee and other secondary school instruction, again in
provincial centers .1 The number *of. studanta$ in zecondary
schools tripled over the decade, while those in primary
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grades increased by two-thirds (77); and a new agricul-
tural university was founded at Erzurum in an effort to
spur the city as a development center for the far east.
Housing credits were made avAilable throughout the
provincial cities and many dwelling units were built,
yet all of the larger provincial capitals were faced
with a gecekondu problem.
It appeared from these programs that government
was concerned with giving "a little bit" of development
to each of a great number of locations. Whether this
Ylittle bit" was sufficient to start any of the outlying
regions into the process of dynamic growth could not
easily be ascertained.
Unfortunately data in depth are available only for
Zonguldak province where the coalsteelland brick complex
was joined by other developments- during the Aecade_ Analysis
of Zonguldak will be the subject of the next two chapters.
For the rest we can draw only tentative conclusions
based on the pattern of urbanization and industrialization
evidenced during 1960.
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VI. The Pattern of Urbanization in 1960
Map IV-4 and Tables IV-fl,12,13 present data on the
pattern of urbanization for 1960. The data indicate that
a number of centers outside the three main cities were
growing rapidly, but that these three were still the
major magnets.
By 1960, some 25 percent of Turkey's population could
be considered urban, compared with 19 percent the decade
before. Roughly two-thirds of this number was concen-
trated in cities over 50,000 in size, which had increased
from 12 to 27 over the period. The three "national"
centers of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir comprised about
one-third of the total urban population and had absorbed
one-third of the increase in all cities between 1950-
1960. (p.197)
Table IV-11 indicates that each geographic region
held roughly the same proportion of total population in
1960 as it did in 1950. Slight drops were experienced
in the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia (the former with
the most dense rural population concentrations and the
latter with the poorest agriculture) from which regional
out-migration may have been heavy. Other regions rose
slightly or remained stable.
Urbanization was everywhere pronounced, although
the Eastern and Black Sea areas continued to be more
rural than other parts of the nation. The most spec-
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tacular proportional rise of urbanization was in the
Mediterranean, whose population in cities over 10,000
rose from 21.5 percent of its total in 1950 to 33 percent
in 1960.
Of all the trends, however, perhaps that of greatest
significance was the continuing eastward spread of
urbanization. Marmara and Aegean again dropped 'ifnthein
proportions of Turkey's urban population, and all of the
other regions gained. Marmara fell from 50 to 39.5
percent of the proportion in cities over 50,000, and the
Aegean from 11.0 to 9.3 percent. Central Anatolia
remained relatively stable in its proportion, while
gains were noted in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and
Eastern Regions. By 1960, every major geographic region
had at least two cities over 50,000 in population.
This eastward spread can be clearly seen on Map IV-4.
Heavy urban concentrations exist in the Western regions
of Marmara and Aegean where the large centers have
satellite to them numerous cities of various sizes.
Yet on the Central Plateau, in addition to the national
center of Ankara, are three concentrations over 100,000
(Eskigehir, Konya, and Kayseri) and a fourth almost as
large (Sivas). Down on the southern coast, a network
of cities large and small focusses on Adana and
Gaziantep, with a secondary concentration at Antalya.
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Although the far east is still rural and sparsely
settled, Erzurum has emerged as an urban "outpost" of
over 100,000. Along the Black Sea coast three somewhat
smaller concentrations can be identified around Trabzon,
Samsun, and Zonguldak.
Outside the three main centers, the areas of heaviest
urbanization appear to be those where heavy public invest-
ment had occurred. Of the 24 cities over 50,000 (aside
from Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir), all were served by
all-weather links in the national highway system and 20
also had rail connections. Twenty-two were provincial
capitals. Nineteen had major state industrial enterprises
and 15 more than one. Most possessed some form of
military installations, and six served as ports.
Seven cities slightly under 50,000 had doubled or
more in size during the decade (Erzincan, Denizli,
Kuthaya, Isparta, Kirikkale, Karabui Osmaniye). All
had both highway and rail access, and the first six
possessed state industries which underwent expansion or
were newly constructed after 1950.
Only along the southern coast, in the area of Adana,
Mersin and Iskenderun, did private investment seem to
play some important role in the expanding economic base
of these urbanizing areas. This section, known as
"Cukorova" is particularly interesting and might provide
an even better case study than Zonguldak were data in
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depth available.* For here government not only brought
highways and some industry, but conducted its most
extensive irrigation program and installed substantial
amounts of infra-structure related to the military ports
of Iskenderun and Mersin and the major NATO airbase at
Adana. Cities in this area showed some of the highest
population increases outside the main centers. Qukorova
had an excellent opportunity to become a growth region,
yet its severe power shortage (despite construction of
hydro dams) and the almost total concentration of'private
investment in textiles** indicated that Uukorova, too, had
serious difficulty in mobilizing its resources.
Except for Cukorova, government continued to be the
main or sole source of any expanding economic base in
the interior regions; and much of this expansion was
suited neither to the regional nor the national economy.
We might feel more confident that some outlying
areas were moving into a stage of dynamic growth had
there been--during the 1950-60 decade--an effective
means of coordinating the main public development expen-
*A study of Qukorova is presently being conducted by the
Ministry of Reconstruction.
**Local officials have told this writer that most of the
private industrialization has been undertaken by the
area's cotton farmers tnemselves in various ginning and
finishing industries. These are in direct competition
with the government plants and add to the nation's
undisposable surplus. The owners appear to survive via
the high price supports on both raw cotton and finished
products. Other plants suited to the area (the grain-
washing station at Mersin cited above) have not found
financing. Nor is there any packing or juicing plant to
process the region's growing citrus production which,
according to AID and FAO sources, could easily supply
much of the West European market.
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ditures made within a given region or province. With
coordination, these projects in industry, transport,
housing, etc. might have been sufficiently mutually-
supporting to provide an area with at least the basis
for a first round of growth. However, one of the most
serious obstacles to emergence of growth regions was the
lack of area coordination which now characterized acti-
vities of government staff agencies. It is to this
subject that we turn below.
Table IV-11
Total Population by Gross Geographic
Region for 1950 and 1960
Region
Marmara
Aegean
Cent. Anatol.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anatol.
E. Anatol.
Total
1950
Tot. Pop. Pat.
3,814 -18.2
2,206 10.6
4,739 22.6
2,052' 9.9
4,608 22.0
1,121 5.3
2,411 11.4
20,971 100.0
1960
Tot. Pop.
5,229
2,919
6,386
2,896
5,658
1,683
3,031
27,802
Census of
Appendix
1950 and 1960 in Keles, op.cit.,
Pet.
19.0
10.5
23.0
10.4
20.3
6.2
10.6
100.0
Source:
Table IV-12
Population in Cities 1000. and over by
Gross GeOgraphic Region for 1950 and.1960
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anatol.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anatol.
E. Anatol.
Natl. Total
Population in
Cities 10,000
and over in 000
1950 1960
1,418 2,243
542 860
817 1,585
447 951
348 673.
171 271
205 405
3,943 6,988
Number of
Cities
'50 '60
20 29
18 21
22 26
12 22
18 27
8 9
8 11
106 145
Pct. of Regional
Population
1950 1960
37.0 42.5
24.5 29.5
17.2 25.0
21.5 33.0
7.6 12.0
15.2 16.0
8.5 13.3
18.8 25.0
Pct. of National
Populatin in. Cities
10,000 and over
1950 1960
35.7 31.3
13.8 12.5
20.7 22.8
11.4 13.7
8.9 9.8
4.3 4.0
5.2 5.9
100.0 100.0
Source: Keles, Ibid.
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6Table IV-13
Population in Cities of 50,000 and over by
Gross Geographic Region for 1950 and 1960
Pop. in Cities Pet. of Regional Pop. Pct. of Natl.
50,000 and No" of 1950 1960 Pop, in Cities
over in 000 Cities Total Urban Total Urban 50,000 and over
Marmara
Aegean
C. Anatol.
Mediter.
Black Sea
S.E. Anatol.
E. Anatol.
1950
1,087
240
561
190
59
0
53
1960 '50 '60
1,828 2 5 28.5 78.0 35.0 82.0
1950 1960
50.0 39.5
430 1 2 10.9 44.0 14.7 50.0 11.0 9.3
1,119 5 5 11.8 69.0 17.5 71.5 25.6 24.5
629 2 7 9.2 42.5 21.7 66.0 8.7 13.8
231 1 3 1.3 17.0 4.1 34.5 2.7 5.0
141 0 2 0 0 8.4 52.0 0 2.8
236 1 3 2.2 25.6 7.8 58.5 2.0 5.1
Natidnal.Tht;2,189 4,616 12 27 10.5 55.7 16.6 66.5 100.0
Source: Keles, Ibid.
100.0
a GA R I ..
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o 1960 Provincial Capital
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Boundary
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VII. A Breakdown of Coordination
A. Proliferation of Agencies at the Center
Near the end of Inonu'S tenure a World Bank mission
surveyed the Turkish economy and its prospects. The-
mission concluded that increasing fragmentation of
decision-making power at the center prevented Turkey
from adopting a consistent national development program.
"Except for the loose and general direction afforded
by the Council of Ministers and the Grand National
Assembly, the major agencies which carry out the
policy in industry, mining, transportation, power,
and communications are not subject to any central
agency which can make policy for all of them.
Ataturk maintained a close and coordinated control;
but since his death and as dictatorial controls
have been relaxed the different agencies have
drifted apart and coordination has been lost." (78)
The problem lay partly with the increasingly complex
nature of Turkish society. Early in the Republic,
introduction of a modern economy to a peasant culture
could be accomplished by concentration of development
power in relatively few agencies directly responsible
to top policy makers for both planning and operational
instructions. Thus the Minister of Public Works was
able to supervise infra-structure provision on the local,
regional, and national scales. Sumer and Eti Banks
could develop major industries working under the guidelines
of a fairly simple national plan. The Minister of
Agriculture, particularly with the small sums allocated
for this sector under the Republicans, was in a position
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to direct planning and implementation of most agricultural
development programs.
In principle, at any rate, coordination was assured.
Ataturk and his ministers framed policies and kept tight
supervision and budgetary control.
In practice, however, the system became extremely
cumbersome. Reponsibilites grew more complex as various
industries and ministerial departments began to deal
with critical operation and maintenance problems as
well as development. Some of the smallest details had
to be referred from the field to the Center where still
another round of approvals awaited up to the ministerial
level and beyond. Industrial plants and construction
projects could grind to a halt while all the necessary
channels were entered. Turkey could not expect to move
far forward while this sytem remained in effect.
As one example of the difficulties, we have the
following comments on the structure of the Ministry of
Public Works during 1947:
" .. Under the administrative structure as it stood
in 1947, all five departments had to recruit personnel,
issue publications, receive and expend funds,
requisition supplies and materials, and route
correspondence through five bureaus, each of which
exercised a veto power over departmental action.
While each denartment retained the right of appeal
from a bureau veto to the Minister of Public Works,
this was far from a satisfactory substitute for
effective autonomous control. Firm programming was
next to impossible when any departmental project
could be blocked at any stage by a bureau veto.
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...the difficulty was compounded by the fact that
the bureaus themselves could not make independent
judgements on the Highway Department's recommen-
dations. Every purchase of equipment and
supplies and every sale.. .had to be submitted to
the Accounts Control Office of the Ministry of
Finance for final review and approval...
The hierarchy of clearances, established by statute
in 1929, was intended to assure strict accounting
control of the budgets and expenditures...This
purpose was frustrated by the very elaboration
of checks and safeguards. It was impossible as
a practical matter for the Department...to wait
for weeks or months for the Ministry of Finance
to approve of an emergency purchase of gravel to
keep a key road open...The system was saved from
complete breakdown only by the development of
informal and officially unrecognized short cuts
...The consequence was that firm budget control,
instead of being assured, was rendered impossible
... (79)
As the difficulties mounted during the 1940's, the
Republican government created some semi-autonomous
agencies along functional lines. The Democrats followed
suit. Thus the sugar and cement industries, the forestry
and land distribution directorates, the steel mills and
the coal mines became quasi-independent bodies still
nominally responsible to a ministerial body but with
separate budgets. (80)
Confusion occurred due to a lack of consistent
structural pattern to these agencies. Some had funds
inside the regular government budget, others were outside,
and the degree of independent control varied widely.
About the only standard procedure was that decision--
making power for each organization remained at the center.
Field operations continued to refer to Ankara for planning
and implementation instructions.
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Under the American aid program emphasis on functional
responsibility and autonomy increased. Vast sums were
allocated to the irrigation and highway programs, for
example, each of which was subject to the standard pro-
cedures and delays within the Ministry of Public Works
and the further close scruitiny of every disbursement
decision by the Ministry of Finance. The technical
advisors firmly believed that these operations would not
succeed unless they could cut through red tape and make
their own decisions quickly. Thus, although still within
the nominal control of Public Works, the Highway and
Waterworks Divisions were granted what amounted to
independent authority.
We might examine the Highway Agency as an example.
According to Lehman, the Hilts Report recommended "new
legislation recasting the Department of Roads and Bridges
into an agency with reasonable autonomy and independent
responsibility, and freeing it from its enforced
dependence on the consent of bureaus which had no direct
interest in the road system." (81)
Hilts proposed an organization modeled on an Ameri-
can state highway department. In actuality, however, the
Karayollari agency established in 1950 was far more
powerful than any American highway department. For it
had no need to hold public hearings and was given complete
and final jursidiction over location and timing of roads.
-4:
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Nor did the legislation require that the roads program
be coordinated with other forms of transportation, with
industrial or other government development agencies.
The General Director of Highways, as did the General
Director of Waterworks under similar arrangements,
essentially became a Czar with unencumbered authority
over his sector of activity. Lehman comments:
"The law gave the Directorate authority to keep.
its own books and to control its own receipts
and expenditures...the Ministry of Finance
treated the road funds as an unencumbered account
against which the Directorate could write checks
at its own discretion. There was no evidence
that the Finance Ministry sought at any time to
influence the Directorate in its use of these
funds.
The new law granted to the General Directorate full
authority to decide upon road location and design,
and to determine priorities in road construction
and betterment.. It continued the financial aid
previously given to the provincial road systems,
but made the payment of such aid subject to
approval by the Directorate of provincial road
plans and designs." (82)
Meanwhile, the strong thread of consistea direction,
which had knit staff organizations together in an earlier
era, was now broken. At the same time as the sector
agencies were freed to perform their limited functions
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more efficiently,* no mechanism was substituted to insure
that sector activities would also be mutually-supporting;
e.g.that tndustries would be served by highways and power
lines, or that a village might obtain assistance in
raising its farm productivity at the same time as a road
linked it with a city.
Top political leaders, antagonistic to the concept
of planning, continued to press for across-the-board
development. Heads of the semi-autonomous agencies were
each allowed to establish their own systems of priorities
on the construction and location of facilities, with
external constraints limited largely to the total funds
available in an annual budget and the requests from
political leaders for specific projects. Under such
loose direction and control, the ltkelihood that public
expenditures within any given region or province might
dovetail with one another became rare or coincidental.
As Morris notes in his evaluation of development
activity late in the Menderes period:
*Yet there were often significant failures in the provision
of clear functional responsibility as well. Some operations
were granted conflicting or overlapping authority. For
example, three separate agencies held some responsibility
for planning the nation's electric system (the Electric
Research Institute, the Waterworks agency, and Eti Bank),
while the latter two shared in the operations of the
system with the municipalities. The Waterworks agency
was in charge of providing the main irrigation canals,
but another General Directorate in another ministry
(Agriculture) had jurisdiction over secondary systems,
and who maintained what was unclear. (83)
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"growth has proceeded on all fronts in an
un-coordinated manner, stimulated and
directed by the compulsion to build factories,
to develop transportation and electric generating
facilities and to improve production on the
farm...Lack of effective direction and coordin-
ation have led to misallocation and waste of
scarce resources..." (84)
B. The Impotence of Provincial Government
Failing consistenT direction from "the top," Turkish
administrative law still offered the possibility that
provincial authorities might have power to bring about
integrated area development within the Vilayets. The
Vali, or provincial governor, is nominally responsible
for all government activities conducted within the
province and for a review of their budgets.
Although himself an appointee of the Ministry of
Interior, the Vali supervises the operations of -
Agriculture, Public Works, Health, Education and other
central government representatives within the province. (85)
He must approve -municipal budgets and has veto power over
the election of municipal mayors. Through intelligence
from his subordinate local officers, the Kaymakams and
Nahiye Mudurs, the Vali is theoretically able to obtain
a good grasp of his province's resources and needs. Each
year the Vali assembles all requests for both adminis-
trative and development expenditures and forwards a
provincial budget to Ankara for approval.
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In practice, however, exercise of a coordinative
function by the governor is next to impossible.
The main roadblock lies in the method of budgetary
approval at Ankara.* For the governor's "package" budget
goes to the Minister of Interior, who does not examine
its contents as a package, but sends each section to the
agency of ministry which handles the particular sector
program. Although investment items may be related to one
another when they leave the governor's office, they may
be completely unrelated when they return. Gorvine
comments:
"For example, the Vali may request funds for a
school and a road to that school. The requests
go to the Ministry of Education and Public Works
respectively. He may receive the funds for the
school without the funds for the road, or funds
for the road but no funds for the school.
There are no formal coordination devices that
come into play to prevent this situation from
arising...Each agency, therefore, may receive
funds quite unrelated to those of any other
agency, and the Vali is unaware of what his
Vilayet will receive as a total until it is
virtually too late to do anything about it." (87)
Faced with the frustrations of central budgetary
approval, most provincial -governors have been content
to remain, as Gorvine puts it, "simply the requisitioning
officer for the agencies within (their) jurisdiction." (88)
Wickwar notes that the men who become Valis have been
*The provinces are almost completely dependent on Ankara
for both administrative and development funds. Local
revenue-raising power is so limited, that an average of10 percent or less of provincial expenditures are obtained
from local revenue sources. (86)
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trained as administrators to carry out directives sent
down from above, not "as )promoters, planners, and
coordinators of economic and social development." (89)
The few Valis with imagination and drive to "beat
the system" are faced with innumerable frustrations.
The writer has met one such man, a retired navy admiral
appointed as govenor of Zonguldak. When the governor
became aware of gaps and inconsistencies in allocations
to his province, he bypassed the local representatives of-
the ministries and made frequent trips to Ankara 250
miles away. There he moved from office to office,
buttonholing officials of the relevant sector agencies
to discuss Zonguldak's problems. By the spring of 1962,
however these contacts had met with no measurable
change in allocation procedure. (See Chapter gik)
If any areas were favored at all under this set of
provincial-central relationships, they were the national
centers of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. For in Ankara,
those men and agencies who made development deisions
at a distance from other parts of the country were
confronted with.problems in their own immediate environ-
ment which required some coordinated decision-making.
At Istanbul and Izmir, the major commercial, industrial
and military centers, voices of other powerful interest
groups were raised besides those of the governors to
effect specific projects. We have already noted the
evidences of concentrated development in these centers
and their increasing attractiveness.
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Any other area with real growth potential was,
however, hindered in obtaining sufficient mutually-
supporting public investment to mobilize its resources
and to attract private entrepreneurs. Difficulties
stemmed from those characteristics of national develop-
ment decision-making noted above:
1. The commitment of top political leaders to
nation-wide, dispersed investment and their
commensurate failure to establish clear -area
priorities for the staff agenciest activities.
2. The breakdown in coordination among the staff
agencies at the center.
3. The inability of regional officials to exact
coordinated programming from the central
authorities.
C. Some Signs of MOdification
We have some evidence that, late in the decade,
the government began to recognize a need for regional
considerations in its development effort. Four items may
be cited.
a. In 1958 a new Ministry of Reconstruction was
created with responsibilities for housing and physical
planning and general supervision over the Bank of
Municipalities, the Housing Bank, and the Land Distri-
bution Agency. This ministry was enabled to prepare
regional plans for Turkey and to adopt measures for
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implementing these plans. At the same time,
however, the Ministry received no legal
jurisdiction over activities of other develop-
ment agencies--all in senior ministries or semi-
autonomous--and no powers to enforce compliance
with any programs it should prepare. Its small
regional planning department held, moreover,
no specific legal responsibility within the
Ministry and, by the end of the Menderes period
had prepared no plans. (90)
b. In 1959 a pilot coutity-wide development project
was tried in a small Kaza (Koycegiz) some 150
km. south of Izmir. Under OEEC sponsorship, the
operation involved participatton by several
different ministries and agencies. It suffered
organizational difficulties and was abandoned in
1960. (91)
c. The FAO, as part of its nisZin report, proposed
a coordinated investment program largelygagrioultural
in character, for the three provinces of Antalya,
Isparla, and Burdur on the southern coast. The
government appeared willing to support the pro-
gram, but a revolution occurred before any final
commitment for allocation of responsibility could
be made. (92)
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d. According to Robinson (93), Menderes was
considering replacement of the 60-odd provinces
by 10 "super-provinces," each under the juris-
diction of a Vali. This system would allow for
more streamlined administration and development
programming. Although many Turks have mentioned
the super-province idea to this writer, it
appears to have been only an idea, not a worked-
out plan, by the time the government fell.
With time, the government might have moved to establish
investment priorities on the basis of growth regions. But
there was no time, and May 27, 1960 arrived with little
evident changes in the Democraes policy of dispersed,
uncoordinated investment outside of the three main
centers.
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VIII. 1950-60, A Summary Evaluation
A. End of an Experiment
On May 27, 1960 a miliatry coup overthrew the Menderes
government. After seventeen months of military rule and
the abolition of the Democratic party, free elections were
held and Turkey returned to civilian control--an uneasy
coalition between the Republicans and former Menderes
supporters, with Ismet Inonu as Prime Minister.
Meanwhile, a lengthy series of trials ended in the
execution of Menderes and two -cabinet members and the
imprisonment of Bayar and over 200 deputies and public
officials. Although Turkey would again become a demo-
cracy, the Democratic Party experiment was ignominiously
ended.
Increasingly repressive measures adopted by the
government to stifle its political oppostion brought
on the military revolt. This repression, the spending
policies of the administration,* and its leaders' personal
morality were main subjects at issue during the trials.
Whatever the merits of the charges, Turkey of 1960
was clearly in serious economic and political difficulties.
Some targets of the Menderes administration had been
achieved, but they came at the cost of inflation and
*At the insistence of the allies, Turkey had introduced a
currency reform in 1958 which halted inflation and reduced
imports but had no noticeable effect on government spending.
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increasing dependence on the assistance of Turkey's allies.
Unless this assistance continued for an indefinite period,
it now appeared that Turkey could not survive.
The Democrats had put economic development as the
foremost objective, and indeed made some remarkable
strides. National income rose 70 percent over the decade
(at 1961 factor costs). Per Capita income, kept down by
the increase in population, experienced a respectable
growth of 24 percent between 1950 and 1960. Industrial
production rose substantially, by 77 percent. The yearly
level of Gross National Investment, which had been under
10 percent of GNP in 1950, was maintained at from 12 to
16 percent during the decade. (94)
Yet the rise in income was imperfectly distributed,
with the three national centers (themselves under enormous
migration pressure) outstripping the rest of the nation.
Furthermore the agricultural sector received little
benefit, despite heavy investment outlays. We have
noted earlier that farm production increased 45 percent
in value, while cultivated land expanded by oven one-half.
Moreover, much industrial growth can be attributed to
heavily-subsidized state factories whose products were
unsuited to Turkish or foreign markets.
Only via inflation and foreign aid was the high
level of investment maintained. Total money supply
(in circulation and in bank deposts) rose from 1.9
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billion TL in 1949 to 13.1 billion TL in 1960. (95)
The annual budgetary deficit, 8.5 percent of public
expenditures in 1950, rose to almost 18 percent by
1960. The bulk of this deficit was met by grants, loans,
or the allocation of counterpart funds from Western
allies. (96)
In only one year (1953) did foreign aid take up
less than 50 percent of the budgetary appears, and for
most years this assistance met about two thirds of the
amount.
In 1950 the country's foreign trade deficit had
been $22.3 millions. Table IV-13 below indicates how
this annual deficit grew during the decade.
Table IV-14 o
Turkey's Annual Foreign Trade Deficit, 1950-60
in $ millions
1950 22.3
1951 88.0
1952 193.0
1953 136.4
1954 143.5
1955 184.3
1956 102.3
1957 51.9
1958 67.8
1959 116.2
1960 147.5
Source: "First Five Year Development Plan,"
State Planning Agency, Ankara, p. 21
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At the end of Menderes period, most economists
agreed with Baade, who wrote:
"The task of achieving an equilibrium in the
Turkish balance of payments is consequently of
rather a frightening magnitude. Proceeds from
exports can be increased to the necessary
extent only through systematic development over
a long period of years. During this period the
unavoidable deficit in the Turkish balance of
payments will have to be met by the friends of
Turkey if the task of making Turkey independent
of further foreign aid is to be solved." (97)
B. Spread of Development, Some Conclusions
The Democrats' expansion programs brought some bene-
fit to the Turkish people, but the benefit came at a
cost of political chaos and national insolvency.
As with the Republicans before them, extension of
economic growth from the traditional centers of Istanbul
and Izmir was a key aspect of the Democrats' development
effort. Outside of a major concern with Ankara, both
governments had followed a dispersed rather than a
concentrated approach to decentralization.
Objectives behind this approach were, however, quite
different in the two periods. So, to a certain degree,
was the outcome. For, although each effort led to
substantial waste and inefficiency, the situation in 1960
could be considered worse than at any other time.
Planning had been abandoned and coordination had broken
down. Maintenance of costly, unproductive dispersion
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measures had contributed to the country's deepening
debt. Growth at the national centers continued to pull
away from the rest of the country. Many other regions
had become urbanize4 but few cities could boast a viable
economic base to absorb their populations and offer long-
run prospects for productive employment. Despite heavy
investments, agricultural decline was unchecked, and the
indigent peasantry was moving to the cities.
Both governments pursued what may be construed as
"political" goals. in adopting the decentralization
measures. Ataturk's political objective was one of
achieving national unity and integration through
widespread extension of modern economic and social
activity. He was not concerned with votes as a means
of retaining power. The Democrats, however, were con-
cerned with popularity.. Development of the interior,
where most of the population lived and private enterprise
was -not flourishing, could bring political support--
and did.
Both governments held economic objectives as well.
The Republicans had been committed to exploit interior
resources as substitutes for imports. The Democrats, also
concerned with resources, nevertheless had also promised
high levels of employment and income. Interior public
industrialization during the 1950's seemed conducted More from
the standpoint of providing widespread employment than from
a careful examination of resource potential.
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The Republicans wanted to diminish Istanbul's imporl
tance, and thus tried to keep all possible projects away
from the old capital. Menderes and Bayar, however,
intended to restore Istanbul's glory, if not its political
power. Devoted also to Izmir and Ankara, they intensified
other urban programs in the interior when pressures on
the centers grew too acute to handle and conditions in the
periphery continued to worsen.
Defense considerations motivated decentralization
under both Republicans and Democrats. In the earlier
era, however, the railroad line and the interior
factories--both constructed partly for security purposes--
did not result in major peasant movements. During the
more mobile '50's, the defense-inspired highway network
reached deeply into regions hitherto isolated from urban
influences. As agricultural conditions deteriorated,
residents of these regions found the highways, and the
cheap transport they afforded, an easy channel to the
cities.
The Ataturk-Inonu program was distinctly urban-
oriented. The Menderes-Bayar program began by emphasizing
improvements to the long-neglected agricultural sector;
and this emphasis produced the most ironic set of para-
doxes. Little rural emigration occurred while the Repub-
licans were building up the cities. Great waves of migra-
tion were set off after the Democrats invested heavily
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in the countryside. To some degree the exodus was
expected as population grew and land dwindled. Yet the
form of rural investment program which the Democrats
conducted did much to accelerate the movement of people
and little to raise their productivity. Only when faced
with the magnitude of this population shift, did the
government once more turn to industrialization of the
peripheral cities.
Under the Democrats, concern with a build-up of
urban centers in the interior came largely from desper-
ation, rather than conviction. Such a build-up appeared
to be the only way in which the main centers could be
relieved of pressure, employement found for the displaced
peasantry, and the party promises of a good life for all
kept.
And in its haste to develop the periphery, government
made many mistaken choices of investments suited neither
to local resources nor national needs. Many interior
communities received factories which in the short run
could absorb some surplus labor but, because of the losses
and subsidies involved, had a negative effect on the
Turkish economy and were unable to serve as foci for
attracting other enterprises. The advantages of providing
highways and unprofitable industries to declining regions
with little growth potential can be seriously questioned.
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Even plants that were suited to the economy and
the site seemed plagued with enormous obstacles to begin
or sustain operations.
Once again the question turns upon the creation of
growth regions outside the main centers. Given the
approach to decentralization during the decade, it is
difficult to see how any area could have amassed enough
advantages to move into a stage of dynamic development.
Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir continued to draw a dis-
proportionate share of the modernizing elite. The latter
two continued to contain the great bulk of private
development activity, and indeed, with the help of
public investment, solidified their dominance. Any
outlying region, such as Zonguldak or Cukorova, with the
resource base for a substantial contribution to national
development was hindered from realizing its full potential
by the widespread, unrelated investment measures. Nor
were there any formal institutions, within the regions
or at the centers, that had power and responsibility to
correct these imbalances.
Had the approach been less dispersed, with a
commensurate concentration of attention on but a few of
the many locations selected for invesment, the nation's
overall economic picture might have been considerably
better by 1960. The political conditions could hardly
have been worse.
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Such a contention is perhaps dangerous without more
evidence than in this general review of public policy.
Therefore, we now turn to a case analysis of one region
whose broad resource base gave evidence of being extremely
valuable to the Turkish economy. Conduct of development
activity in Zonguldak resembled that in other areas of
the nation. By examining conditions in Zonguldak, it
may be possible to affirm or deny our assertion that
Turkey's approach to decentralization seriously jeopar-
dized both the creation of growth regions outside the
main centers and the nation's larger development prospects.
We will also be able to obtain a better grasp of the
manner in which this approach was actually implemented.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ZONGULDAK PROVINCE: A TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
I. Introduction
In Chapter One, seven characteristics were suggested
as common to regions experiencing dynamic growth. They are:
1. Rapid Urbanization that results in:
a. retention of population within the
region who might emigrate were local
economic opportunity unavailable.
b. attraction to the region of migrants
from other areas.
2. Major industrial development, related to
the region's resources, which is able to
function without prolonged subsidy or losses.
3. Existence of external economies which lead
to the formation of industrial complexes.
4. Rising per capita incomes to support an
increasing amount of service activity and
employment.
5. A level of educational services substantially
higher than the national average and a stock
of other social overhead facilities sufficient
to enable continuing economic growth.
6. Rationalization of agriculture and conversion
from subsistence to cash-crop farming.
7. An "atmosphere" within the region conducive
to further spurts of growth and change.
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Our detailed examination of Zonguldak will attempt
to identify the presence or absence of these characteristics.
Zonguldak lends itself to a case analysis as an area whose
entire spectrum of modern economic activity and infra-
structure has materialized since Ataturk began to foster
development of the interior forty years ago. This
mountainous province is located some 300 km north-northwest
of Ankara, bordering on the Black Sea. Small in size
(8400 km 2 or one percent of Turkey's land area) and in
population (570,000 in 1960 or two percent of the national
total), Zonguldak is nevertheless extremely important to
Turkey's economy.
It accounts for all of Turkey's bituminous coal
supply, essentially the entire domestic iron aDd steel
output*, and 13 percent of forestry production. In addi-
tion, there are major brick and tile installations and
several smaller industries. Next to Istanbul, Izmir, and
Ankara, the province holds the largest concentration of
industrial workers in Turkey.
Public investment in Zonguldak province has been
significant under both Republican and Democratic adminis-
trations. Although its blend of resources and economic
activities is unique to the province, Zonguldak is repre-
sentative of other areas outside the three main centers
*except for small scrap furnaces at Istanbul and Izmir.
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where public decentralization efforts have operated. The
major industries are state enterprises, with their policy-
making headquarters in Ankara. Infra-structure has been
planned and installed by the same national sector agencies
that function throughout Turkey. Responsibilities of
Zonguldak's local authorities are identical to those in
other provinces.
After a general description of Zonguldak, its
geography and historical background, we will examine the
state of its development during 1960-61 in terms of the
seven growth region characteristics. This study will pro-
vide a basis for evaluating Turkey's decentralization
policies as applied to a specific region outside the main
centers. Although the study period extends beyond the
Menderes administration, the subsequent government had
made no significant changes in the character or organization
of decentralization activity.*
*The revolutionary government did, however, create a
State Planning Organization attached to the Prime
Ministry to oversee -all aspects of public expenditure
including regional development. By 1962 the agency
had not yet produced its first national plan or re-
gional programs, although both were under study. A
five-year national plan was issued in 1963 and called
for coordinated investment in Zonguldak, Antalya, and
Cukorova.(l) At the same time, however, it recommended
massive development efforts in the far eastern and
southeastern regions, the most backward in the nation.
Since these recommendations cover most of Turkey's
land area outside the three main centers, the plan
essentially represents a restatement of the dispersion
approach.
0
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Material on Zonguldak comes primarily from two
sources: a 1961-62 study by the Ministry of Reconstruction's
Regional Planning Bureau (Bolge Planlama), and the joint
OECD-AID analysis of State Industrial Enterprises cited
in Chapter Four.
Bolge Planlama performed a preliminary land use and
economic analysis of existing conditions in Zonguldak.
This was the first such study attempted by a Turkish agency
for an area outside the main centers* and underscores
Zonguldak's relative importance to the national economy.
The study region was limited to the province itself,
rather than a larger or smaller area because both the coal
deposits and the main Black Sea industries between.Marmara
and Samsun were confined to the province.**
*State Planning Organization staff members assisted
in the study. At the same time as the Zonguldak
project, Bolge Planlama also initiated a regional
analysis of the Marmara. In 1961 FAO won approval
to station a planning team in Antalya (again, with
no implementation power) under SPO jurisdiction. In
1962, a joint planning program for Cukorova was ini-
tiated by SPO, Bolge Planlama, and the Agency for
International Development. To the best of this
writer's knowledge, these efforts have not yet led
to specific investment projects or any reorganization
in the conduct of development activity.
**Statistical data in Turkey for units smaller than the
nation as a whole are primarily available on a
provincial basis.
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of its major modern economic activities, only forestry
extended beyond Zonguldak's boundaries into neighboring
Vilayets. Data were obtained chiefly from files of state
enterprises and sector agencies and were supplemented by
field interviews. The Planning Bureau had no responsi-
bility for implementing any of its findings, but pre-
sented some recommendations to other government agencies
in 1962.(2) This writer served as resident foreign
advisor to the Bolge Planlama team. Descriptive and
evaluative material in the subsequent chapters, unless
referenced otherwise, represents his observations during
the course of the project.
The State Enterprise analysis dealt with the coal,
steel, and cement industries in Zonguldak and was per-
formed by foreign advisors expert in these fields. It
resulted in recommendations for structural change to the
industries.
On the matter of data, the reader is once more
cautioned about potential unreliability in statistical
material. Statistics on Zonguldak evidence many gaps and
are often of questionable accuracy. They must rather be
considered indicative of orders of magnitude and patterns
of relations.
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II. General Description (Maps V-2,3)
Zonguldak has roughly the shape of a right triangle.
Its hypothenuse of 220 km. reaches from southwest to north-
east along the Black Sea. The horizontal axis extends some
200 km. eastward to Central Anatolia, from which a north-
south line approaches the ocean, 120 km. away.
The province lies within the Pontic mountain chain
that stretches across the entire Black Sea coast. Sometimes
as high as 500 meters at the shore, these mountains rise to
1200 meters or more at the province's southern boundary.
Beyond them lies the central plateau.
Three rivers and numerous small streams drain from
the mountains to the sea. The rivers (the Gulunc, Filyos,
and Bartin) form valleys where the most intensive agri-
cultural cultivation is conducted. The Filyos is the
longest river, with a source some 200 km. inland, while
the Gulunc, with a 30 km. length is the shortest.
Most of the settlements are located in the river
valleys or at their mouths. Again reading from southwest
to northeast, we see a pattern of four coastal communities
each 30-50 km. apart at points where a river meets the sea:
Eregli, Zonguldak City, Filyos town, and Bartin. The last
is actually 10 km. inland on the sole navigable river of
Turkey.* The only coastal town not at a river is Amasra,
*Suitable for transit by 500 ton coastal vessels up
to the town itself.
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20 km to the northeast of Bartin.
Main inland towns of Devrek, Safranbolu, and Karabuk
are all situated on tributaries of the Filyos river.
The bituminous coal deposits, with proven reserves
of 1.3 billion tons (3), extend from Eregli along the coast
as far as Amasra; although the presently-worked seams run
from Eregli to Filyos and inland for no more than 10 km.
Small manganese deposits are also present near Eregli.
Aside from these minerals, the chief natural resource
of Zonguldak has been its forests which cover about 60
percent of the province. Inland are great stands of oak,
beech, other hardwoods and evergreens. At the sea "the
rocky limestone coast of Zunguldak is clothed with a
luxuriant evergreen shrub vegetation--the bay tree, myrtle,
tree heath, holm oak, strawberry tree, philyrea,
rhododendron..." (4)
Zonguldak's climate is mild and humid. Rainfall
averages from 1000-1500 mm yearly. This is roughly twice
the amount of precipitation on the central plateau and half
that of the damp tea-growing area of the eastern Black Sea.(5)
In winter, temperature rarely falls below freezing along the
coast and in the valleys, although the mountains them-
selves are snow-covered from December through March.
Population density in Zonguldak for 1960 was 67
persons per km2, twice the average for Turkey and the three
immediately adjacent provinces of Bolu, Cankiri, and
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Kastamonu.(6) This overall density was roughly comparable
with that of Izmir and the eastern Black Sea, though only
half that of Istanbul province.
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III. Historical Development
A. Before the Republic
In pre-Ottoman history, only three places within
the present provincial boundaries held any importance.
Eregli was colonized by Greeks in the sixth century B.C.
and became the large trading center Heraclea of Asia
Minor. Amasra was settled at the same time, also by
Greeks, and the two ports were later allied with
Mithridates of Pontus in his battles against the Romans.
In Byzantine times, Filyos was founded as a port at the
mouth of the river that bears its name. Genoese families
obtained all three of the towns for trading posts from
the Seljuk Turks in the early XIV century. Their rule
continued until Ottoman conquests about 1450.(7) Then
each of the towns sank back to the status of a large
village. Only one significant relic, the massive Genoese
citadel at Amasra, remains to mark this early colonization.
In 1822, coal was discovered near Eregli. The
Sultan promptly gave mining concessions to several firms
(nostly French) and rights to land that extended 100 km
along the coast from Eredli to Amasra and over 30 km inland.(8)
Although title remained with the Sublime Porte, the mine
companies had otherwise complete control over use of this
territory. Since much of its was difficult of access, the
land was allowed to remain in dense forests.
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Mining was extremely primitive. It took place in
many small areas along the coast, particularly Zonguldak
town which, at 12,000 people, was the only sizable community
by the 1927 census. The geographer, Ernest Nowak, toured
the region at this period and commented:
"There are no trained miners. The number of workers
is insufficient; the methods employed are irrational,
hence the price is so high that the coal can
barely compete with the English imports." (9)
Total annual production amounted to about 1,000,000
tons, most of which was sent via coasters to Istanbul.
The remainder went as bunker fuel for Black Sea ships.(l0)
Nowakts description of the area as a whole in this,
the beginning of the Republican period, indicates that
Zonguldak region was very much a collection of small,
isolated economies.
Each of the sea-coast towns was the focus of a small
hinterland but had little relationship with the dher
communities. In addition to the coal ports of Eregli,
Zonguldak, and Amasra, Bartin also had a flourishing
trade with Istanbul. It was a timber port and the center
for a rich agricultural valley that sent poultry and eggs
to the capital.
The only interior town of any prominence was
Safranbolu, about 100 km from the sea and a way stop for
caravans from Central Anatolia to Kastamonu and Sinop.
Safranbolu takes its name from the saffron plant, its
chief product.
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Map V-1 shows the state of communications at the
beginning of the Republic. No "all-weather" roads existed.
Amasra and the river port of Bartin were connected by a
track to Safranbolu open only in the dry season. The road
from Zonguldak town to the interior stopped at Devrek, bent
back to Eregli and was closed for much of the year. All
other communications were by sea.
B. Modernization, 1923-1960
Ataturk early recognized the potential importance of
coal deposits to domestic Turkish industry. Harnessing of
this resource could make Turkey self-sufficient in power
supply and would provide fuel for the nation-wide rail
network. Government immediately began to buy out the
French and the few Turkish concessionaires. A mine tech-
nicians' school was established in Zonguldak town during
1924. One of the first railroad extensions programmed was
the Ankara-Zonguldak route (Map V-1).
Nowak comments on the importance of this projected
line:
"The opening of the lately projected railways
would put the valuable coal field in touch with
the interior and would also permit adequate ex-
ploitation of timber resources unrivalled in the
Near East---beech, fir, pines and the less im-
portant oaks."(11)
The railroad was finished in the late '30's as far
as Zonguldak town. A short line was also built just east
of Eregli to transfer coal from the Kandilli fields to
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that port, but the two were never linked over the inter-
vening 30 km according to the original plan.*
coal
Complete control of the mines was not obtained until
the 1930's when ETI Bank took responsibility to consolidate,
develop, and operate the shafts. It was then that the
Bank, in order to obtain sufficient labor force, began the
system of hiring temporary workers from among peasants in
the province that remains to the present day. Official
recruiting efforts are still conducted in 500 of
Zonguldak's 735 villages, and each temporary miner spends
from two to six months of a year at the pits.(12)
Production by the outbreak of World War II had
risen to 2,700,000 tons run of the mine annually. Mean-
while, workers housing, social facilities, company offices,
port, and railroad yards had been constructed at Zonguldak
town, whose population grew to 33,000 by 1940. War halted
the modernization program, which was revived in 1946 with
the arrival of American advisors. A 10-year Marshall-Plan-
supported modernization was completed in 1959 at the cost
of 375 million TL. Further foreign aid funds were granted
to the mines after 1959.
*Engineers estimated that 11 tunnels through rock were
required to make the connection. Although the plan
remained on the books, it was always considered too
expensive and was not revived until 1959. (See
Chapter VI).
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In 1960, run of the mine production was 6.3 million
tons. Zonguldak City had grown to 90,000 and over 40,000
people (including permanent and temporary workers) were
employed within the province in some phase of the mining
operations. The country no longer imported coal.(13)
Control over the mines was taken from ETI Bank in
1957. A separate corporation TKI, with headquarters in
Ankara, now owns this system. It inherited the two ETI
bank subsidiaries, EKI (in Zonguldak) and AKI (in Kandilli)
which actually operate the mines and defer to Ankara for
major decisions. TKI is nominally under Ministry of
Industry supervision.(14)
steel
In 1937, as part of the five-year industrial plan,
Turkey's first steel mill was constructed at Karabuk, a
village 10 kilometers from Safranbolu and on the rail line.
Coal came by rail from Zonguldak and iron ore by rail from
Divrigi, 600 km to the east. Britain provided the initial
technical assistance, which was continued by the U. S.
after the War. In 1960, overall production was 216,000 tons,
about half of the country's consumption. Some 8,000
workers are employed at Karabuk, now a city of over 30,000
with workers housing, social facilities, etc.
The mill is currently embarked on a program to double
its production. Funds come from a $15,000,000 Export-
Import Bank loan and a German loan for a new coke plant.
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The Mill was originally a Sumer Bank project, but is now
a separate corporation, again with headquarters in
Ankara.(15)
Other investments
Although coal and steel are the major industries,
other investments--both public and private--have occurred
since 1923. Forestry exploitation began under the
Forestry Directorate before the war, and two saw mills
employing together about 750 workers are now in oper-
ation at Devrek and at Ulupinar near Bartin. Between 1945
and 1950, a Sumer Bank refractory brick plant was built
at Filyos (employing about 500) and the nation's largest
power station erected just east of Zonguldak City at
Catala4zi. This power station was linked with a grid
system furnishing electricity to Marmara and northwest
Anatolia. After 1950, port expansion at Eretli,
Zonguldak, Bartin, and Amasra was initiated and a four-
lane highway constructed from Karabiik to the Ankara-
Istanbul road. Private investment became significant only
after 1950, when small metals-processing operations
agglomerated around the steel mill in Karabuk; and food
processing, brick and tile, and woodworking operations
were started elsewhere in the province.
As the Menderes period drew to a close, construction
on a government cement plant began at Bartin. Plans
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were also drawn in 1959 for the largest single industrial
project in Turkey's history---a second steel plant, jointly
owned by private interests, the Turkish government, and
foreign investors, to be built at the coal port of Eregli.
The U. S. Development Loan fund would provide $139,000,000
in foreign exchange for this operation. Construction
began in 1961 with opening scheduled for 1964.(16)
Thus, from primitive beginnings, Zonguldak province
became an important producer of raw material and industrial
goods for Republican Turkey. It was a target for govern-
ment investment throughout the 40-year period and had
recently begun to draw some private capital. In terms of
foreign aid to support Turkish industry, the province was
clearly an area that drew much interest. Its resource
base was such that even further contributions might be
expected.
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IV. Urbanization and the Pull for Population
First on the list of growth region characteristics
is urbanization. It was noted in Chapter one that modern
economic development would lead to rapid urbanization,
that the region would become attractive for migrants from
elsewhere in the country who might otherwise seek work
in the national centers; and that local urban employment
opportunities would keep local residents within the region
in its cities or in their traditional rural surroundings.
This section will examine the three phases of urbanization
as they appear in Zonguldak.
A. The Urban Pattern
By 1935 and the commencement of ETI Bank's mining
program, Zonguldak city had grown to 28,000 people and was
still the only community over 10,000 in the province. It
represented less than 10 percent of the population. In
1960, three cities were over 10,000 and contained almost
25 percent of Zonguldak's people.(17) Although this
figure was comparable with the overall national average, it
was twice the average urbanization for provinces along the
Black Sea. (Table IVrlO)
In addition to the three centers, several smaller
communities possessed some "urban" characteristics and
economic activity. Important functional interdependencies
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had materialized between these towns. Instead of the
earlier pattern of isolated economies, by 1960 a set of
hierarchical relationships had begun to characterize the
urban pattern. Below is a list of the communities with
some urban characteristics. They may be located on Map V-3
Table V-1
Cities and Towns in Zonguldak--1960
name population
Zonguldak* 90,000
Karabiik 31,000
Bartin 12,000
Eregli 9,000
Safranbolu 7,500
Devrek 4,000
Filyos 4,000
Amasra 2,500
Caycuma 2,000
Source: "1960 Genel Nufus Sayimi, Telegrafla
Alinan Ilk Neliceler," Istatistik
Genel Mudurlugu, " Ankara, 1961, p.17
Each of these was a market center for nearby villages,
and all but Filyos and Amasra were Kaza or "county" seats.
Each performed at least one modern economic function linked
in some way with other towns in the region. A brief de-
scription of the main economic activities and regional
interrelationships of each community follows.
*For this analysis Zonguldak City is considered to include
the contiguous suburbs of Kozlu and Kilimli. Although
separate municipalities, all are part of the coal
community with no logical basis for separation. In 1960,
Zonguldak had 60,000 people, with the remainder about
equally distributed to the other two.
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Zonguldak City is the provincial capital and seat of
all major governmental agencies within the province. It is
also "capital" of the coal district, containing most of the
miner's residences and the headquarters of EKI which oper-
ates the local mines. Zonguldak also contains major coal-
washing stations and the large repair shops for mine equip-
ment where spare parts and some sheet metal enclosures are
fabricated. Zonguldak receives much of its iron and steel
from Karabik and in turn ships approximately 750,000 tons
of coal yearly to power blast furnaces at the mill. The
harbor deals almost exclusively in coal for shipment to
Istanbul andather ports.
In addition to its government-managed mine activity,
Zonguldak contains about 20 small private industries
(from 10-15 workers each) engaged in biscuit-making,
soda-bottling and other food processing operations; in
machine repair; and in making rubber footwear for peasants---
all locally consumed products.
Karabk was a new town expressly constructed for
the steel mill, and it remains almost exclusively an
iron-and steel making center. In addition to the large
government plant, since 1950 the private sector has con-
structed some 20 small metals processing operations. These
are foundries and rolling mills, some employing as many as
50 workers. Raw material is purchased from the government
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mill. Production of both public and private plants is
mainly shipped out of the region. (Map VI-2)
Coal comes to the mill via rail from Zonguldak,
100 km away. Iron ore is also brought by rail from
Divrigi in Eastern Turkey, 600 km away. Only limestone
is locally mined.
With growth in the steel industry, Karabuk's de-
velopment now extends as far as Safranbolu, 10 km distant,
where "suburban" housing for plant officials has been
erected.
Karabik's port is Filyos, rather than Zonguldak whose
harbor is too small for even the present coal trade.
Weather conditions at Filyos, however, keep the makeshift
jetty that serves as harbor facilities unusable for half
the year.
Bartin, the third largest city, is the center of what
diversified private enterprise exists in the region. Its
small shipbuilding yards construct many of the wooden
coastal vessels in use along the Black Sea. A half-dozen
brick and tile operations (ranging from primitive kilns
to one modern plant employing 100 workers) provide much of
the region's building materials and export to other areas
on the Black Sea.
Two canneries were established after 1950 to process
the area's agricultural produce (each privately owned and
employing about 50 workers). A biscuit-making plant and
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some small oil presses round out Bartin's industrial
activity.
In 1960 a large public cement mill was under con-
struction. The mill was scheduled to use slag from
Karabuk's steel process as its main raw material, an
operation that would further solidify a link between the
two cities.
Eregli presently functions as the coal port for AKI,
the second and smaller company subsidiary that operates
mines to the east of the town. Due to congestion at
Zonguldak harbor, coal steamers regularly wait several
hours or more in the sheltered Eregli port before pro-
ceeding to their destination. Ereli also has the oldest
cannery in Turkey (private with about 25 workers) and a few
building materials operations. It is the site of the second
steel mill, now under construction.
Safranbolu is still a way stop on the road to
Kastamonu and eastern Black Sea ports. Its saffron pro-
duction has disappeared, however, and the town has declined
in favor of KarabUk of which it is now a suburb. One in-
dustry, a small private tannery, was in operation and
furnished hides for boots and gloves to be used by mine
and steel mill workers.
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Filyos is the site of Turkey's major refractory-
brick plant. Fire-clay abounds in the immediate vicinity,
and additional raw materials are shipped from Istanbul.
A large part of Filyos' production goes to the furnaces of
KarabUik, of which it is also the port.
Devrek is the center of the Forestry Directorate's
operations in Zonguldak. It is exclusively a lumber town,
with a 500 man saw mill. Some pit-props for the Zonguldak
mines are sent from Devrek (although the bulk of this re-
quirement is imported from abroad). Two bus and truck
body-building operations have been established by private
entrepreneurs since 1950 (25-50 workers all told) and con-
sume some of the lumber. Devrek is also a transport
junction where the roads from Erelli and Zonguldak con-
verge.
Amasra no longer produces coal, although proven
reserves exist in the adjoining hills. It is now a fishing
village and NATO port, with one of the few concentrations
of woodworking handicrafters that exist in Turkey. The
street of woodworkers sells primarily to summer tourists
who form the real economic base of this picturesque com-
munity.
In the summer, Amasra's population swells from 2500
to 10,000. Both the Zonguldak mines and the Karabiik steel
mill operate rest camps here for their workers. The town
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is a 6 1/2 hour drive from Ankara and draws many vacationers
from the capital. Accommodations are spare: three decrepit
hotels and the homes of local residents who take in boarders
during the season.
Caycuma is really a large village but contains some
"cottage industry" in leather-working. Hides are brought
from the Safranbolu tannery to be made into shoes and gloves
for the industrial workers. Some Caycuma residents commute
by train to the Filyos brick plant, 20 km away.
B. The Attraction for Migrants
Before economic developments under the Republic,
Zonguldak had little reason to attract population. Our
query is whether the subsequent urban economic activity
has drawn population from other regions, thereby siphoning
away some of the potential migration to the main national
centers.
Statistical material here is quite sketchy. We must
rely on information collected during the 1950 and 1955
censuses of population as an indication of trends.
Between 1950 and 1955 population in Zonguldak province
increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent, slightly
higher than the national figure. Some 64,500 people were
added to the 1950 total of 427,000.
Of this addition 24,500 (38 percent) were people born
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in other provinces. Meanwhile, 7,500 people born in
Zonguldak had moved to other areas between 1950 and 1955.
This left a net balance due to immigration of 17,000 or
over one-quarter of the total increase.*
In 1955, 58,000 residents of Zonguldak province
listed other areas as their birthplaces. They formed 12
percent of the total provincial population. Only 27,000
people who claimed Zonguldak as their birthplace (6 percent
of the total born in Zonguldak) were then living in other
provinces.(18)
Thus, Zonguldak appeared to have gained twice.as
many people from other areas as it had lost to emigration.
The immigrants represented a significant proportion of
the region's population and indicated a drawing power both
in the province's immediate surroundings and into more
distant areas where emigration was pronounced. Most
migrants came from the three adjacent vilayets of Bolu,
Cankiri, and Kastamonu; from the densely populated eastern
Black Sea provinces;** and from the highlands of Eastern
Anatolia.
*These figures deal only with net migration at the
end of five-year census periods. We have no way of
measuring yearly flows or temporary movements, which
may be higher or lower than the above figures.
**By 1950 (the only date for which we have figures)
Zonguldak had absorbed six percent of all those who
had emigrated from the Eastern Black Sea
Provinces. (19)
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Table V-2
Birthplaces of Immigrants to Zonguldak--1955
Total number of Zonguldak residents
in 1955 who were born elsewhere....58,000
Adjacent Vilayets: (Bolu, Cankiri, Kastamonu)
Eastern Black Sea: (Coru, Giresun, Ordu, Rize,
Samsun, Sinop, Trabzon)
Eastern Anatolia: (Erzincan, Erzurum, Sivas,
Gumugane)
All Other
12,000 21%
26,000 45%
4,000 7%
16,000 27%
Source: B6lge Planlama Data from
Central Statistical Office
The two major cities, Zonguldak and Karabtik, had
been targets for most of this population flow. In 1955,
over three-quarters of those born outside the province
lived in Zonguldak City and Karabaik, and they comprised
one-half the population of these centers.(20)
C. Retention of Local Residents
Perhaps an even more telling indication of
Zonguldak's attraction power is the ability of its eco-
nomic activity to keep peasants within the province who
might otherwise leave.
Between 1950-55, population in places under 5,000
grew by an average annual rate of 2.1 percent. This was
somewhat higher than the overall national average for
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places under 5,000, 1.9 percent. Zonguldak's rural population
continued to increase at the same rate between 1950-60.(21)
These figures represent a remarkable degree of rural
stability. For in 1950 the average amount of land per farm
family in Zonguldak was well below that of Turkey as a whole.
About 80 percent of Zonguldak's farm families worked land
of less than 50 decares, while the comparable national
figure was just above 60 percent.(22) Moreover, per decare
yields for the subsistence crops which characterized
Zonguldak's agriculture (Chapter Six) were the same or
lower than the national average.
Thus, rural population grew at a higher than average
rate, while agricultural conditions appeared to be below
average (Chapter Six). Some reason other than farming must
have held back extensive emigration.
The reason lay in hiring practices of the State
Economic Enterprises. Of the 40,000 workers employed by
the mines in 1960, some 26,000 were considered "temporary"
employees from villages within the province.(23) These men
worked from 2-6 months each in the pits and otherwise re-
tained their rural residences. Standard practice has been
for the men to leave farm plots to wives and families while
they move to one of the barriacks which the mines maintain
in Zonguldak city or near the shafts.
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According to Ministry of Reconstruction figures,
these temporary workers--who thereby found an important
supplement to farm income--represented one man for every
2.3 of the 61,000 Zonguldak farm families in 1960.
Although the steel mill hires few temporary workers
due to the skills its operations require, Karabik also draws
from nearby villages. Directors of the refractory brick
plant and the forestry enterprises described to this
writer a similar dependence on workers from rural areas.
Many in the nearer villages are permanent employees of the
enterprises.
The strong economic interdependency between the rural
and urban districts may be seen in the male-female distri-
bution for areas within the province.
Table V-3
Sex Distribution for Zonguldak--1955
in U0
Male Pct. Female Pct. Total
Vilayet 251 51.0 240 49.0 491
Zonguldak City 62 67.0 31 33.0 93
and Karabuk
All other areas 189 48.0 209 52.0 398
Source: B*lge Planlama from Statistical
Office Figures.
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Heavy preponderance of men in the two major cities re-
flects not only the presence of immigrants from other provinces*
but also the large number of peasants from Zonguldak who are
temporary residents. Over one-half of the male population in
Zonguldak City and Karabik were people born in the province.
Many of these would return to their villages to be replaced
in their jobs by another group from the province's farms.
So long as the plants continue to hire from neighboring
villages and continue to depend heavily on part-time workers,
it appears that rural population remains on the land and does
not depart in large numbers for the national centers or other
areas.
The foregoing discussion has presented a general de-
scription of Zonguldak's history and economy, sufficient to
indicate the region's vital significance to Turkey and its
role as a locus of major public expenditures during the
national period. Our treatment of urbanization further demon-
strates that Zonguldak attracts some migration due to this
economic development and that its urban activities have held
down emigration of its rural population. We have not yet
dealt with the nature of this development itself, i.e. the
effectiveness with which opportunities in Zonguldak have been
*Over two-thirds of the migrants were male. This pro-
portion suggests that migration may have been temporary
or that the men may have been "advance parties" who
would send for their families once more firmly es-
tablished in urban activity.
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mobilized. For this and discussion of the six other growth
region characteristics as they apply to Zonguldak, we turn
to the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
ZONGULDAK PROVINCE: GROWTH AND ITS OBSTACLES
I. The Agricultural Picture
One sign of a growth region is increasing rational-
ization and modernization of agriculture. In Chapter One
it was suggested that the food demands of growing cities,
the contacts between peasants and aspects of a money-
based economy, the modernizing influences of urban jobs
and activities would spread to nearby rural areas and
induce peasants to shift from a subsistence to a cash-
crop system. Types of farming undertaken would naturally
depend on the area's climate and soils.
Our examination of Zonguldak's economic base begins
with the traditional rather than the modern activities.
Agriculture still employs the bulk of Zonguldak's labor
force (in 1955 over 50 percent of the males and almost all
the women workers).(l) By first studying the changes in
this, the dominant activity, we may be better able to
assess the strength of modernizing influences brought
by industrialization.
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A. Expectations
Given natural conditions in Zonguldak, one might
expect diversification and rationalization of agriculture
to have occurred. According to experts from the Agri-
culture Ministry, the region's soils and climate are
particularly well suited to vegetable-raising and
orchards.* Zonguldak is well-watered. Its seacoast
and river valleys enjoy milder winters than Central
Anatolia, and the heavy forest cover aids in preventing
erosion. In 1960, some 130,000 people lived in cities
over 10,000 within the province. Three canneries processed
produce for shipment to the major national centers. The
Menderes program of liberal agricultural credit opened up
new sources of financing, and every Kaza had an agricultural
agent sent by Ankara to assist agricultural development.
Frequent contacts of peasants with urban life via work in
the mines and mills might also increase a desire to pro-
duce cash crops. Many factors seemed to favor diversified
farming.
However, diversification has not materialized. The
vast majority of cropland continues to be sown to corn and
wheat for family consumption, two crops unsuited to the
soils, topography, and climate. The three canneries are
*Although topographical conditions make most of the
land adapted only to forests.
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so short of local materials to process that they have to
import fruits and vegetables from as much as 600 km away
merely to maintain operations. Primitive farm practices
have led to marked erosion. Zonguldak's farmers remain
among the poorest in the nation, and conditions appear
to be worsening with population increase.
B. Land Use and Ownership Patterns
During the 1950-60 period, Turkey's nationwide land
distribution program saw an average of 50 decares each
granted to some 300,000 families for subsistence purposes.(2)
Average land holdings for Zonguldak's 61,000 farm families
appeared to be at or below this figure.*
In 1960, the Forestry Faculty of Istanbul University
conducted a detailed land use analysis of Zonguldak for
B81ge Planlama. From this analysis, a provincial-wide
average of 47 decares of cultivated land per farm family
*From statistical office information, Bblge Planlama
estimated Zonguldak province to have 61,000 farm
families in 1960, with an average of 6.5 persons per
family. This was a 25 percent increase in number of
farm families since 1950.
-41
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was estimated.* Moreover, the study concluded that only
40 percent of the total territory then under cultivation
was at all adapted to crops by virtue of soil and
topography. Indeed, many of the ubiquitous cornfields
were on slopes of 50 percent or higher.
A parallel study by the State Planning Organi-
zation indicated that the problem of small holdings was
even more severe than this overall estimate; and that
rural-overcrowding was particularly acute in the fertile
river valleys.
Table VI-1 estimates average farm sizes for each of
the main kazas or counties within the province.**
*The survey made the following estimates for land use
in the province.
percent Total percent
Agricultural land
Field crops 34.5
Vegetables and 0.3
vineyards 34.8
Forests 58.5
Meadow and pasture 1.8
Settlement area 0.3
Waste or unused land 4.6
**Not included in the tabulation are the kazas of Ulus,
Eflani, and Kurucasile in the eastern third of Zonguldak,
whose characteristics probably parallel those of Devrek
and Safranbolu.
Information for this survey came from local agricultural
agents. Partially as a check on the estimates, Bolge
Planlama and the Statistical Office commissioned a ield
survey of Bartin kaza in which a sample of 500 peasants
were interviewed about their agricultural activities.
Data here indicated that Bartin, the area with the most
fertile soil, showed an average farm size of only 19.0
decares per family.(3) Although the two studies show
much disparity in both methods and conclusions, we can
surmise that an acute problem of land availability exists.
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Densest concentrations of agricultural population are
in Zonguldak and Karabuk kazas, adjoining the major cities.
Although family plots are smallest in these counties, many
of the peasants hold full-time jobs in the state enterprises.
For them, agriculture is primarily a supplement to indus-
trial income.
Next in density, but larger in amount of rural population,
are the river-valley kazas of Bartin, Caycuma, and Eregli.
These are beyond commuting distance from the main cities
and contain the most level and well-watered land in the
province. These peasants subsist mainly on farming.
Income from other sources is primarily via temporary work
in the mines. Although holdings here appear larger than
near the cities, the average size is between 30 and 40
decares. Indeed, Table VI-1 indicates that the average
holding for Zonguldak province may be well below the 47
decare figure derived from the Istanbul University study.
The most sparsely-settled areas are Devrek and
Safranbolu, where heavy forest-cover and difficult
topography make productive farming close to impossible.
Here the holdings appear to be somewhat larger than else-
where.
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Table VI-
Average Arable Land per Farm Family by Kaza, 1960
in Decares
Main Centers
River valleys
Uplands
Zonguldak
Karabik
Bartin
gaycuma
Eregli
Devrek
Safranbolu
Est. no. of fam.
6000
5000
10,700
8,000
9,850
8,650
2,850
land/fam.
7.5
26.2
39.3
30.5
36.6
42.0
60.0
Source: "Ilce Anket", State Planning Organization,
Ankara, 1961. Not included are the
kazas of Ulus, Eflani, and Kurucasile.
C. Mechanization
Farming methods in Zonguldak are among the most
rudimentary in Turkey. There is a particularly low
utilization of mechanized equipment, as noted in Table VI-2
below.
Table VI-2
Farm Equipment in Zonguldak, 1957
type number proportion of Turkey Total*
tractors 38 .0008 percent
wood plows 90,400 4.6 percent
iron plows 6,180 0.6 percent
Source: Bblge Planlama Data from Central
Statistical Office
*Zonguldak has roughly 2 percent of Turkey's farm
population.
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Irrigation and drainage works, despite the number
of rivers and small streams, are practically non-existent.
According to the Bartin Survey cited above, less than one
percent of the Kaza's cultivated area is irrigated.
D. Crop Patterns
Most production is corn and wheat grown for home
consumption at per decare yields that roughly approach
the national average. The 1960 land use survey estimated
only three percent of the cultivated land in gardens and
vineyards. The Bartin study (footnote supra) showed that
only eight percent of this county's land was in crops
other than corn and wheat; and the once flourishing
poultry and egg trade here has practically ceased. Nor
is animal production or fishing of much significance to
Zonguldak.
For the two-year period, 1958-59, Zonguldak's yields
on corn and wheat were about the average for Turkey, some
140 kilos/decare for corn and 100 kilos/decare for wheat.(4)
The writer paid several visits to the Eregli and
Bartin canneries which at all times were operating well
below the installed capacity of their equipment. Their
owners complained about insufficient produce in the area
but had no suggestions on how to improve the situation.
They had evidently not established contracts or guarantees
with local peasants to purchase crops which might be preserved.
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The owners appeared concerned only with their operational
and marketing problems, not with stimulating local sources
of supply. They told of having to bring fruits and vege-
tables from Malatya, Bursa, and even the Marmara coast
in order to maintain operations. Survival seemed to come
only by paying low wages to their help, mostly teen-age
girls.
For 1960, Bblge Planlama estimated the value of
various crops produced in Zonguldak---both for home and
market consumption, using prevailing market prices. These
estimates were based on figures furnished by local agri-
cultural agents.
Table VI-3
Value of Agricultural Production in Zonguldak by Crop Type
1960
Crop type Value in TL Pct. of Total Value
cereals 120,800,000 56.0
animal feel 56,300,000 25.0
fruits 25,000,000 11.0
vegetables 8,400,000 4.0
legumes 8,300,000 3.5
oil seeds 1,000,000 0.5
TOTAL 219,800,000 100.0
Source: Ozen Dalli, unpublished study on Zonguldak's
Economic Base, Blge Planlama, Ankara,
1962, p.7 .
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Clearly, fruits and vegetables commanded a far higher
value than the proportion of land they consumed, while the
opposite was true with cereals. Yet the peasants, par-
tially out of ignorance and partially perhaps out of an
extreme reluctance to risk new crop patterns without guaran-
tees of profit, continued to farm in their traditional way.
E. Rural per-capita Income.
B3lge Planlama computed an estimate of average per
capita farm income based on the above figures. The sum
was 470 TL, or less than half the estimated average rural
per capita income of 990 TL for the nation as a whole.(5)
Zonguldak was both a poor province from, the agricultural
standpoint and one of the poorest in a nation of subsis-
tence farmers.
Income from temporary work in the mines did not
raise the rural average income by any significant amount.
About 26,000 men, or one for every 2.3 farm families, re-
ceived these wages during 1960.
If each miner had a "take home pay" of 1000 TL
for his tour of duty, this sum distributed over the entire
rural population would raise per capita income to only
540 TL.*
*Average daily wage for temporary mine work was about 9
TL.(6) In addition the mines supplied a man with room,
food, and clothing for his working period. If each man
worked about 5 months (a generous assumption), he would
receive around 1100 TL, of which 1000 TL after taxes and
incidentals might be brought back to the village.
- t r t l ;_A11 -- -- ,I. I 111 , -=
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Permanent state enterprise employees who live in
villages and peasants with other sources of non-farm income
(i.e. forestry) probably represent a group no greater than
20 percent of the temporary mine workers. Even if their
income total equalled that of the part-time miners, the
resulting rural per capita figure would still be about
600 TL, or less than 2/3 the national average.
Again, we must remind the reader that these numbers
represent general magnitudes rather than precise figures.
The relationships are clear, however, and they brook of
only one set of conclusions.
Instead of becoming productive with the onset of
economic modernization in the cities, Zonguldak's agri-
cultural conditions have remained at a subsistence level or
below. The mines and mills do keep people on the land, but
at such low levels of living that migration from the region
might be a more viable alternative.
Income derived from non-agicultural employment is
not invested in improvements to the land. Conditions are
so bad that these sums are needed for consumption. More-
over, ignorance and unwillingness to risk have also con-
tributed to retention of the primitive patterns.
F. Public Programs
Government has not launched a full-scale attack on
agricultural difficulties in Zonguldak. Indeed, present
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programs for the province do more to perpetuate rather than
alleviate the poor conditions. One striking example is in
Eredli kaza where the local agricultural agent told this
writer of his petitions to the government for vegetable
seeds. With these seeds he hoped to start demonstration
farming and convert some of the village leaders away from
cereals. No vegetables were forthcoming from Ankara---
only Iowa corn.
The sole State Waterworks Agency project scheduled
for Zonguldak in the early 1960's covered 153 km2 adjoining
the Zonguldak city area (1.8 percent of the province). It
was primarily geared to reforestation and urban water supply,
and would reduce cultivated land in the area from 5500 to
450 hectares.(7) No proposals for resettlement of dis-
placed villagers were contained in the program; and while
extremely valuable in its objectives, the program did not
provide for improving either the quality or kind of agri-
culture there or elsewhere. Other Waterworks Agency pro-
posals have been made; to irrigate and drain the Bartin
Valley, for example. The governor himself proposed
erosion control for the Filyas river valley. Yet by
1962, no action had been taken to schedule work on either
area nor would capital investments alone be able to change
the expectations and mentality of the peasantry.
Meanwhile, the mines whose hiring policies appear
to contribute directly to rural overcrowding, showed no
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interest in changing the status quo. Conceivably, these
public agencies might try some form of rural educational
program for temporary workers in their barracks during
leisure hours. No such programs have been forthcoming.
So long as government voices little concern over rural
conditions in Zonguldak, little further progress can be
foreseen.
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II. Basic Industry
A growth region will possess major, resource-related
industry which in the long run operates at a profit without
public subsidy. In Zonguldak of 1960, the state-owned coal
mines and steel mill, themselves intimately related, were
the main industries on which economic development of the
province had been based. Public exploitation of the coal
fields had been underway for 30 years. The KarabUk steel
plant had a 25-year history.
A. Coal
Zonguldak province possesses proven bituminous coal
reserves of 1.3 billion tons. The 1960 output of 6.3
million tons was well below what technically could be
produced with such substantial reserves.(8) The mines,
moreover, were operating at a steady financial loss and
had a 12 year cumulative deficit of 564 million TL in
1960.(9) Although Turkey was for the moment self-
sufficient in coal, future requirements, many of them
generated from within Zonguldak Province itself, could not
possibly be met by the present rate and methods of pro-
duction. Indeed, despite the outlay of foreign technical
and financial assistance, production was decreasing rather
than growing. By the spring of 1962, even though in-
dustries then under construction within the region would
clearly face shortages, mine officials had not taken steps
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to solve some of the fundamental problems which retarded
production.
1. Importance of Coal
Coal is perhaps the most important energy source in
contemporary Turkey. Sixty-five percent of the nation's
electric power is thermal; half supplied by bituminous
coal and half by lignite.* Almost all of the railroad
engines are coal powered, since relatively little diesel
equipment has been introduced and, according to AID
officials, most trackage cannot carry a diesel's weight.
The steel, cement, sugar, and fertilizer industries de-
pend on coal and coke. Gas manufactured for Istanbul,
Ankara, and Izmir is a by-product of their coal power
stations. Much Turkish shipping is still coal burning.
Heating for urban homes is handled half by coal and half
by lignite, both of which are rationed for domestic con-
sumption.(ll)**
Before the Republic, almost all of Zonguldak's
production had been shipped elsewhere. In 1960, some 37
percent of the output was consumed within the province
itself; for the Karabik mills, the Catalagzi power station
*Lignite reserves, none of which are in Zonguldak,
have been estimated at over a billion tons and are
not suitable for most industrial or electric power
purposes.(10)
**Village heating is almost exclusively handled by
dung and wood.
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that supplied electricity for much of Northeast Anatolia,
and in the mines* own operations.(12)
Although Turkey has hydroelectric power potential
second only to Norway among European countries, less than
two percent of this potential was utilized by 1960 and
relatively little immediate increase could be expected.(13)
Oil strikes in Turkey had not yet been of major signi-
ficance, and domestic petroleum was being turned to motor
fuel. For the foreseeable future, coal would have to re-
main the chief source of industrial and electric power.
2. Production
Both run-of-the-mine and saleable production dropped
between 1957 and 1960; and the proportion of saleable to
run-of-the-mine fell from 64 percent to 57 percent.
Relevant figures appear in Table VI-4 below.
Turkey's 1959 total production of 0.23 tons per
capita put her close to the bottom of the world's coal
producing nations, second only to India (0.13) tons and
far below neighboring Bulgaria (2.16 tons).(14)
A small amount of by-products are also created at
the mines (coke, tar, bitumen, briquets, benzol) but these
amounted to less than one percent of total production value
in the 1958-60 period.(15)
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Table VI-4
Production of Bituminous Coal, 1955-1960
(in 000 tons)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Run of Mine 5,496 5,888 6,259 6,550 6,515 6,307
Saleable 3,500 3,718 4,011 4,075 3,941 3,653
Source: OECD-AID Mission, "Report on the Coal
Industry", op.cit., Vol. 3, p. 507.
3. Estimated Shortages
Production in 1960 was adequate for existing in-
dustrial and power demands, although domestic use was
rationed. According to the OECD-AID analysis, however,
by 1965 demand for bituminous coal will exceed 5,400,000
tons. This is almost 2,000,000 tons higher than saleable
output in 1960 and 1,000,000 tons above what the coal
company estimates it can possibly produce by 1965.(16)
The largest source of increased demand will come from
Zonguldak itself. In 1964 the new Eregli mill is scheduled
to begin operations. It will require a minimum of 710,000
tons in its first stage, or 20 percent of the 1960 coal
output. Karabuk is undergoing an expansion to double its
capacity by 1964. In 1960, it consumed 760,000 tons of
coal, or 22 percent of the mine production. Requirements
for these mills are not wishful projections, for by 1961
construction at both was well underway. The two would
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themselves consume at least the entire expected increase in
coal output by 1965.(17)
Other demands will come from new cement plants, one
of which was almost completed in Bartin. Turkish industry
in general and domestic power stations, both operating
below installed capacity, might also expand their require-
ments.
The picture was clear. Unless the mines could
markedly increase their output, Turkey would face extreme
coal shortages even though sufficient local reserves were
available. Important sectors of the economy would be
idled, or the nation---already saddled with international
debts---would be forced to import coal from abroad.
4. Basic Problems
Production difficulties have arisen despite infusion
of over $20,000,000 of foreign assistance to the mines
since 1950. Some causes appear to be organizational and
not related to Zonguldak region and its characteristics.
others are directly related to problems of activity re-
lationships within the region.
Organizational factors cited in the OECD-AID study
are the government's pricing policy and the structure of
the company. Government consistently prices coal below
its actual cost; i.e., in 1960, the per ton cost of
coal production was 132.08 TL and the fixed selling price
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was 106.2 TL.(18) According to the OECD-AID analysis,
this practice accounts for some of the operational deficit
and drains away much of the incentive for efficient
management---since mine officials know they do not have to
make a profit.
Secondly, the two subsidiaries operating in the
province, EKI at Zonguldak City and AKI at Kandilli-Ereg1i,
are completely separate as to management and facilities.
Expense might be saved by pooling resources. The above
report also criticizes the substantial welfare benefits--
from housing to free coal--provided to management and
personnel as incentives to remain in the area.
Some adjustments to this situation might indeed
reduce the deficit and increase efficiency.* But none
would deal with the fundamental issue that blocks pro-
duction growth, the surplus of temporary labor. Even if
mine managers were ordered to strive for profits, until
that issue is resolved, production increases would be
hamstrung.
5. Surplus of unskilled workers
Most foreign financial assistance has gone into
mechanization of "back-stopping" operations, namely
processes associated with mining other than the actual
*Although any loss of fringe benefits might cause
professionals to leave the mines.
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extraction. According to AID advisors, the underground
railways, loaders, pumping equipment, etc. are at a very
high level of sophistication.
Yet relatively little equipment is installed in
the actual pit-heads where ancient pick and shovel techniques
of extraction are standard procedure. Here, and as helpers
in the underground service activities, is where most of the
unskilled, part-time peasant workers are employed. So
long as these men and methods are maintained on the job,
coal cannot be extracted faster, more efficiently, or with
less disparity between run-of-the mine and saleable ma-
terial. Turkey's productivity per worker is, as a re-
flection of this system, among the lowest in the world.
Table VI-5
Labor Productivity of Coal for Selected Countries, 1960
Average Output per man shift (metric tons)
Belgium 1.012
France 1.203
W.Germany 1.606
India 0.430
Netherlands 1.101
Poland 1.394
U.K. 1.400
U.S.A. 13.000
TURKEY 0.451
Source: "Report on the Coal Industry,"
op.cit., p. 513.
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Although European rather than American mines might
prove a better basis of comparison, it is interesting to
note that in 1960, the Island Creek Coal company of West
Virginia produced 12.1 million tons of saleable output,
with a total labor force of 4,118 employees.(19) This
one operation accounted for more than three times the
output of Zonguldak, with about one-tenth the number of
workers.*
Hanson describes the pros and cons among the mine
officials for retention of the present system:
"...most of the miners are part-time, seasonal
workers whose homes are in the surrounding villages
and whose main occupation is farming. These workers,
as might be expected, employ traditional methods,
resist innovations, and have very low productivity.
The mining engineers at Zonguldak, being anxious
to introduce modern techniques of coal getting
as quickly as possible, are extremely critical of
the part-time system and express themselves
strongly in favor of building up a stable, permanent
labor force; but some of the administrators and
managers favor the status quo.
They seem partly to be moved by humanitarian con-
siderations, saying that it is bad for the health
and morale of men to spend the whole of their working
lives underground; but they also fear that a full-
time proletariat will be more difficult to manage
than the present labor force. It will develop a
trade union consciousness (and hence presumably
become discontented with the existing officially-
sponsored and extremely tame unions), respond less
positively to the paternalism which at present
characterizes the Zonguldak regime, listen more
readily to 'agitators' and strike more frequently."(21)
*Although the main trouble is at the pit-heads, surplus
labor exists in the back-stopping operations as well.
Of the 30,909 employees listed by EKI on Dec. 31, 1960,
only 10,500 were actual miners and other face workers.
Only 20,000 were involved in underground work of some
kind or repair at the central shops.(20)
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Yet despite the fears of labor unrest, mechanization
is essential if production is to increase. Again, according
to the OECD-AID mining experts' analysis,
"with proper mechanization of all working faces
at bituminous....mining operations, it is esti-
mated that the average miner productivity can be
raised to a minimum of 0.90 tons per man shift
of saleable coal, an increase of 80 percent above
today's performance. "(22)
Mechanization would necessarily mean sharp reduction
in the number of temporary, unskilled workers. Some might
be able to absorb training on the more complex machinery,
but with such an investment the mines could not allow them
to work on a part-time basis.
By 1962, however, the mines had not moved to
mechanize the pit-heads or reduce their staff. In dis-
cussions with officials, this writer was told that no re-
duction was envisaged and that the demand for workers might
level off in the course of time, but would not drop.
6. Pit-props and manganese
If no other non-agricultural options for unskilled
labor existed in Zonguldak, the official reluctance to re-
duce mine labor requirements might be understood on humani-
tarian grounds. Such options did exist however. Their
mobilization was of direct interest to the mines and mills,
but efforts at mobilization on the part of state enterprise
officials were negligible.
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One activity was forestry. Timber for pit-props
in the shafts is one of the largest consumption items at
the mines. In 1959, timber accounted for 18 percent of
AKI's direct operating costs and 10 percent of total costs
excluding administration.(23)
Zonguldak and its neighboring provinces contain
the best of Turkey's forests, including a number of differ-
ent woods suitable for pit-props.* Yet, in 1960 the mines
imported from Finland and other Northern European countries
40 percent of their requirements. This amounted to over
100,000 m3 at a cost of $189 TL/m3.(24) At the official
rate, here was a "leakage" of over $2,000,000 in annual
foreign exchange expenditures.
Presently only 5 percent of the mines' timber comes
from Zonguldak. According to AID advisors and Turkish
foresters (p 345), much more could be accomplished on an
immediate basis to exploit the existing stands. The mines
would save substantial foreign exchange and an expanded
forestry sector could result in employment increases to
absorb some of the unskilled labor surplus.
Forestry was the most obvious example of a poorly-
tapped cpportunity. Another was manganese. Several small,
privately-owned manganese mines near Ere4li produced 7000
tons of manganese ore during 1959. Although an extremely
*Such wood must give off a sound when under stress
to warn of impending cave-ins.
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small amount, this nevertheless represented 20 percent of
domestic production and was largely absorbed in the steel-
making process at Karabutlk.(25) Other manganese deposits
have been found in Zonguldak, but government was neither
aiding the private entrepreneurs to expand their oper-
ations nor exploiting the reserves itself. Here too
was another nearby resource whose exploitation could absorb
some of the coal mines' surplus work force.
7. A Vicious-Cycle
Some form of vicious cycle was functioning within
Zonguldak, impeding the operation of its main economic
activities, holding down emigration, and keeping the
ma4 ority of the population at a low level of living.
A generation before, extraction activity had begun
with a reliance on temporary workers in order to obtain
sufficient labor. This work option retained peasants
within the region and served to attract from outside. As
rural population grew, the part-time work opportunities--
which did not really lead to a rising standard of living--
kept people crowding onto soil of diminishing productivity.
Agriculture in the region suffered accordingly. Moreover,
the mine production system which held this rural population
suffered as well. For it could no longer maintain the
necessary contribution of the mines to national growth.
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Governmental decision-makers did not see the complex
set of interrelationships that had materialized. Agricul-
ture, mining, population, forestry were all intertwined.
in a "regional" problem which the Turkish government
ignored or failed to sense. Some change was needed, but
any change to one of the parts would have repercussions
on the others. Without changes, moreover, the overall
situation for mining and for agriculture could only worsen.
Adverse effects on the economy as a whole would result.
B. Steel
Hanson (26) terms location of the steel plant at
KarabUk "the greatest mistake" of the Etatist period.
None of the raw materials save limestone, the least im-
portant, are in the immediate vicinity. Ore comes by rail
from the Divrigi fields, 600 km to the east. Coal is sent
from the Zonguldak mines, 100 km to the north. Major
markets are 200-300 km away.
The situation has resulted in enormous transport
costs at both ends of the process and has forced the plant
to operate at a constant subsidy.* Subsidy has come via
price fixing. Prices of KarabUk steel are pegged as high
*During its first twenty years, the blast furnace
capacity at Karabik was twice that of the rolling
mill capacity, which meant that much of the plant
went unused. This has now been corrected.(27)
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or higher than imports from Europe and America. Thus, the
declared "profit" of Karabilk on its 1960 sales was
85,000,000 TL, or a 16 percent return on investment.(28)
Since steel imports are controlled and heavy tariffs
levied, the mill is in a "can't lose" position. Its
profits are as unreal as some of the coal mines' losses.
So long as a market for both commodities exists, the price
structure is able to cover--and indeed encourage--pro-
duction inefficiencies.
Defense was the explicit rationale for location of
the mill in a narrow river valley, tributary to the Filyos,
well inland from coal deposits. Since the main markets
during the 1930's were at Istanbul and the west, location
inefficiencies at that time were particularly acute.
However, with the post-war expansion of the armaments
industry at Ankara and Kirikkale and the increased con-
struction in the capital and other interior cities,
Karabuk probably became a more favorable site for this
share of the market than a coastal location. Map VI-1
indicates where Karabik's production was consumed in 1950.
About 40 percent went to Ankara and other inland cities.
This proportion may have been even higher during the
Menderes period when highway improvements put the mill
within three hours of Ankara.
Production itself is varied; rails, heavy and light
structural sections, bars and flats, pipe, with sulphuric
acid and small amounts of superphosphate by-products.
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For the past decade, the plant has accounted for more
than half of Turkey's steel consumption.
Table VI-6
Production and Imports of steel by Year, 1945-1960
(in tons)
Year Total Steel Consumed Imports Karab.Prod. Karab.%
1945 ? ? 47,703 ?
1956 271,000 120,000 150,500 57
1957 227,000 81,000 146,000 64
1958 202,000 65,500 136,000 67
1959 341,000 180,000 161,000 47
1960 216,000
Source: OECD-AID Mission, op.cit., "Report on
the Steel Industry," Vol. 2, p. 414.
The present expansion program is an effort to
further reduce imports. By 1965, yearly capacity of pig
iron and steel production will be doubled to 600,000 and
480,000 tons respectively.(29) When this program is com-
plete, Karabik will still be a small mill with a capacity
-only one-half that of the projected Eretli operation.
Moreover, it will have absolutely no more land on which
to expand.
The main question about projected expansion is,
however, whether or not Zonguldak's coal output will be
sufficient to power the mill's doubled capacity. In the
writer's contacts with Karabik officials there seemed to be
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neither a concern about this matter nor a desire to
pressure for improvements in the mines.
Other problems of regional significance severely
hamper effectiveness of the mill. For example, Karabk
presently imports most of its refractory bricks from
Germany and England at the foreign exchange equivalent
of $500,000 yearly.(30) This comes despite the existence
of a direct rail connection between Karabuik and the
Filyos refractory brick plant. Filyos, which had been
designed with insufficient capacity, meets only 30 per-
cent of the mill's annual requirements. Presently-
scheduled expansion at Filyos, moreover, will be com-
pleted too late to supply bricks either for the new
Karablk furnaces or the new mill at Eregli. According
to brick-plant authorities, neither of the two mills
pressed for stepped-up domestic production before they
placed foreign orders.
Raw material for fire-brick abounds in the region,
and the commodity has a low value in relation to bulk.
Importation from abroad seems particularly strange in light
of the enormous public industry expansion unsuited to
Turkey's economy that occurred during the 1950-60 period.
Yet the government evidently did not consider strengthened
linkages between these two regional activities a matter of
significant priority.
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An even more serious difficulty is the surplus of
labor at the steel plant. Some 8,000 people were employed
at Karabik in 1960, and the SIE study remarked on the
unusually low annual production of steel per employee.(31)
Unlike the mines, the great bulk of Karabuk's staff possess
skills, have some degree of literacy, and are permanent
workers. Yet the surplus, particularly on the super-
visory level, appeared to be acute here as well.
In one sense, the problem at Karabuk brooks of an
easier solution. Some of the excess labor force can be
absorbed under the expansion program. Some can move to
Eregli, although indications are that management at that
mill intends to recruit and train its own staff.* An
additional number might be steered to the secondary
metals-processing industry which has begun to grow up in
Karabuk outside of the government mill. Yet here a most
*The following quotation is from an AID memorandum
of Jan. 9, 1962.
"We conducted a labor-management seminar at Karabk...
John Hagan, President of Koppers...was one of our
guest lecturers....Most of the questions asked him by
the labor and management participants related to the
problem of adequate job opportunities in the steel
industry. Specifically, most of them wanted to know
how many of them could be employed at Eregli. Mr.
Hagan emphasized the point that the new mill would be
modern in every respect and if any people were hired
from Karabuk they would have to be the best people
available. Mr. Hagan did not encourage them to ex-
pect the Eregli mill to solve the problem of the
excess labor force at Karabuk."
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unusual situation has arisen. For the government plant,
despite its excess of personnel, has adopted an attitude
of hostility to these secondary fabricators---even though
they produce complementary rather than competing products.
(See p. 342 )
Thus, although the Karabuk mill shows a paper profit,
its difficulties are as serious as those in the Zonguldak
mines. Neither can be considered a profitable basic
industry, although both are intimately related to the
region's resources and both are of vital importance to the
national economy. Through stimulation of related economic
activities within the region, each of the two industries,
Zonguldak itself, and the Turkish economy might stand to
reap substantial benefits. By 1962, however, no compre-
hensive efforts were being made in that direction.
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MAP Vi-1
FLOW OF IRON AND STEEL FROM KARABUK - 1950
Soxjree E,.D "Thjne kV'on IaSa StC-( T-%i. o M
'1!5 , 18Z.
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III. Industrial Complexes
A growth region, in which basic industry has been
established, will undergo development of industrial com-
plexes related in some fashion to the original activities.
These industries may be classified into the following types:
A. Additional firms or plants to exploit
the basic resources.
B. Firms to provide inputs for the basic
industries.
C. Firms to further process the outputs or
by-products of the basic industries.
D. Firms to exploit other regional resources
which can now be brought into the produc-
tive cycle by virtue of national demand,
the infra-structure installed to service
the major plants, presence of trained labor,
etc.
E. Firms to provide consumer products for
regional or other markets.
Industries representing each of these categories may
be found in Zonguldak.
A. Additional Basic Industry---Eregli Steel
Turkey's second steel mill was under construction
in 1961 with operations scheduled to begin in 1964. Since
the plant was not yet producing, we can focus attention on
regional considerations which bear on its planned develop-
ment.
Feasibility was determined in 1959 by an ICA-
sponsored study prepared by Koppers Co. of Pittsburgh.
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Koppers noted Turkey's growing self-sufficiency in rails
and bars through the Karabuk operation and its programmed
expansion, but continued dependence on high-cost imports for
sheet products. Demand for sheet steel came from the
armaments industry in Central Anatolia, the railroads,
other state enterprises, the canning industry, and a growing
number of metals processing firms largely located in
Marmara and Izmir.(32)
All the raw materials for a major expansion of steel
production were available in Turkey, the report continued;
ore at the Divrigi fields in the east as well as untouched
deposits on the Aegean and near Iskenderun, coal with over
one billion tons of proven reserves at Zonguldak. Limestone
was ubiquitous.
The Koppers study estimated that by 1975 demand
could be high enough for Turkey to absorb a domestic indus-
try producing 1,600,000 tons of steel; 600,000 at Karablk
and 1,000,000 from a second and complementary mill.
Karabuk would continue with rails, bars, and structurals;
while the second plant would handle only sheet. Competition
would thus be avoided.
Both the Turkish government and the American authori-
ties accepted the Koppers recommendations. A special mixed
corporation was formed including the Turkish government,
Turkish private investors, Koppers itself (who would super-
vise design and construction) and other foreign investors.
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The U. S. Development Loan Fund advanced $139,000,000.
The second steel mill was to be the largest single indus-
trial project ever attempted in Turkey.
1. Location
Koppers studied a number of alternative locations,
including some on the West coast near ore deposits, but
concluded that Eregli was most advantageous. It was close
to the coal and on an excellent port site which could re-
ceive machinery and ore and shop finished products to the
west coast. Moreover, the last 30 km of rail line con-
necting Eregli with the main Zonguldak-Ankara system was
scheduled for early completion. This line would be
available for coal transport,* receipt of ore from Divrili,
and shipment of finished products to Ankara and other in-
terior cities whose plate market was expanding. The rail-
road would also serve to establish an important link between
the Karabik and Eregli operations. For the plan included
shipment of over 100,000 tons of steel ingots annually
from Eregli to Karabak for further finishing into bars to
supplement the latter's production. Development at Erebli
was predicated upon existence of this through rail line. (33)
*Mill officials estimated that only part of the coal
requirements could be met by the neighboring Kandilli
fields--at least in the immediate future--and that the
remainder would be found in deposits between Kandilli
and Zonguldak City.
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The project would be constructed in three stages,
with the first of 480,000 tons capacity. Full capacity
would be attained by 1975. At its peak the plant might
employ directly some 8,000 workers. According to Bolge
Planlama estimates, within 15 years this small town of
under 10,000 people would become a city well over 50,000.
2. Transport
Even if sufficient coal were available to allow
the plant to begin operations in 1964, Eregli mill could
not function as planned. For the Turkish government
vetoed completion of the rail line after making a decision
to build the plant. Its estimated cost of 140,000,000 TL
(about $15,000,000) was considered too high.*(34)
Lack of a through rail connection to the interior
would have the following effects on receipt of raw ma-
terials and shipment of finished products.
a. Most coal will have to be shipped by boat from
Zonguldak, whose port facilities are already overloaded
and cannot be expanded due to the configuration of the
harbor.
*The writer has not been able to ascertain whether the
Menderes or post-Menderes government vetoed the plan.
Certainly the large expense was known well before the
decision to build Eregli mill. The line had been
studied for 30 years and had not been completed earlier
because of its cost.
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b. Ore shipments from the Divridi mines, which will
comprise 40 percent of the first stage annual requirements,
will now be given double handling; shipment by rail to
Samsun, then transfer to boats for Eretli. With the rail
line, shipments could be made on the same direct basis to
Eregli as to Karabuk and the low utilization of Turkish
rolling-stock increased.
c. The ingots can not be sent to Karab ik for the
programmed processing into bars. Boats might be used in a
two-stage transfer process to the rail line at Zonguldak or
Filyos; but neither port has handling facilities and Filyos
is closed for half of the year. Adjustments might be made
to the latter with new facilities, but at what cost?
d. Interior markets---the armaments industry,
railroad shops and other state enterprises, Ankara and
other cities--are essentially closed to the plant. The
only alternatives open are a major investment in harbor
improvements at Filyos for double shipment by boat and rail,
or shipment of interior-bound goods first to Istanbul by
boat and then back-haul by rail to the interior.
None of these alternatives had been studied by the
transport agencies and, to this writer's knowledge, no
comparative cost estimates were made before the railroad
was abandoned.
If highway connections between Eregli and the in-
terior were adequate, some of the problems might be
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alleviated by trucking. Good roads would also be desirable
if the town of Erelli were to have any opportunity for
growth as an industrial center. But these connections
were completely inadequate for heavy-duty service.
Indeed, the only first-class road in the province was the
Karabuk-border connector. (Map V-3)
Each road from Eredli received the lowest "degree
of satisfaction" ranking given by the highway department
to all-weather facilities.(35) Although stabilized, they
are a succession of hair-pin curves with narrow beds.
Many bridges are wooden and unable to take heavy loads.
The Devrek-Karabuk line over which ingots would have to
travel is an unstabilized jeep track closed in wet weather.
These roads could, of course, be up-graded by the
opening date of the mill. Yet priorities assigned by
Karayollari for their up-grading were, through the spring
of 1962, well below the critical category.
Karayollari assigned long-range improvement priori-
ties to about 400 sections in the national road system.(36)
Positions of the four links that affected Eregli's commu-
nication with the interior were as follows.
Improvement
Section Present Surface kms Priority
Akcakoca-Erelli low-quality stabilized 41 232
Eregli-Devrek low-quality stabilized 65 48
Devrek-Karabk unstabilized 60 107
Devrek-Ankara Hwy low-quality stabilized 73 220
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A major harbor expansion was underway at Erekli to
make its port suitable for the steel industry. Neverthe-
less, this was only one essential phase of the transport
picture. The remainder had been neglected. As matters
stood in 1962, Eredli mill might be ready to operate by
the target date but its operations and impact on the
Turkish economy would be severely hampered.
4. Other difficulties
At the very outset of the steel mill program,
officials knew that some sweeping changes would occur
to this small coal port of 9,000 people. By opening date
in 1964, population might rise as high as 25,000. Housing
and utilities would be needed. Services for the plant
and its personnel were required, and the possibility of
eventual secondary industry about the mill was not unre-
alistic.
The plant did estimate its housing requirements,
but land was not purchased until a year after the mill
site itself, by which time prices had doubled. Iller
Bank, the national agency responsible for town planning,
assigned only one staff member to prepare a land use and
facilities program for Eregli which, by the spring of 1962,
after thousands of construction workers had descended on
the site, had not yet reached the sketch stage. Eregli's
water supply and other municipal services were inadequate
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for its existing population. Sufficient water for both
industry and town existed only several kilometers.from the
municipal boundaries, yet a State Waterworks Agency program
to bring this water to Eregli came under study only in the
spring of 1962. At one point in the search for water,
steel mill officials were prepared to flood out the only
contiguous area topographically suitable for a concentration
of secondary industry.*
In the face of these mounting pressures, both the
Provincial Governor and the Kaymakam of Eregli were making
frequent trips to Ankara. With little success, they per-
sonally tried to persuade various sector agencies to
release funds for schools, water lines, health facilities,
and even a house of prostitution ("to keep our own girls
from being attacked", the Kaymakam said to this writer.)
B. Inputs for Basic Industry
1. Brick-making at Filyos
Some 90 km north of Karabik, linked with a direct
rail line, is Sumer Bank's refractory brick operation at
Filyos. The plant was constructed in 1948 and produces about
28,000 tons annually with a labor force over 500. Only two
other refractory operations exist in Turkey, both private
*This idea was dropped when other possibilities were
discovered. The company had made no plans, however,
to encourage secondary industry.
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and in Istanbul, with a combined output of 4,000 tons per
year. Thus, the Filyos plant is the main domestic pro-
ducer of furnace linings.(37)
Filyos is a particularly good location. Fire-clay,
about 60 percent of the raw material, is found in coal
measures which exist only in Zonguldak. Binder clay,
most of the remaining ingredients, comes by 100-200 ton
coastal vessels from deposits near Istanbul. Filyos is
very well-related to the main present consumer, Karabuk,
and to the future Eregli operation.
Filyos produces only "acidic" or neutral fire brick
suitable for outer wall furnace linings. It does not pro-
duce the magnesite type required for interior linings of
open hearth furnaces, although ingredients for magnesite
and chromite types abound in Turkey and can easily be
shipped to Filyos. An expansion program, now scheduled
for completion in 1964, will be geared to magnesite pro-
duction and will increase total plant capacity by 50
percent.
The entire present output is consumed, one-fifth by
Karabtlk.* Capacity at Filyos has been continually below
*The remainder goes to the armaments industry in Ankara,
the cement, glass, sugar, railroad and other public
enterprises, plus about 5000 tons to the private sector.
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demand, forcing Karabuk to import most of its acidic brick
requirements as well as magnesite. Present planning was
not coordinated with expansion at Karabftk or the Eregli
program. Indeed, contacts had not been made between
Sumer Bank and Eregli officials to ascertain whether
Filyos could meet any of the initial 30,000 tons of fire
brick needs. Import orders for at least part of this
quantity had been placed by the end of 1962.
Quality control has been another problem to plague
the Filyos plant. According to its chief engineer:
"In the judgement of the operators at Karabulk,
the higher cost they must pay for importing
fire brick is more than offset by the loss of
operating time that would result if the blast
furnace had to be closed down for repairs due
to the unsatisfactory quality of the fire brick
used."(38)
We have no way of judging how serious this matter of
quality control might be. The fact remains that Turkey
has all the raw materials to meet its refractory brick
needs and the nucleus of a production process within the
region where the main consumers are located. The nation
has many sources of technical and financial assistance.
Were some priority attached to making effective use of
related activities in Zonguldak, both the capacity and the
quality problems of brick-making at Filyos might have a
chance of solution.
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2. Leather-working
We have little information on the small leather-
working shops in Caycuma and Devrek which fabricate boots
and gloves for workers in the mines and the steel mill.
This is a source of some employment for these two communi-
ties, where skills in the craft have developed. With an
effort at consolidation of the cottage-workers, a market
even wider than the region might be cultivated. Certainly
the Eregli mill presented an opportunity for expansion of
the operations. However, no government or private effort'
was underway to explore prospects for improvement or future
growth.
C. Processing of Outputs or By-Products of Basic
Industries
1. Agglomeration at Karabuk
The most striking example of Zonguldak's potential
significance for secondary processers has been the
agglomeration of metal-working operations at Karablk. One
of Etatism's basic tenets was that the state-owned factories
would become nuclei for further private investment and thus
lead to an industrialization of the interior exceeding
government's initial pump-priming efforts.
Due to its transport disadvantages, KarabUlk might
have difficulty in becoming a popular site for private
metals fabricators unable to absorb the distance costs to
the market. Indeed, until 1950, no such agglomeration about
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the mill occurred.
Yet over the course of 20 years, iron and steel-
making skills were transmitted to many workers in the town.
KarabUk grew to possess certain advantages from the stand-
point of a trained labor force which did not exist elsewhere.
Furthermore, the post-1950 highway link brought
Karabik within three hours of Ankara where a construction
boom set up demands for structural steel members, rein-
forcing rods, ornamental ironwork and other similar
products. Smaller interior cities had similar requirements.
Since few construction techniques and materials were
standardized, the sizes and shapes of metalwork in each
new building had to be individually fabricated.
Thus, entrepreneurs--some of whom were former steel
mill employees--appeared in Karabk. They bought directly
from the plant and used local labor to finish metals for
construction works in the interior. Their foundries and
rolling mills are small. None seems to employ more than
50 workers, and the 20-odd firms contain perhaps 3-400
people. Equipment is rudimentary.* Working conditions
are primitive and safety precautions minimal.
*Although some brand new English and German machinery
was in evidence.
342.
The writer discovered much idle machinery in these
plants and saw many trucks leaving with only half-loads
or less to make Ankara deliveries. Owners admit their
inability to diagnose or stimulate an effective market
and complain that they receive no technical or marketing
assistance from the government. Without such assistance,
long run survival will be difficult.
Inefficient though these operations may be, they
do represent a level of skill and entrepreneurial interest
which Turkey can ill-afford to lose. They also represent
a chance to make Karabuk a more viable industrial community
(with shared transport and other services as well as
additional employment opportunities) than if production
were confined to the steel plant alone. They do not com-
pete with the main mill, and they need help to continue or
consolidate.
According to the General Director of Karabik, however,
these operations are a nuisance. He told this writer that
Karabuk would soon be producing similar items* and that it
was his goal to wipe out the smaller fabricators in the
course of time. He declined to comment further on his
motivies.
*The official schedule of Karabuk production does not
call for speciality items such as the private plants
fabricate.
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In light of earlier Etatist policies and Zonguldak's
employment problem, this attitude carries something of the
incredible.
Whatever the motivation, it is somewhat ironic to
witness a situation in Karabik comparable to many one-
industry towns of the Western World. Friedmann, for
example, comments on such a pattern for private industry
within the TVA region of the United States.
"What is even more disheartening is the fact
that the location of a single textile mill or
garment plant may itself spell the virtual end of
further industrial development in a community.
The existing plant has an interest in maintaining
its near complete monopoly over the local labor
market and may therefore endeavor to oppose the
establishment of new plants which appear to
threaten its dominant and controlling position."(39)
And Harris(40) cites cases in India where govern-
ment plants in new towns prevented other activities from
locating nearby.
Neither the private industries of the TVA region
nor the public Indian plants had been developed with an
express charge to assist other enterprises in their
communities. This was, however, the charge to public
enterprise under Ataturk. That it has been ignored, at
least in Karabuk, bodes ill for future viability of this
region as a growth area.
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2. The Bartin Cement Plant
The single industry to process by-products was
not yet in operation by 1962. Examination of this cement
plant at Bartin, however, provides another opportunity to
study mobilization of activities related to the basic
industries.
Plans were drawn for this plant about 1956.
Construction activity during the last decade had markedly
increased demands for basic materials, and none of the
Black Sea port cities had direct access to a cement plant.
Located at an all-weather port in the building materials
center of the area, the Bartin plant seemed admirably
suited for its purpose. It would provide jobs for about
350 workers and give an important lift to the dying
coastal shipping industry.
The Eregli mill and Karabuk's expansion program would
be major customers within the region for its output. Total
investment for the operation was equivalent to about
$9,000,000 in 1960.(41)
Bartin differed in one major respect from Turkey's
15 other cement factories.* Main component of its raw
material inputs would be slag from the Karabk mill.
Karabdk slag had been hitherto completely waste material,
*In its programmed capacity of 950 tons per day, the
Bartin plant would rank eighth in size.(42)
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and earlier proposals for a cement plant at the mill never
materialized. Thus the Bartin operation would now put this
material to use and would represent another activity linked
to pre-existing investments. Slag would form 30 percent
of initial raw material inputs and increase to 70 percent.
A series of construction delays prevented completion
untillate 1962 (well after construction at Eregli had begun).
The last bottleneck had been failure of the electric power
agency to schedule and implement connection of a tap line
from the power grid 40 km away. Yet even when this con-
nection was finished, the plant would not go into operation.
For in six years no arrangements had been made to transport
the slag from Karabuk to Bartin.
The two towns have no rail connection, and the
Karabk-Filyos line is 40 km from Bartin. The road be-
tween Karabik and Bartin is tortuous, narrow, and of poor-
quality compaction for its entire 90 km length. In 1961,
it stood 79th on the highway department's list for im-
provement priorities.(43) Were the slag to be shipped
by truck, plant requirements would call for from 15 to 50
truckloads per day.
Cement plant officials continued to state they would
use Karabik slag, but the Karabuk General Director told
this writer that he would refuse to ship the material until
either a rail-line or a good road were built.
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Thus the cement people faced alternatives of not
going into production, waiting until Eregli steel produced
slag (at least 3 years), seeking a new source of raw ma-
terial (which they had not done), or trying to expedite
a transport link with Karabuk (which meant years of further
delay).
Had such a link been examined from the outset,
officials could have also studied the suitability of Bartin's
all-weather facility to substitute for Filyos as Karabdk's
port (thereby providing some back-haul for the slag trans-
port vehicles). Indeed, with easy transport available to
the coal fields and the interior,* Bartin might have proven
a better location for the second steel mill than Eretli.
As the writer discussed these multi-purpose aspects
of the problem with government officials, it appeared that
none had been considered. The Bartin cement plant was a
valuable asset to Zonguldak, but here too an important
economic activity was hamstrung by failure to establish
required links to other enterprises within the region.
D. Mobilization of Other Resources---Forestry
Almost 60 percent of Zonguldak province is covered
with forests. Installation of the rail line and power
facilities to serve the basic coal and steel industries
*Estimated cost of a rail connection to Bartin from the
main line was, according to railroad department officials,
less than a third that of the Eregli-Zonguldak connection.
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enabled forest exploitation on a commercial basis to begin
late in the 1930's. All forestry work is controlled and
conducted by a General Directorate of the Ministry of
Agriculture. Two saw mills are in operation (at Devrek and
Ulupinar) with a worker total of about 750. Perhaps
2-3,000 other people have temporary or permanent employ-
ment in some phase of lumbering.
In 1960, Zonguldak produced 13 percent of Turkey's
forest products(44) as shown in the Table below.
Lumbering, therefore, ranks as the third major modern
economic activity within the region.
Table VI-7
Forestry production in Zonguldak, 1960
quantity in m3 value in TL
logs 186,463 38,224,915
pit-props 9,164 1,374,600
industrial wood 2,107 282,338
telephone poles 184 38,640
Firewood 2,912,777quintals 1,835,049
Other 7,210quintals 21,630
41,777,172
Source: Ozen Dalli, "Zonguldak Sanayii",
Unpublished mss, Bolge Planlama,
Ankara, 1962. pp.4 -5 .
Most of Turkey's forests have been severely depleted
by peasants who seize the wood for fuel and allow their
goats to strip young trees of bark and leaves. Not so in
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Zonguldak and its neighboring provinces, where the
Forestry Directorate has instituted effective police con-
trols. Here, however, in its zeal to "conserve" a natural
resource, the Directorate seems to have cut too little
from the stands and is thereby endangering productivity.
A 1962 analysis of the Filyos river watershed by
AID's forestry advisor states:
"Much of the stand is mature or over-mature,
consisting of a relatively high percentage of
large diameter and/or variously defective trees
which must be harvested in the next few years to
allow maximum growth of the excellent 'crop' trees
in the stand...This initial heavy improvement
cutting is imperative if the forests are to be
brought under optimum management in as short a
time as possible, and it requires an outlet for
a very large quantity of the lesser quality wood
as well as for the better, large-diameter saw
logs, veneer logs, and poles."(45)
Earlier we noted how an increase in pit-prop pro-
duction from the region could substitute for imports at
the mines. A second immediate development possibility is
construction of a kraft-paper plant. AID advisors,
Turkish foresters, and private firms had been pressing
for such a mill since at least 1955--the height of in-
dustrial expansion during the Menderes period. Arthur D.
Little, Inc., made a favorable feasibility study late in
the decade. Sumer Bank drew up a tentative proposal, and
both foreign and Turkish private capital have evidenced
interest. Such a mill, using pulpwood readily available
from the region, could be both a source of employment and
an extremely important addition to the economy.
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The large state paper factory at Izmit presently
produces two-thirds of Turkey's needs for newsprint,
wrapping paper and cardboard. Seven small plants in Marmara
manufacture wrapping paper. But all of the other require-
ments, including kraft paper to package the products of the
cement, sugar, and fertilizer industries are met from im-
ports.(46) According to the AID advisor:
"A pulp and paper mill of 150 tons daily capacity
would require about 300 tons of pulpwood per day,
or a total of 100,000 tons per year. Considering
only the present high-productive forest area of
about 350,000 hectares... the proposed.. .require-
ment falls safely within even the ultra-conservative
annual growth of only 1 cubic meter per hectare on
coniferous stands, disregarding the heavy improve-
ment cutting and the use of a percentage of hard-
wood in the pulping mixture.
Even a 250 ton mill could operate on the current
harvest of the best productive forest land in
the Filyos watershed, leaving ample for other in-
dustries and domestic uses such as fuelwood.
And as net forest growth inevitably will increase
with removal of competing mature or defective
trees, the future picture looms even brighter
for the pulp and paper industry than it does at
present."(47)
Here is another source of foreign exchange "leakage"
which could be blocked by domestic production. Estimated
capital requirements equivalent to $20,000,000(48) were
little more than the amount tied up in the three unnecessary
sugar plants unfinished by 1960. (Chapter Four)
Forestry officials have considered the town of Filyos
ideally suited as a site for such a plant:
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"It combines an adequate land area, good climate,
plenty of water, adequate available electric
power, water transport of the product, and an
existing or proposed road system adequate to
transport the raw material to the mill by truck
and railroad.(49)
Although Filyos already has some of the necessary
external economies, Bartin--were it possessed with the
effective interior connection--might prove even better.
For here would be an all-weather port also proximate to
the forests and a cement plant customer for the paper
enterprise.
Regardless of where is most suitable within the
region, however, the fact remains that Zonguldak's
forests lend themselves to greater exploitation with a
paper plant. By spring of 1962, little progress had been
made on this aspect of resource mobilization.
E. Consumer-oriented industries.
A number of small, privately-owned firms have
materialized in Zonguldak--mainly after 1950--and are
chiefly concentrated in Bartin.*
Bartin's brick and tile plants already supply much
of Zonguldak's building materials requirements. They are
*In 1962 the State planning Organization began a study
of why entrepreneurs had developed in Bartin rather
than other towns within the region.
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among the few such operations on the Black Sea west of
Ordu and thus export, via 100 ton coasters, to construction
projects at Sinop, Samsun and other coastal cities.
Development of the new Eregli mill plus associated housing
can provide a larger regional market for the plants.
The canneries in Bartin and Erelli send all of
their produce to Istanbul, Ankara and the other large
consumption centers. Cost to the consumer is quite high,
due to the use of imported tin plate* and the high cost
of obtaining produce. However, once domestically-fabricated
Erekli tin plate comes on the market, this aspect of
production cost may be reduced. The canneries stand to
benefit by their location in the region if they survive
long enough to use Eregli plate; for all three had large
inventories and idle capacities.
Woodworking enterprises, the bus and truck body
shops at Devrek, the boat-building at Bartin, and the
handicrafters at Amasra--all give evidence that some
individuals have developed skills to fabricate forestry
products for sale.
Largest of all these enterprises is probably the
modern brick plant at Bartin with 100 workers. Most of
the others have rudimentary equipment and appear to survive
only by paying the lowest of wages. Average daily wage at
*Up to 80 percent of production cost, according to
the owners.
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the canneries, for example was 3.50 TL*---compared with
9.00 TL for temporary miners and 23 TL for skilled per-
sonnel at Karabik.(50) Unemployment is so severe that
even at these rates the plants have no shortage of help.
Owners are frank to admit their inability to find
ways of expanding markets or improving efficiency. They
have bitterly complained to this writer about lack of ad-
vice and assistance from the National Chamber of Commerce
and the Ministry of Industry, each of which has repre-
sentatives within the province.** They claim hostility
on the part of the coal company and steel mill; and while
the owners are aware of defects in their operations, at
the same tiae they feel unable to alter the situation by
their own efforts.
Perhaps the industrialists' complaints are exagger-
ated. We have no quantifiable information on their pro-
duction, methods of financing, etc., and thereby no means
of judgment. Yet the facts of underutilized potential
are apparent. There is some entrepreneurial spirit, but
little entrepreneurial know-how. Neither under the
Menderes administration nor in the period immediately fol-
lowing was any public program specifically directed at
aiding this nucleus of private development, which had
followed on the government-directed industrial growth.
*In U.S. money about 40 cents
**These representatives have in turn pleaded to the writer
a lack of support from their parent Ankara agencies.
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IV. Education and Infra-structure
A growth region will possess a broad stock of
educational facilities and services adapted to providing
personnel with skills for its expanding economy. Other
essential elements of infra-structure within the region
will at least be adequate to sustain rather than retard
future growth.
A. Education in Zonguldak
Despite the heavy public investment in mining and
industry for Zonguldak over a 30-year period, the region's
stock of educational facilities and its complement of
teachers are relatively poor. In this respect, Zonguldak
is no better (and in some aspects poorer) than the
national average. Witness the literacy figures for 1955
in Table VI-6 below.
Table VI-8
Literacy in Zonguldak and the Nation, 1955
Pct. male literates
over 6 years of age Pct. female
Turkey 56 25
Zonguldak 57 20
Source: 1955 Mufus Sayimi, op.cit., p. 138.
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The province has a male literacy rate comparable with
the national average and a female rate below the mean. In
1955, average urban literacy (i.e. in places over 10,000 for
the nation as a whole) was 64 percent. The comparable
Zonguldak figure was 64.5 percent.(51)
Although the province held Turkey's fourth largest
concentration of industrial workers, nineteen other vilayets
in 1955 showed higher proportions of literacy. Six prov-
inces which possessed cities over 50,000 had higher literacy
rates. (52)
The small mining technicians school in Zonguldak city
was the only specialized institution which could prepare
people for industrial trades above the middle school level,
while the province had only two vocational schools for
younger pupils. Both Karabuk and Zonguldak had lisees.
No plans for new specialized facilities were under con-
sideration by the Ministry of Education in 1962, except a
teachers' training school to be built in Zonguldak city
during 1964. (53)
Pupil enrollments and student-teacher ratios for
various facilities appear below.
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Table VI-9
Enrollments in Zonguldak, 1960
National
School type enrollment students/teacher Average St./T
elementary 49,292 53 50
middle 3,601 23 23
lisee 909 31 19
Source: Bolge Planlama Data from Ministry
of Education.
Only a relatively small proporation of elementary
enrollment reaches advanced schools; and the pupil-teacher
ratios in Zonguldak seem to be higher in elementary and
lisee than the national mean.
While one can conclude from these figures that edu-
cation in Zonguldak is the same or not much worse than
Turkey's average, the region's great importance as an
industrial and mining center warrants a greater-than-
average effort in education. On-the-job training provided
for workers in state enterprises cannot be minimized---but
one of the blocks to effective growth within the region
may well be this lack in the amount and diversification of
educational facilities.
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B. Infra-structure
Much of this discussion has dealt with the role of
infra-structure in both expediting and preventing the
region's development. We have seen how the railroad and
power grid enabled exploitation of the forests in addition
to serving the basic coal and steel industries. The super-
highway from Karabdik to Ankara provided an opportunity for
agglomeration at the steel mill. Yet at the same time
serious blockages have been unidentified as such by the
responsible authorities; i.e. the failure to link Eregli
steel mill with its interior markets, and the failure to
tie Bartin with the supply source for the cement plant.
Port expansion at Eregli and Bartin gives each of
these towns an opportunity for further development. Yet
the physical restrictions of Zonguldak port prevents this
overloaded facility from meeting new demands.
Indeed the overall physical constraints on Zonguldak
city may provide a major obstacle to effective readjustment
of the mining program.
Zonguldak is in a narrow valley bordered by 500 meter
high mountains. All the level, buildable area within the
city proper has been consumed during the past 30 years.
There is literally no more place to construct housing and
institutions except at slopes exceeding 25-30O. Moreover,
bearing capacity of these areas has been weakened by
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subterranean coal shafts. Numerous structures have al-
ready settled because their ground supports could not carry
the weight. Kozlu and Kilimli suburbs are slightly, but
not significantly, better situated.
The coal company, which controls most of the land,
responded to the problem by refusing to grant building
permits to private individuals. Yet population increased
by 30,000 during the 1950-60 decade, and some 8,000 illegal
houses have been erected on precarious sites. The coal
company itself lacks land for new installations and housing,
and the outskirts of Zonguldak are in great danger of
crumbling in upon themselves.
Should the mines increase their output and do so by
an intensive mechanization program, a larger number of
permanent workers with families will have to be accommo-
dated. Any solution to the problem of increased building
areas must now be studied, therefore, in a context far
larger than Zonguldak-Kozlu-Kilimli alone. By spring
1962, the coal company had not initiated such a study.
Although the DSI program will provide Zonguldak
city with its needed increase in water supply, every other
community has a water shortage for existing population and
activities. The shortage exists despite good rainfall and
the presence of many rivers and streams. No community has
a sanitary sewage system, or plans for one, and only
Zonguldak city possesses storm drainage mains.
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Shortages within a developing nation can be expected.
Some amount of improvisation is perforce required. Yet
over the course of 10 expansionary years, the Turkish
government installed highways, power lines, waterworks,
schools, etc., throughout the country at a rapid rate. In
its zeal to spread development, the government somewhere
failed to take account of critical problems and requirements
in an area which offered one of the greatest potentials for
development to take hold. Although some of the main infra-
structure elements within the province allow for expanded
activity, gaps elsewhere restrict existing activities and
prevent others from beginning operations.
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V. Incomes and Services
A growth region will evidence generally rising
levels of income which will support an increasing amount
of service activity and employment.
We have noted earlier that per capita income for the
rural majority, about 75 percent of Zonguldak's population,
was well below Turkey's rural average, even though many of
these peasants were employed in the state enterprises.
Incomes from permanent non-agricultural activity were
also not significantly high. The wage scale in private
manufacturing plants, as evidenced by the 3.50 TL daily
average in canneries, was generally below that of the
temporary mine workers' 9.00 TL per day. According to
Filyos officials, the brick plant workers averaged 11-14 TL
per day.(54)
Permanent workers at the mines and mills had sub-
stantially higher incomes of over 20 TL per day. Fringe
benefits of housing, food, clothing, and other commodities
plus health and life insurance added to these figures.
Plant managers and other executives received salaries
roughly comparable with public officials at Ankara, which
were further increased by fringe benefits. Life for this
permanent personnel appeared quite comfortable. Without any
further information in depth, however, it would seem that
overall incomes in the province--for both agricultural and
non-agricultural employment--were quite low.
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Our only means of income comparison with the rest
of Turkey is again via income tax returns. These taxes are
levied on all salaried workers and self-employed individuals
in both public and private sectors outside of agriculture.
In 1957, income tax payments from Zonguldak accounted for
2.0 percent of Turkey's total. This was roughly proportional
to the province's share of total Turkish population. Yet
by 1959, Zonguldak's tax contribution declined to only 1.6
percent of national revenues.(55) The reader will remember
that this was a period when the three national centers,
and Istanbul in particular, were increasing in proportion
of income tax payments.
Thus, Zonguldak appeared to be declining in relative
prosperity while the main centers were further solidifying
their positions as major concentrations of national wealth.
Zonguldak, despite its economic contributions and impor-
tance, was sinking back towards peripheral status.
This diagnosis is further reflected in the character
of service activity in Zonguldak. Over 80 percent of the
province's tax returns came from salaried workers--mainly
representing state enterprise employees. Only 5-7 percent
came from the category "trade and commerce", compared to
a nation-wide proportion of 23 percent between 1957 and
1959.(56)
The following table indicates relative proportions
of service employment among the labor force of Zonguldak and
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Turkey for the 1935-55 period. Census figures in such
detail may be extremely misleading due to compilation in-
accuracies, and the reader is again urged to study relative,
rather than absolute, magnitudes.
Table VI-10
Proportion of Service Employment in the Labor Force of
Zonguldak and Turkey, 1935-55
In Percent
Category 1935 1945 1955
Zong. Tur. Zong. Tur. Zong. Tur.
Commerce 1.8 2.8 2.2 3.7 1.4 2.7
Transport 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.5
Pub.Admin. and 2.1 5.2 5.4 9.2 2.5 4.3
Services
Total 5.9 9.5 9.8 13.7 4.3 8.5
Source: Bolge Planlama Data from Central
Statistical office, Censuses of
1935, 1945, 1955.
A low proportion of service employment is indicated
throughout for Zonguldak. Moreover this proportion appears
to be decreasing relative to other forms of activity.
Workers in these categories increased by 65 percent for
Turkey as a whole over this period, while the growth in
Zonguldak was only 32 percent.(57)
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Most of the investments to stimulate Zonguldak's
economic contribution were made after 1935; yet the pro-
portion of service employment has declined in the course of
development.
This picture is not altogether surprising. Major
economic enterprises of the province are not prosperous
and are beset with severe problems. Underemployment is so
high and average level of expectation so low that people
remain in Zonguldak to work at minimal wages. The survival
of private industrial activity may also be attributed to
presence of a large labor force willing to take little
remuneration. With this as a basic pattern, few of the
services called for in higher levels of growth can be
supported. The state enterprises "take care" of their own
permanent staffs, while the rest of the province is left
at subsistence status or worse.
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VI. An Atmosphere for Development: The Lesson of Zonguldak
When the six aforementioned growth region charac-
teristics are present and both entrepreneurs and public
officials exhibit attitudes favorable to growth and
change, then an area may be said to possess an "atmosphere"
that generates development. On balance, the picture in
Zonguldak is discouraging. Zonguldak has many essential
ingredients for growth; resources, factories, infra-
structure. Yet, self-sustaining growth has not been
achieved.
Plants are built related to resources, but cannot
function through lack of some vital utility. Factories
operate at a loss. State enterprise is a local employment
source for peasants who remain on the farms while working
in modern industry; but Zonguldak's farmers are among the
poorest in the country; their income derived from mine
employment has not led to improved agricultural practices,
and the very system of part-time workers retards production
at the mines. Private enterprise finds some source of
attraction, but has production and marketing processes so
primitive that it survives only by paying subsistence wages.
Public enterprise, unresponsive to its own critical prob-
lems, is a hostile neighbor. Entrepreneurs are demoralized.
Peasants stay with a stoicism bred of limited expectations.
The governor must rush to Ankara with pleas for the bare
necessities of public works.
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Zonguldak makes important physical contributions of
coal, steel, and other commodities to the Turkish economy--
but at such continued high levels of subsidy that the
province is a drain on rather than a support of that
economy. Without some major changes in conditions, even
these physical contributions may not be easily sustained.
As the main national centers continue to generate
opportunities and rising incomes, the province drops
further behind. Today, some thirty years after the first
efforts to mobilize local activities, Zonguldak is more
a region "mired in the periphery" than one in process of
dynamic growth.
Where does the trouble lie? In Chapter Four we
noted that Turkey has continued to disperse its public
investments widely over the nation and that the once-
tight coordination of public agencies broke down during
the past decade. Can the problems of Zonguldak be traced
to insufficient investment and lack of formal coordination
among public bodies? Certainly these factors bear some
demonstrable burden. They are, however, merely aspects
of a more fundamental failing in the formulation of public
policy and its implementation.
A. Investment
Zonguldak probably did receive more public investment
than most, if not all, other provinces outside the main
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centers. Few provinces could boast such extensive and
diversified industrialization through public effort. Nor
did Turkey have difficulty in obtaining foreign technical
and financial assistance for these enterprises. Zonguldak,
from this standpoint, was a particularly favored region.
True, despite the outlays serious unfilled gaps
existed. Unless additional investments were forthcoming
in transport, agriculture, education, for example,
important elements of the economic base could not function.
The Turkish government had been continually concerned
with distributing highways, factories, social facilities
and other projects throughout the nation. This unwilling-
ness to concentrate investment selectively in only a few
key regions outside the centers undoubtedly undermined
amass
ability of potentially more productive regions to/a stock
of facilities sufficiently complementary to mobilize their
potential. Had government been primarily concerned with
Zonguldak, the missing investments might have been forth-
coming.
But we cannot assign to this factor chief responsi-
bility for failure. For Zonguldak affords many instances
of adequate capital investment combinations and possi-
bilities that still did not work.
The mines are a striking example. The United States
government was prepared to allocate enough foreign exchange
for equipment to increase productivity markedly. Mine
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managers did not, however, attempt to tackle the fundamental
difficult1sof pit-head mechanization and surplus labor.
Nor did they press for transfer of some of this surplus to
readily-exploitable forest resources, whose availability
for pit props would save both foreign exchange and import
delays.
The steel mill at Karabuk underwent a major ex-
pansion program, yet government's pricing policy was such
to encourage management inefficiencies and labor surpluses.
Plant officials knew that "profits" would be forthcoming,
regardless of production weaknesses.
The private entrepreneurs at Karabuk had ready
access to sources of supply and labor and excellent
transport connections to the interior. These did not,
however, provide the entrepreneurs with enough knowledge
about potential markets to sustain profitable operations.
Private canneries at Bartin for local produce might be
considered an excellent investment; but the fact that
local peasants produced corn and wheat instead of carrots
and cherries cannot be attributed entirely to lack of
capital.
Indeed, given the government experience with major
outlays for mechanization and irrigation elsewhere,
similar investments in Zonguldak applied in a similar
fashion might not really increase productivity by very
much. A rail line from Karabuk to Bartin might bring slag
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to the cement plant. But, how could one be certain of
enough utilization of Bartin port to provide back-haul
for cars carrying the low-value slag?
Some aspects of Zonguldak's problems can be traced
to insufficient capital; but the manner in which capital
is utilized and buttressed by policy and operating de-
cisions appears to be a far more significant issue.
B. Coordination
Coordination failures are also symptomatic of
Zonguldak's difficulties. Had Sumer Bank timed the Filyos
brick plant expansion to coincide with development programs
at Karabuik and Erelli, the large quantities of refractory
materials needed by the steel plants might have been
available within the region. Were the transport agencies
involved in decisions to build the Bartin and Erelli
plants, a different location pattern might have been de-
termined; and these two activities, both related to re-
gional resources and national needs, might not be crippled.
Yet even if by some magic formula activities and
budgcts of Turkey's existing development agencies had been
brought together, analyzed, and timed in concert as they
applied to Zonguldak, it is still difficult to believe that
the region would be in significantly better condition.
Filyos might still suffer from lack of quality con-
trol. Refractory bricks might be available for the steel
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plants, but if they could not bear the high heats, the
steel-making process would flounder. Private entrepreneurs
in Karabak and Bartin would still face hostility of the
state enterprises and find no more success in stimulating
new markets. The fatalism and fears of the peasantry that
seem to block any beginnings of diversified agriculture,
despite nearby urban markets and canneries hungry for
produce, would remain unchanged.
Even if some central decision-maker tried to co-
ordinate investment budgets, the long and tortuous
channels from regional to central authorities would still
be the mode of decision-making itself. Local and
provincial authorities, from both the government and the
industries, would still be unable to make policy on most
administrative as well as investment matters. Remote
officials in Ankara would continue in control, divorced
from first-hand contact with the province and its problems.
Indeed, another layer of approvals at the center might make
the already cumbersome bureaucratic machinery even more
complex. Coordination of existing public development
agencies could amount to superimposing bureaucracy upon
bureaucracy with little effective result. It would do
nothing to stimulate local initiative or create local
institutions; to improve the efficiency of enterprise
management; to stimulate some desire for progress among
the peasantry; to improve the quality of Zonguldak's
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education. Without coordination, investments would con-
tinue to be ill-timed or insufficient. Yet coordination
failures were symptoms not root causes of the problem.
C. Lack of a Regional Policy
The Turkish government was willing to spread public
investment throughout the nation, but had no regional
development policy and no concept of what regional growth
might contribute to the national economy. Zonguldak was
not made the object of a coherent, comprehensive program
to exploit its natural and human resources in a profitable
manner. Nor, for that matter, was any other area where
public investments were placed outside the main centers.
This investigation has rested on the assumption
that a nation's economic and social development is
strengthened as new growth regions materialize. Turkish
policy makers, in both the Democratic and Republican period,
lacked such an understanding of the spatial context in
which national development occurs.
Ankara, the one successful effort to bend all
energies in creating a growth region, was undertaken pri-
marily for its political rather than economic value. In
later years, when foreign financial and technical aid pro-
vided the flexibility for government to carry out broad-
scale development programs, the economic and social signi-
ficance of what had occurred at Ankara was somehow lost.
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Zonguldak held an opportunity to bring latent re-
sources into the productive cycle. It, too, might have
been attacked with the same concerted approach that
characterized creation of the capital many years before.
It was not so treated. Productivity and a rise in levels
of living were not automatically forthcoming, and the
region declined relative to the centers despite expendi-
tures that were made. In this context, no amount of
capital investment or formal coordination among public
agencies could reverse the trend.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RELEVANCE OF THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE
The question now turns on what lessons the Turkish
experience might afford for other nations concerned with
the spread of economic and social development from tradi-
tional centers. Can insights be derived from this period
of almost 40 years of public decentralization activity
which might have wider application?
Case studies present a constant source of danger to
the researcher bent on establishing general principles.
It is all too easy to become lost in concrete, particular
experiences of a specific society with little relevance
in other contexts. Generalizations from such situations
are unwise; and Turkey no doubt presents pitfalls in certain
aspects of its development history. We must proceed with
caution.
Nevertheless, some attempt at a distillation of
principles from the foregoing chapters is essential. For
our subject cannot be left on a plane of abstract theory.
At the outset, this study established its concern with how
a nation can spread sustained growth and change beyond
i
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initial points of concentration. Our search is for prin-
ciples around which practical programs of action can be
organized. Without some detailed testing of various
approaches in historical circumstances, any thinking about
techniques for creating growth regions may have limited
operational value. Turkey is perhaps the only developing
country to try a number of approaches over many years and
possess enough records for at least a tentative evaluation.
Moreover, Turkey is far from unique in those of its
national characteristics that bear on the problem of de-
centralized growth. It began as a primitive nation with a
small elite and an illiterate peasant majority. Turkey
in 1923 had two traditional centers of development and a
hinterland with largely-unexploited natural resources. A
brilliant, charismatic leader brought it to nationhood.
After a period of authoritarian rule, the country made a
transition to a multi-party, democratic system. A popu-
lation explosion occurred, sending farm migrants to the
cities. American and other foreign aid has been applied
to the development effort. The distribution of power in
Turkey is typical of a unitary state, with strong central
government and weak local responsibility. Capital expendi-
tures and projects are allocated according to individual
sectors of the economy and infra-structure. These are all
aspects of the Turkish experience which both are relevant
to the potential for decentralized growth and have parallels
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in many other modernizing nations. They do allow for
evaluations of wider, though perhaps not universal,
applicability.
I. First Principles Affirmed
One of the fundamental lessons to be derived from
Turkey is the necessity of a coherent regional policy on
the part of government as the basis for any efforts to
develop outlying areas. A national economy exists in
space. Its dynamic processes originate in one or two key
urban centers. Only as thes3 processes spread to other
regions which in turn begin to evidence characteristics
of sustained growth, does a national economy become
integrated and a populace become fully involved in social
change.
Governments may want to exploit hinterland resources
or to reduce inequities between bountiful centers and a
poverty-stricken periphery. So long as these remain the
only objectives of a decentralization policy, mixed perhaps
with political considerations, no successful attempt at
creating growth regions can be expected. Individual re-
sources might well become utilized. Temporary redress,
through employment or dole, might be achieved for some
backward areas. But the complex of characteristics and ad-
vantages signalizing an area whose productivity and income
levels are continually rising will not materialize
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automatically from limited action stemming from such
limited goals. The centers will continue to monopolize
the modernization process. Hinterland resources will flow
to the centers, with little in return to the region of
origin. Over time, the economic and cultural gap will
widen. Indeed, as we have seen in Zonguldak, the very
resource development itself may become a drain on the
economy, rather than a profitable supplement. Growth re-
gions can materialize only when government is prepared to
mount a comprehensive attack on the problems of backward-
ness and imbue a region with the kind and quality of ac-
tivities that characterize development at the national
centers.
As to how this process may be effected, the Turkish
experience reaffirms validity of two principles proposed
in Chapter One as necessary prerequisites for a decen-
tralization program; i.e., (1) that decentralization
efforts should be made on a selective, concentrated basis
in peripheral regions of high growth potential and (2)
that the commitment to decentralize involves a corollary
commitment to guide the selected regions continually through
the growth process. We have seen that a dispersion policy
might be able to gain short-run political objectives, but
is unsuited to stimulation of long-term, dynamic growth.
We have also seen that a potentially-productive area can
remain in the periphery, despite a complement of modern
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economic activity, when not made the object of a constant
effort to sense out changes in the region's circumstances
leading to application of new and complementary programs.
Selective concentration and continuous attention are
fundamental prerequisites of a commitment to create new
growth regions outside the national centers.
Yet Turkey illustrates that the task is perhaps
even more formidable than our initial chapter may have
indicated. It is simple to suggest selective concentration
and continuity as principles, but without a favorable
institutional context through which they can be applied,
little development of outlying growth regions can be
expected. The practical experience of Turkey also pro-
vides insights as to the nature of such a favorable in-
stitutional context.
II. The Institutional Context for Effective Decentralization
These insights can be grasped by isolating the
structural characteristics common to the successes, rather
than the failures, described in the preceding chapters.
For in addition to creation of Ankara, Turkey did inaugurate
several programs that were largely successful in achieving
their objectives. Each of these, except Ankara, dealt with
a limited sector of activity rather than with the compre-
hensive task necessary for regional development. Yet each
involved careful programming, large expenditures of funds
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for physical facilities and operations, and the introduction
of modern institutions and techniques. Each represented a
major departure from past practices. They included such
efforts as the Sumer Bank industrial program of the 1930's,
the network of People's Houses, the Industrial Development
Bank, and the highway and waterworks programs of the 1950-60
decade.
Each of these operations was effective in pursuing
its own limited goals and, with the efforts at Ankara
under Ataturk, shared certain basic structural characteris-
tics. Had Turkey organized programs to create growth re-
gions from resource areas with a similar set of underpinnings,
the prospects for her present development pattern might be
more encouraging.
The four most striking similarities between the
successful programs are discussed below. These would be
important components in the structure of regional develop-
ment activity within a developing nation whose "national
circumstances" paralleled those of Turkey. They are:
1. Support and personal involvement of the
highest national political leaders.
2. A directing organization with status quasi-
independent of the administrative bureaucracy.
3. Concentration of planning and implementation
responsibilities within the same organization.
4. Leadership and staffing by an elite group of
modernizers.
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1. Support and personal involvement of the highest
national political leaders.
A government based on diffusion of decision-making
and budgetary powers can initiate significant development
programs at different levels of the hierarchy. Thus, in
the United States, federal, state, and local bodies each
hold important powers, responsibilities and revenue-
raising authority. Development projects* can be conceived
and conducted effectively at each level. The relevant
decision-makers have immediate access to programs imple-
mented under their jurisdiction and can direct the course
of the work.
Within a unitary state, however, decision-making
and financing are concentrated at the national governmental
center, not in the provinces and the towns.** Provincial
and local autonomy are strictly limited and controlled.
When this unitary state is also an underdeveloped one, with
a small complement of skilled and responsible administrators,
actual authority over what may be accomplished in economic
(as well as political) development rests with few hands.
*Despite increasing dependence of state and local on
federal authorities.
**In developing nations organized on a federal system,
such as Brazil, these relationships may not necessarily
apply. Since Turkey has been our main subject of
study, this evaluation may be pertinent only to unitary
states, though certain substantive parallels may also
exist in other systems.
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The president or other chief national figure is the
most powerful of these. Projects which have complete
personal support from the chief leader and his close asso-
ciates stand the greatest chance of accomplishment---
regardless of what people or institutions at lower levels
want or undertake. If the top men are dedicated to develop-
ment and social change, they can best mobilize the bu-
reaucracy and other layers of society who may resist the
new. By identifying a particular project with their own
personal image and by consolidating the necessary powers
for the task, top leaders have available the only body of
strength sufficient to force through major transformations.
Thus, in Turkey, Ataturk conceived the idea of
Ankara as capital and for a 15-year period lent to its
development his personal attention and energies. The idea
of an industrial nation, utilizing domestic resources, also
stemmed from Ataturk and his close advisors. Their personal
commitment produced the first Sumer Bank programs after
private enterprise proved unable to perform the job. The
highway construction activity of 1950-60, which left a
road system unmatched in the Middle East, caught the imagi-
nation of Menderes and Bayar. By their individual efforts
and intervention, the program was pressed through at a
higher priority than all other development measures.
Commitment from the top leaders also aids in en-
dowing a region with that "special" status necessary to its
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effective competition with the center for modernizing
people and activities. Risk-conscious private entrepreneurs
will not invest in an outlying area where they are unsure of
government's complete sincerity and support. Such assur-
ances and guarantees of continued public effort can have an
impact only if they come from the top.
Creation of a growth region from a backward area is
a demanding task. It is difficult to conceive of how the
effort, if left only to lower levels of government, can
muster sufficient momentum to get past the first round of
facilities installation...no less move on to other, more
complex stages.
2. A directing organization with status quasi-
independent of the administrative bureaucracy.
Turkey inherited its system of public administration
from the Ottoman Empire. In this sense Turkey was not
unlike many newly-independent nations who have retained
the formal organization established under colonial powers.
The system was geared to control and routine admin-
istration rather than to innovation and development.
Ataturk, conscious of the need to unify his country,
broadened the control powers and expanded the bureaucracy
both at the center and in the field. The bureaucracy was
staffed with men trained to carry out orders and administer
rules laid down from the top. Imagination and innovation,
critical to the development process, were circumscribed.
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The men themselves became increasingly prone to fatalism
and indecision. The few exceptions, such as the governor
of Zonguldak, received minimal reinforcement from others
in the administrative apparatus. Programs geared to de-
velopment begun within this framework, such as post-war
highway construction, could not proceed because of the many
and rigid forms of approval required for each small budget
request. When an administrative system is based on re-
sistance to innovation and change, effective attempts to
innovate or change must to some degree take place outside
the system.*
Most of the successful public development programs
conducted in Turkey were placed outside the web of
ministerial bureaucracy and national-provincial adminis-
tration. Each had a large measure of control over its
own budget and required minimal approvals of projects
or expenditures from outside the program itself. They
were established as special arms of the top decision-makers
and drew responsibility and authority from this relation-
ship.
The People's House activity was the job, not of the
ministries, but of the more flexible Republican Party.
*Railway construction during the 1930's by the
Ministry of Public works may have been a notable
exception; but the reader must remember that this
was then the main job of the tlinistry, and one to
which the President assigned top priority.
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Sumer Bank, with a separate allocation of capital and
operating funds, was especially created to handle indus-
trialization during the 1930's. Laws were passed to free
both the Highway and Waterworks Departments from rigid
supervision by the Ministries of Public Works and Finance
during the post-war period. The construction and cultural
development of Ankara was handled by the top decision-
makers themselves, without dependence on cumbersome chains
of command.
Functional autonomy for the highway and waterworks
agencies during the 1950's enabled them to achieve their
missions. The problem was not that Karayollari or DSI
were ineffective. Rather, they were perhaps too effective.
For the other related sectors of activity (i.e. industry,
agriculture, education) did not undergo complementary ex-
pansion* necessary to make full use of what Karayollari
and DSI built. Indeed, the highway program, for example,
unchecked by requirements of complementarity, proceeded
to build fine roads often in places unrelated to the po-
tential of the economy.
But complementary development of related sectors
within regions of a larger nation is the essence of our
concern in this study. Such mutually-supporting activity
has, in the national centers, led to sustained and dynamic
*in space as well as time.
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growth. Efforts to duplicate basic characteristics of
national centers in areas important for their resources
may induce generation of sustained growth in these areas
as well. The quasi-independent status of successful sector
activities has direct relevance to the type of organization
necessary for the more complex regional job.
A single organization should receive primary re-
sponsibility for this job within a given area. Although
it would require close supervision by the chief national
decision-makers who back the program, at the same time
it must have a reasonable amount of autonomy, unfettered
by constraints and needs for approval from petty bu-
reaucracy. The task involves programming and coordinating
the activities of several sectors over long periods of
time. An organization charged with such an assignment
needs to allocate funds and take operating decisions with
some degree of speed and flexibility. Failing such autonomy
and subject to the constraints of an existing administrative
system, a program can become hopelessly mired in the red
tape endemic to what Hanson calls "a caste of routine-
bound bureaucrats, determined, through the influence they
exert over the holders of political power, to defend a
status quo largely created by themselves for their own
benefit. "(1)
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3. Concentration of planning and implementation
responsibility within the same organization.
In addition to their positions outside the bu-
reaucracy, the effective Turkish development organizations
all were responsible for both design and execution of
their projects. They were forced, in a sense, to see
programs through from genesis to completion and were not
required to rely on other organizations for significant
phases of their work. There was relatively little oppor-
tunity for breakdowns in communication, misunderstandings
of responsibility, or inter-agency jealousies to take
effect.
Karayollari decided on what highways to build. It
drew the plans, managed construction, and maintained the
system. The Industrial Development Bank worked with
entrepreneurs in defining factory projects, providing
technical assistance to program preparation and initial
operations. It made the financing and kept a continuing
record of performance. At Ankara, it was Ataturk and his
close associates who conceived the idea of a diversified
national capital and cultural center and directly super-
vised planning and implementation in the early years.
A regional authority would be concerned with "total"
resource exploitation; industrial, agricultural, infra-
structure, as well as human development. Under this re-
sponsibility would fall preparation of the plans and
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action programs for the various sectors. It might also
prepare a capital expenditure budget for the region as a
whole, to be approved by the national decision-makers as
the basis for fund allocation.
We do not propose that a regional authority be
charged with every phase of design, development, and ad-
ministration of each sector activity within its area of
control. This would prove too cumbersome a burden and,
indeed, might serve to detract from creation of other re-
sponsible institutions. An authority's own administrative
and operational activities might extend to exploitation of
the major resources. For example, in Zonguldak, such
an authority might have direct jurisdiction over the coal
and steel industries and their attendant urban facilities
and infra-structure. In other sectors its activities might
be primarily planning and commissioning projects conducted
by other agencies under its general supervision.
McKinley has noted the success of.such a practice
under the TVA:
"By its policy of delegating many of its tasks
to state and local institutions on a contractual
and compensatory basis, and by its proffer of
free technical assistance, it has constituted a
major source of the yeast that during the past
fifteen years has greatly raised the level of
state and local services in that part of the
South and strengthened rather than impaired the
vigor of established local institutions."(2)
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In backward areas of a developing nation, however,
a regional authority must also be charged with creating
and stimulating local institutions that are unlikely to
arise without special efforts. It would also have some
responsibility to offer special incentives to private
entrepreneurs, both of a financial and technical assistance
nature.
Generally the kind of authority we suggest has been
associated with river-valley development (i.e. TVA and the
Damodar project in India). In Venezuela, a powerful re-
gional agency has been established for Guayana with direct
jurisdiction over steel industry development combined with
both planning and supervisory powers for other sectors
within the region.(3)
The precise responsibilities would again depend on
the particular nation and region involved. We cannot
spell out here a set of functions that might be applicable
to every case. Rather, our intent is to demonstrate that
the principle of concern with total resource exploitation
and the power to commission and supervise specific projects
in related sectors are crucial to the effectiveness of a
regional organization.
Thus, when Turkey in the 1950's established a re-
gional planning agency as an obscure department of a junior
ministry, powerless to enact any of the recommendations it
might conceive, this was no basis for effective development.
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The chain of administrative bureaucracy was unbroken. The
uncoordinated sector agencies retained jurisdiction over
location and timing of projects, and the regional planning
group had no authority to impose a different approach.
Even if persuasion and rational exposition caused
some agencies to dovetail projects in a specific area,
this would be a poor substitute for the essential full-
scale attack on a region's structural problems. Persuasion
without power can accomplish little in a developing nation.
Actual manipulation of authority and funds is a critical
component of a program directed at producing change. This
would appear to hold as true for a regional development
program as for construction of a national highway network.
4. Leadership and staffing by an elite group
of modernizers.
Caliber of leadership and personnel is the deciding
factor in any activity's success, regardless of how
smoothly-tailored its organizational framework is to the
task at hand. Without good people, there are no good
projects and no regional development.
Here again is precedent in the successful phases of
Turkey's experience. The Highway Department's director
from 1950-60 was an excellent, western-trained engineer.
Under him was a body of men specially educated in their
jobs by the Bureau of Public Roads technical assistance
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team. Many were sent to the United States for graduate work
in engineering and administration. Special pay scales were
established for them, outside the ordinary ratings of the
Turkish civil service, and made commensurate with training
and responsibility. Karayollari had the funds, power, and
freedom to do its job of highway building. But it also had
the skilled technical staff, conscious of their membership
in an elite fraternity, to plan and execute the work.
Ankara's remarkable emergence as a national and
cultural capital to replace the image of Istanbul was not
merely a function of the power consolidated at the spot.
Ataturk had around him the best, most highly-educated and
dedicated of the Turkish intellectuals and administrators.
These were concentrated at the capital to plan and execute
the work of governmental and cultural change. Ankara be-
came a modern community, because it had a "community of
modernizers" directing its growth.
An effective regional development authority would be
staffed with just such a modernizing elite; specialists in
ecucation, industry, various types of agriculture, engineers,
men skilled in commercial affairs, community development
people and the like. These would be selected for their
promise and given special training at home or by the foreign
assistance agencies abroad.
Of equal importance to the level of skill, are the
attitudes and orientation of the personnel. There should
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be no room for the stultified bureaucrat, antagonistic to
change, or the arrogant intellectual, with an ingrown
feeling of superiority to the people he is supposed to help.
Hanson suggests that personnel in such an innovating public
enterprise should possess
"... all the qualities, such as administrative
flair, energy, readiness to accept responsibility,
and knowledge of the principles of business
organization that private enterprise requires of
its top level people, plus something else.....
the unselfish devotion to the 'public good'
characteristic of the best civil servants, a
sense of the importance of public relations,
and ability to establish fruitful and cooperative
relationships...."(4)
Difficult though it may be to amass a working group
with such varied skills and interests and the proper
orientation for development work, the task is far from
impossible. For this is precisely what the U.S. foreign
aid program has done--on a sector basis--in Turkey and
in many other countries throughout the world. We have
trained skilled corps of highway engineers, public health
specialists, agronomists, educators, etc., and have placed
them in highly-effective specialized agencies with limited
objectives. Although they perform their individual tasks
with great credit, much of their ability to reinforce each
other is lost because of this functional separation.
Regional development offers an opportunity to bring
together these modernizers as well as the activities they
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represent. It provides a concrete, physical framework
for establishing a common basis of interest among people
of diverse skills, each of whom has a part to play in the
growth process.*
The principles suggested above have parallels in
experience of several Turkish sectoral efforts and in the
manner by which early development of Ankara was conducted.
A fifth component of the "institutional context" can be
seen thus far only in the early Ankara experience,
Turkey's single successful and comprehensive attempt to
create a growth area. That is location of a significant
amount of decision-making within the region itself.
*Lucien Pye suggests that establishment of such groups
of skilled professionals dedicated to common goals
is among the few means by which developing nations
can conquer the psychological barriers to growth.
"By this approach national development would be
furthered as ever-increasing numbers of competent
people meet in their daily lives the exacting but
also psychologically reassuring standards of pro-
fessional performance basic to the modern world.
The emergence and interaction of such people as they
fulfill their professional activities would provide
transitional societies with communities of modern-
izers who would constitute islands of stability in
an otherwise erratically changing world. The es-
tablishment of such communities would provide the
necessa-y environment in which the more ambitious
transitional people could escape the paralyzing
effects of feeling isolated and alone in the
search for new identities."(5)
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5. Location of decision-making within the region.
It is no more feasible to produce sustained growth
in Zonguldak from Ankara than to prepare a Cape Kennedy
missile for launching from Washington. Decentralization
of development requires some decentralization of authority
in order to achieve its objectives.
Distance problems are critical enough when each
investment decision must be referred back to the center
through channels in the expectation that men remote from
activities and events will be able to make considered
judgments within a reasonable period of time. In Chapter
Four we noted how a potentially valuable project in
Mersin had in three years'time drawn neither a positive
nor a negative response from the Industrial Development
Bank, headquartered 400 miles away.
But investment is only one of the factors involved
in regional development. The human resources of an area
must be activated as well as material facilities. People
in the region must learn both the skills and the attitudes
necessary for modernization. Changes in social, as well
as economic structure, are required; and the Turkish
experience has indicated that the latter is difficult to
accomplish without the former. The "atmosphere" conducive
to growth and change must somehow be transmitted to the
region chosen for transformation.
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This transformation cannot possibly come about if
manipulated by men and institutions lacking intimate
familiarity with the regional conditions. How can con-
tinuous attention to the details of change, to bottlenecks,
and to activation of new opportunities be managed from a
distance?
Then, too, a successful growth region will also
attract capital and modernizers from other parts of the
nation, including the main centers. If agency directors
charged with the program and their top professional
staffs leave the actual work to lesser minions in the
field, a psychological element critical to success would
be eliminated. In countries where government plays
significant roles in regulation and control of business
operations, few entrepreneurs will establish firms where
direct access to decision-makers is impossible. Few
doctors, lawyers, teachers, administrators, etc., would
be tempted to leave the centers for an outlying area so
"unimportant" that the government authorities who direct
its destiny are not on the scene.
Those who produced a viable national capital and
cultural center in Turkey lived there, witnessed every
step of the process and were party to the success or
failure of each venture. Ankara in its early years held
the leaders of Turkish government, art, education, etc.
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These men were vitally concerned with making the area
palatable to their own tastes and desires. They and
their activities provided a lead for others to follow.
Ataturk wanted to create similar dynamic centers
elsewhere in the interior. Instead of ceding important
discretionary powers to men in the field, however, the
government kept tight centralized control over their
activities. In the early years of the Republic, the
great enthusiasm and dedication of Ataturk's followers
were able to compensate for some of the difficulties
caused by constant referral of decisions to the capital.
As time passed, however, the system grew more cumbersome,
and fatalistic resignation settled in among officials
and managers in the provinces.
The question of delegation of authority presents
difficult problems to a state whose entire administrative
system is based on centralized control. It could repre-
sent a diminution of central government's power, and thus
be considered dangerous by the national leaders. By the
same token, however, complete concentration of development
authority within a region outside the center might also
prove unworkable. Close contact with the top national
leaders and with the country-wide sector agencies is also
critical. At the very least, liaison activity with these
decision-makers and agencies must be conducted at the
capital.
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The form and extent of delegated authority is also
a matter to be decided in context of each nation and its
particular political circumstances. Some such delegation
is essential, however, for regional development cannot be
accomplished without a close identification between re-
sponsible public officials and the area selected for in-
tensive effort. This is perhaps what Hirschman means by
suggesting that each "growth pole" region should have
some "equivalent of sovereignty".(6)
III. Some Pitfalls and the Alternatives
We cannot in good conscience advocate that a nation
establish a number of such development authorities simul-
taneously in several regions. Even one operation, con-
ducted within the proper institutional context, would
present a centralized state with serious difficulties of
organization, staffing and control.
The problem of obtaining enough quality staff for
a single attempt is sufficient in itself to indicate
caution. A bold program can collapse through lack of
proper personnel. Powerful agencies can easily misuse
their powers and budgets if run by incompetents or people
insensitive to the tasks at hand. It would be folly for
a nation to create several strong regional authorities
without the human potential to exercise the responsibilities
required.
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A nation's administrative system could also become
enormously complex and confused if several multi-sector
regional programs had to be integrated into the national
budgeting process. Moreover, simultaneous efforts to
make several areas outside the centers attractive for
investors and modernizers might well weaken the ability
of any single region to attract its necessary complement
of growth activities.
One of the strongest arguments against trying a
number of regional projects at once is the problem posed
to national stability. Such bodies would exercise signi-
ficant powers within the regions where they operate.
Even while stimulating local initiative, they could lead
to dangerous sectionalism which might weaken efforts at
national integration in countries still unaccustomed to
unity and political responsibility. McKinley, in
cautioning against too-extensive repetition of agencies
such as the TVA suggests:
"We may thus get a new and uncontrollable
sectionalism, pulling us apart at a time when
from the standpoint of both our domestic and
international interests we must be guided in
public administration by national policies
and goals."(7)
Regional development activities should be carefully
supervised from the center to guarantee their reflection
of national political and economic policies. Super-
vision would be difficult to maintain if many efforts
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are launched.
A viable alternative to several, however, is not
abandonment of the "authority" concept. We have seen, via
the Turkish experience, how complete reliance on the dispersed,
sectoral approach is an ineffective means of extending de-
velopment. When most of the forces favoring growth are con-
centrated at national centers, a massive thrust of invest-
ment and energies is necessary to start the process anywhere
else. Given the social and political structure prevailing
in nations such as Turkey, only a strong public authority
with comprehensive responsibilities can initiate and manage
the job.
One, or at the most two, comprehensive area de-
velopment agencies may be all that a nation can absorb
at the same time. A suitable complement of people might
be found for a single program. Disruptions to the fabric
of overall governmental administration might be relatively
slight. Indeed, if a nation has not tried such an ap-
proach before, a single project may be the limit of its
budgetary and organizational capacities.
Turkey did make a single successful attempt at
Ankara forty years ago. A growth area was created from
the Anatolian wilderness. Ankara might well have been the
only such comprehensive project which -Turkey could have
absorbed in its early national history. Unfortunately,
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the Ankara experience, motivated as it was mainly by
political considerations, did not act as a basis for later
attempts in areas important for their natural resources
when economic development became the primary national
goal.
Many generations have been required for national
centers to build up enough strength for their role as
development areas. Extension of the growth process from
these centers is a formidable, time-consuming, though
not impossible task. It must be approached with care
and a willingness to experiment in one or two pilot
regions. Once these new growth areas are functioning
successfully, government can proceed with other sections
of the nation, learning and adapting its techniques from
experience of the initial pilot efforts. At this point
in time, when the base of national economic and social
institutions has broadened beyond its initial points of
concentration, still further modifications in a govern-
ment's approach to the spatial distribution of develop-
ment may be in order.
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APPENDIX A
GflOSS GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS UTILIZED IN TEXT
Regional divisions employed in analyzing the spread
of urbanization refer to large and distinct geographic
(rather than economic) zones within Turkey. They have been
delineated by the Turkish geographer, Prof. Hamit Sadi Selen,
and were used by Keles in his basic study of city develop-
ment, Turkiyede Sehirlegrme Hareketleri. Boundary lines
have been drawn to coincide with provincial divisions.
The reader may notice some of the physiographic distinc-
tions between the regions by referring to Map II-1
(topography), Map 11-2 (rainfall) and Map 111-6 (crop
patterns). Brief summaries of zonal characteristics and
lists of the provinces included in each region (1960)
appear below.
Marmara consists of Thrace and those Anatolian provinces
west of the plateau itself that border on the Sea of
Marmara. Soil is fertile, the climate is temperate, and
a large variety of crops--from wheat to fruits--are grown.
Provinces: Istanbul, Edirne, Kirklareli, Tekirdag,
Qanakkale, Balikesir, Bursa, Bilecik,
Kocaeli, Sakarya.
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Aegean comprises the provinces south of Marmara between
the Aegean Sea and the plateau. The river valleys and
alluvial plains, well watered and with a longer growing
season than the Marmara,make it one of the two most
fertile areas of the country. Much of Turkey's tobacco,
cotton, and grapes are grown here.
Provinces: Izmir, Manisa, Aydin, Denizli, Mugla.
Central Anatolia is the steppe stretching from the Pontic
Range on the north to the Taurus on the south, from the
Aegean hills on the west to the eastern Anatolian mountains.
High and dry, this area is the heart of Turkey's wheat
production.
Provinces: Ankara, Eskigehir, Konya, Nevgehir,
Nigde, Kayseri, Yozgat, Sivas,
Kuthaya, Afyon, Burdur, Isparta,
Kirsehir.
Mediterranean is the second of the two extremely fertile
regions and has a warmer, more tropical climate than the
Aegean. It extends from the slopes of the Taurus mountains
south to the Antalyan and Cilician plains and the sea.
Its eastern boundary coincides with the north-south
Anti-Taurus mountain chain. Cotton, citrus, and pistachios
are the main crops.
Provinces: Antalya, Igel, Adana, Hatay,
Gaziantep, Maras.
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Black Sea is the littoral from Marmara to the Russian
border and the Pontic mountains that separate it from the
Plateau. This is the most heavily-forested area of Turkey,
with the highest rainfalls and densest rural population.
Corn, tobacco, tea, and hazelnuts are the main crops.
Provinces: qankiri, C,orum, Amasya, Tokat,
Bolu, Kastamonu, Zonguldak, Sinop,
Samsun, Ordu, Rize, Trabzon,
Gumushane, Coruh, Artvin.
A/
Eastern Anatolia is the heavily-mountainous region that
extends from the Plateau to the Russian and Irani borders.
The typical cereals are grown, and the area contains most
of domestic cattle production. Its rivers provide the
bulk of Turkey's untapped hydroelectric power potential.
Provinces: Erzurum, Kars, Erzincan, Agri, Van,
Bitlis, Mus, Bingol, Tunceli, Elazig,
Malatya.
Southeast Anatolia consists of the south slopes of the
Anti-Taurus mountain chain that bends in a crescent from
Hatay to the Iraqi border and encloses high steppe country
similar to the Central Plateau. It is the most sparsely
settled region, with some cereal production and grazing.
It is a major exploration area for oil.
Provinces: Diyarbakir, Siirt, Hakkari, Mardin,
Urfa, Adiyaman.
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